

New War in Southeast Asia:

**Documents on Democratic
Kampuchea and the Current
Struggle for National Independence**

Produced by the Kampuchea Support Committee

P.O. Box 1285, Peter Stuyvesant Station, New York, New York 10009

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Kampuchea Support Committee

Statement of Unity and Purpose:

The recent invasion and military occupation of Democratic Kampuchea by Vietnam came as a shock to people throughout the world. Government leaders, newspapers, and a wide range of international organizations have spoken out in defense of Democratic Kampuchea, and there have been protest demonstrations around the world.

Here in the United States prominent intellectuals, journalists, Cambodian residents, people active in the anti-war movement, and many others have voiced their opposition to Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. Shortly after the invasion over 1,000 people demonstrated in several American cities in defense of Cambodia's independence, and activities are underway throughout the country to provide information about the present situation.

The Kampuchea Support Committee seeks to serve as a national focal point for this concern.

Our organization has a single point of unity: *We support the current struggle of the Kampuchean people, led by the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, to restore their country's national independence. In this light we oppose Vietnam's invasion and armed occupation of Cambodia.*

Based on this point of unity, we see the following as the main tasks of our organization:

1) to provide information to the American people about the continuing resistance in Cambodia; about the background of the Vietnamese invasion and the role of the Soviet Union within it; about the culture and life of the Kampuchean people; and about their

efforts to rebuild and develop their country prior to the invasion.

2) to explore all efforts to lend concrete support to the Kampuchean struggle; in terms of material aid, organization of speaking tours to present Cambodian points of view to various audiences in the United States, and campaigns to protect Kampuchea's national art treasures from depredation and pillage.

3) to oppose any attempt to recognize the Vietnamese-sponsored "Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation," which owes its existence to the Vietnamese invasion.

4) to bring public pressure to bear on the United Nations, the U.S. government, and other organizations to deny all forms of aid or support for Vietnam so long as it remains in occupation of Kampuchea.

We will seek to accomplish these tasks through educational programs; dissemination of literature, films and other informative material; and through open forums for broad public discussion of the international, regional and domestic issues relating to Democratic Kampuchea.

We welcome endorsements and support from individuals and organizations including community and student groups, professional organizations, religious groups and trade unions. Anyone who agrees with the principles and tasks of this national support organization for Kampuchea is encouraged to join.

The Kampuchea Support Committee has books, articles, videotapes, films and speakers available for educational outreach. Contact the address below for more information:


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
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Democratic Kampuchea



Southeast Asia

Introduction

Kampuchea (Cambodia) went through a period of intense war against U.S. aggression, interference and domination, culminating in complete victory on April 17, 1975. Since then a worker-peasant state—Democratic Kampuchea—was founded. The people of Kampuchea concentrated most of their efforts in rebuilding the economy and constructing a new society where the basic needs of the people—food, clothing, housing, health, education and employment—were guaranteed.

In a period of three and a half years, a great amount of economic and social growth was achieved. With these advances, Democratic Kampuchea began to open its doors for international visitors, many of whom reported favorably on the Kampuchean revolution. International opinion welcomed such increased contacts with the Kampuchean people. But these developments came to an end with the Vietnamese invasion of Democratic Kampuchea on December 25, 1978. The Kampuchean people are now in various base areas in the countryside waging a war of resistance and for national independence.

The developments in Kampuchea have been covered in a slanderous and distorted way, particularly by the U.S., Soviet and Vietnamese media. The following collection of documents has been put together by the Kampuchea Support Committee to provide an understanding through direct and indirect reports from different points of view about the present situation in Democratic Kampuchea and its impact on Southeast Asia.

Reprinted from the Congressional Record- Senate
January 18, 1979

Report by Richard Dudman on his December 1978 visit to Kampuchea

[From the St. Louis Dispatch, Jan. 15, 1979]

CAMBODIA

(By Richard Dudman)

INTRODUCTION

(The Pol Pot regime came to power in Cambodia by guerrilla warfare, and even while it ruled, it apparently stood ready to return to the jungle if necessary. And today, just 3½ years after hostilities ended, guerrilla warfare is indeed a reality once again.

(A new regime under Heng Samrin was installed by force in Phnom Penh by the Vietnamese Jan. 8 while Pol Pot reportedly was taking to the jungle to organize resistance to the invaders. It is another chapter in the centuries-old history of attempts by one or another of the peoples of Southeast Asia to rule all of that area.

(Richard Dudman, chief Washington correspondent of the Post-Dispatch, and two other Westerners were permitted by the now-dislodged rulers to visit their country last month in an eleventh-hour effort to present to the world an image of strength and stability, and to drum up support against the Vietnamese assault. Dudman's observations are detailed in this special section. Because of the turn of events, this report may stand as a unique compilation by a Western correspondent of what appears to be but a fleeting moment in the long and tormented history of the peoples of this land.

(The end of this chapter, however, may not be written for many years. Pol Pot's first actions after he gained power in 1975 were designed to reverse history, to turn a land that had been moving into the 20th century into an all-encompassing agrarian, commu-

nal society. He drove his people from the cities and towns to farm and build in labor brigades with primitive tools. His regime has been accused of killing hundreds of thousands of Cambodians in the process.

(But these actions left Cambodia with few if any worthwhile military targets for a modern aggressor. The exodus left no major inhabited cities, few factories and not much of a standing army in the Western sense.

(Cambodia's experiment in Cambodian-style Communism may have played out its brief role on the world's stage—unless the guerrilla-type insurgency Pol Pot apparently has returned to can again be victorious, this time against the Vietnamese.)

THE ENEMY: VIETNAM

Cambodia's leaders were preparing for the worst last month while trying to present to the world an image of strength and stability.

They spoke freely of the possibility of having to abandon large parts of the country, perhaps including Phnom Penh, in the face of a full-scale Vietnamese offensive.

If that happened, they told me they would revert to the guerrilla warfare that they had fought from 1970 until their victory of April 17, 1975.

I found Phnom Penh and the other cities still almost totally deserted—little changed in the nearly four years since they were quickly and forcibly evacuated in the days immediately after the 1975 "liberation." Their capture in a Vietnamese thrust would have little but symbolic meaning.

Although Phnom Penh remained the nominal seat of government, the shadowy ministries of the Pol Pot regime seemed to

have no fixed headquarters. The old administrative buildings of the former government stood empty.

The officials told us frankly that fear of being targeted for execution was the reason leaders of the regime generally avoided being photographed or interviewed—or even allowed themselves to be identified by name.

For the same reason, the government refused to publish a table of organization or give the names of more than a few of its top officials.

The leaders said fear of assassination also led them to keep secret the details of a shakeup of senior government positions after an attempted coup last May. They preferred to keep their enemies guessing as to who held what job.

Officials spent much of their time moving about the country, explaining that they had to circulate to maintain close touch with the people. But security considerations doubtless figured in this policy as well—in the manner of a hunted man who sleeps in a different bed every night.

In short, the Communist government of the country it renamed Democratic Kampuchea never really rose above the shadowy underground insurgency that it had been before it overthrew the previous, United States-supported government.

Pol Pot and his associates were so secretive that they did not even call their movement the Cambodian Communist party until September 1977, although it had been founded in 1960 or earlier. Until 1977, they called it only "Angka," Cambodian for "The Organization."

Now that the worst has happened, in the

"lightning war, lightning victory" that they said the Vietnamese had been plotting all along the prospects are that the ancient country will once more be torn by protracted guerrilla warfare.

The two-week visit by myself and Elizabeth Becker of the Washington Post in December, the first by any non-Communists since the 1975 victory, may also prove to have been the last look by any outsider at Cambodia under the harsh and xenophobic rule of the Pol Pot regime. The major Vietnamese invasion that has now swept across the country began two days after our departure.

The notebooks, photographs, and recollections of Miss Becker and myself, plus whatever his colleagues may make of the meticulous notes of Malcolm Caldwell, the British scholar who accompanied us and was killed in a terrorist attack on our last night in Phnom Penh, may be the only first-hand non-Communist record of a short-lived regime unique in world history.

While the visit amounted to a conducted tour, with strict limits on conversations with ordinary Cambodians and no opportunity to speak with any but a few top government officials, there was plenty of opportunity for observation in tours of 11 of the 19 provinces.

The trip produced fresh insights into the mounting Cambodian-Vietnamese hostilities, the evacuation of the cities, allegations of genocide, and the nature of daily life in a land almost totally closed off from outside inspection.

In a show of confidence, our escorts took us to the border town of Krek, which many Western intelligence estimates were considering to be in Vietnamese hands. Visits to two specific areas where Radio Hanoi had told of current uprisings found peaceful harvest scenes and a small pottery plant operating normally.

In one such spot, the Cambodians had set out a picnic table with chrome and plastic chairs and served orange soda pop and cookies under the trees to demonstrate that they controlled the area. This was at the ancient temple of Banteay Srei, near the historic ruins of Angkor Wat.

But this picture did not come through as sharply as the Cambodians had hoped.

They ignored or refused our requests to visit other border points where Vietnam was widely believed to hold substantial parts of Cambodia. And while we traveled through the country, every venture among the people was treated as a small military operation.

On the road, our Mercedes-Benz sedan was sandwiched between at least two other cars. When we walked through a factory, or a rice paddy, or temple ruins, two khaki-clad guards with pistols under their loose shirts fanned out to protect our flanks.

Officials warned us against wandering off unescorted, even in almost-deserted Phnom Penh. They said there was danger—although unspecified—even though the few persons remaining in the capital presumably had been carefully screened.

When we slipped away several times, believing the warnings to be a mere excuse to keep us from seeing too much, the guards quickly found us and drove us back by automobile to whichever guest house we were occupying at the time.

On one occasion, a guard took Miss Becker by the arm and gently but firmly conducted her home.

Our escorts discouraged visits to private homes on more precise security grounds. They permitted us inside only two occupied houses in the entire two weeks.

When we made an urgent and rather formal request to see more homes and speak with the residents, one of the officials considered the matter for an hour and then replied in sad tones: "You have forced me to tell you something I did not want to tell

you. Our people have been subjected to five years of war and much bombing, and their attitude now reflects that experience. We have to go ahead and explain very carefully that these are Americans who come in friendship. We are responsible for your safety."

This little speech drew a private comment from Caldwell, who was a Marxist and a committed believer in the rightness of revolution but also a skeptical and perceptive critic.

"I wonder if the cadres aren't afraid for their own safety when they go among the people," he said.

Despite the restrictions the Cambodians placed on our activities, we were able to gather significant information about the new Cambodia for the first time since the Communist victory of almost four years ago.

At one of the few unscheduled stops on tours of the country, we ignored the objections of our driver and walked through a banana grove to a peasant home. Four young women willingly lined up in front of the thatched house and smiled as we took their picture.

We saw no sign of the resentment mentioned by the official, there or anywhere else in our travels around the country.

Special safety precautions were taken as we approached the border town of Krek on Dec. 13. Three jeeploads of soldiers armed with a submachine gun and an anti-tank recoilless rifle accompanied our limousine.

We took Route 7 southeast from the provincial capital of Kompong Cham. At Suong, still 25 miles from the border, the word was no further stops until Krek. It would be too dangerous.

State Department officials had suggested that I ask the Cambodians to take me along Route 7 to Mimot and Snuol as a test of intelligence reports, many of them from Vietnamese sources and subject to bias.

They had predicated that the Cambodians would not be able to take me even as far as Krek. As we approached the town, however, the area was peaceful and the Cambodians were clearly in control.

Occasional gunfire in the distance was the only reminder that the border was just five miles away to the east and that the front in the shooting war was less than one-quarter that far.

No guns or Cambodian troops could be seen except those in our party. Farmers were harvesting within a mile of where we stood, at the junction where Route 22 heads south toward Tay Ninh in Vietnam and on to Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon). Workmen were repairing the Krek airport landing strip, damaged when the area was overrun in a Vietnamese offensive a year earlier. The sector commander whose entire name was Pin, a tough 40-year-old man with skin the color of an old penny, pointed south at the fork and said the front was one and one-quarter miles down the road.

How wide was no-man's land? He said there was no distance at all between the two lines: "We are always engaged."

Pin scoffed at the idea of Western analysts that the Vietnamese might be able to take Phnom Penh.

"We have a revolutionary army, and they are noble people with correct leadership," he said. "Even if the Vietnamese use planes and tanks and very sophisticated artillery, with the Soviets backing them, our revolutionary army can wipe them out any time they launch an offensive."

He described the Cambodian strategy by saying that they allowed the Vietnamese to advance some distance, offering only light head-on resistance. Then the Cambodians would bring in their heaviest force and strike the Vietnamese from both sides.

This was the response to the Vietnamese offensive of December 1977, when he said the Cambodians defeated the Vietnamese strategy of "lightning attack, lightning

victory."

Pin said the Vietnamese forces in the sector were far weaker than a year earlier, when they had advanced to a point just east of Suong before the Cambodians drove them back in the "great victory" of Jan. 6.

Vietnamese performance since then suggests that officer Pin either was wrong or else was putting on a brave show. Krek, Suong, Mimot and Snuol, all towns in Pin's military sector, were among the first places reported overrun in the new offensive.

This casts doubt on other things he said. But for what it's worth, he told us malaria and venereal disease, which used to plague his troops, had both been wiped out in recent months. He said Cambodian troops never smoked marijuana, "because it is no good for the spirit of fighting."

Throughout the visit, officials denounced the Vietnamese continually—as did Radio Phnom Penh—as fascists, false Communists, aggressors, "the Cubans of Asia," "country-swallowers," and crocodiles—a "most ungrateful animal, which does not recognize as master the person who feeds it."

The foreign ministry official who toured the country with us took us to a zoo and at one point said, "Come see the Vietnamese prisoners." He led the way to a pit with 60 big crocodiles in it.

At another time, the official said with a straight face that all Vietnamese army officers have three wives—one in Hanoi, another in Saigon, and the third at the front. He complained of a Vietnamese restaurant operator in Paris who had the effrontery to name his place Angkor Wat.

The same official told of a battle in which the Cambodians could not understand why the Vietnamese continued fighting so long, until they advanced and saw the dead enemy soldiers chained to their guns. There was no supporting evidence of this, and Caldwell joined in calling the tale an old chestnut.

At a dinner given by the foreign minister, Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary, at former Prime Minister Lon Nol's old palace, Ieng Sary told us that for our own safety we would not be permitted to go to a "hot battlefield." He listed as "hot" Route 7 near the border beyond Krek, Route 22 in the same area, and route 13, which runs from Snuol to the border.

Nowhere in our travels did we see any sizable body of Cambodian troops or weapons, and the only signs we saw of Chinese assistance in the country were two MIGs flying over Phnom Penh one day and a line of 55 Chinese trucks driving north from Kompong Som, where a Chinese freighter had discharged them.

The weekly Chinese plane between Peking and Phnom Penh, a Boeing 707, was full of Chinese in both directions, however, giving support to estimates that China has 20,000 advisers in Cambodia.

For their own part, Cambodian leaders have said repeatedly that they would abandon the cities if necessary and revert to guerrilla warfare.

WHERE ARE THE RICH?

In the eyes of much of the world, the most important question about Cambodia is whether the now-dislodged Pol Pot regime systematically killed off entire classes of the population as charged by Vietnam and some Cambodian refugees.

A related question: What has happened to the upper- and middle-class city dwellers, who were forced to join in the quick evacuation of Phnom Penh and other cities immediately after the Communist victory of April 17, 1975?

Two weeks of questioning and observation in 11 of the country's 19 provinces led to the conclusion that the Cambodian revolution must be one of the bloodiest of our era.

But repeated interrogation produced no

clear answer to the question of "autogenocide," the term for an alleged methodical execution of much of the entire class of former professionals, tradesmen, civil servants, and soldiers.

It seemed evident throughout this reporter's visit to Cambodia before the recent Vietnamese attack that the new Cambodia's version of Communism had no place in it for anyone who wanted to read, write, or even think independently, or for anyone who wanted to own more than a bare minimum of personal property.

At the same time, the physical condition of life may well have improved for many peasants and former urban workers—possibly for the vast majority of the population, as the regime claimed.

The revolution, an unprecedented leveler, had made conforming a condition of survival.

Cambodia's revolution, surely the most extreme in modern history, evidently had forced former city dwellers to adapt to an austere standard of hard manual labor, no money, no mail system, no telephone service, no books, almost no individual property, no advanced education, little or no religion, and none of the freedoms accepted or at least professed by most of the rest of the world.

Social upheaval had gone well beyond the Chinese precedent at the height of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, when China was in the grip of the faction now denounced as the Gang of Four.

Top officials whom we interviewed acknowledged by clear implication that the revolution had been accompanied by many killings, although they never would give a total figure and certainly gave no confirmation of the estimates of 1 million to 3 million often cited by outsiders.

Thiounn Prasith, the high foreign ministry official who had charge of our visit, disputed the charges of genocide. He asked how the new government could build up the country's agriculture and industry if it killed off all the former soldiers and civil servants when it needed all the manpower it could muster.

Complaining about critics' emphasis on human rights, Prasith said that "some persons pay much attention to the traitors and no attention to the people." He said the Western view seemed to apply the human rights standard to "traitors who killed many people" but to ignore the victims of past killing and repression.

Ieng Sary, the deputy prime minister for foreign affairs, did not bother to deny the charges. He complained angrily, in an interview, that outsiders always wanted to know about the "5 to 20 percent of Cambodians who were well-off before the revolution" and seemed to lack any interest in the great majority who were poor.

He said that some killing could not be avoided after the 1975 "liberation." But he added that, considering the "complicated situation" after the five-year war, the Cambodian Communist party had "solved the problem in a good condition" and had "avoided many more killings."

"Maybe that is not your belief," he went on. "But we are responsible and we grasp the concrete situation in our country. We carry out all our tasks in order to serve the rights of our people, not just the rights of certain groups."

Prime Minister Pol Pot, in his first meeting with non-Communist reporters, avoided the question with these words:

"We consider that 96 percent of the people, both those before liberation and those after liberation, are good.

"Among the other 5 percent who were hesitating, we were able to successfully re-educate and recover more than 4 percent. . . . As for the remaining 1 percent, we do our utmost to re-educate them."

The officials insisted that most former city

dwellers had been integrated into the rural communal cooperatives or industrial work forces or "trade unions," sometimes after a period of adjustment. They said this differed from the Vietnamese system of segregated re-education camps for suspect elements.

But persistent requests to obtain eyewitness accounts of the mass exodus from the cities and the adaptation to life in the new order produced access only to one man and one other family whose members had lived in Phnom Penh before the revolution.

Interviewed through a Communist interpreter, with local Communist cadres listening, they told routine stories of having voluntarily left the capital and made their way to a hospitable reception in their present cooperatives.

One of these persons was a man named Leng Kry, who was presented to us at a co-op at the village of Preuh Meas in Kompong Cham Province. He said he had worked before the war in a furniture shop owned by a man named Truong Duc, behind Phnom Penh's central market. He said he went to work in the Sam Peou Meas restaurant and later in the Sra Mekong liquor store when wartime inflation made life difficult.

Kry, 45, said he left the capital the day after "liberation" because he had heard life was better under the revolutionaries. He added that he had heard that the capital was full of spies and he did not want to be associated with them.

It took him a week, he said, walking or catching a ride in a car or truck, to reach the co-op with his family. They took along his bicycle and his wife's sewing machine, he said.

Kry said that from the start he worked and ate and attended political meetings with the peasants who were already there.

We neglected to ask what had happened to the bicycle and sewing machine. An official said later that Kry probably still had the use of them but they now would be shared with other members of the co-op.

The Phnom Penh family was brought forth at the Le Bo cooperative in Takeo province, south of the capital. Managers of several co-ops had been telling us that half their members had come from Phnom Penh. But when we asked to meet some of them, they always turned out to be away bringing in the rice harvest.

Neth Yan, his wife, Ken, and their two daughters, 15 and 17, who giggled shyly as we questioned their father in a communal dining hall, had left the capital the afternoon it fell. The father said he had been a soldier in an engineering unit under the former government.

Yan said he changed out of his uniform immediately because he was afraid. (A burst of giggles from the daughters at this.) He said he took the family to Takeo Province because it had been his home originally.

It took him two years to learn to work alongside the farmers, plowing the paddies and transplanting rice seedlings, he said, but eventually he became a full-fledged member of the new society and began taking part in the political meetings held three days a month.

He described these as sessions in which members discussed how to build up the country and the standard of living and then adopted some resolutions about working hard to achieve maximum production.

When we pressed for details of the political meetings, his replies grew more formal, as if he had been coached.

Had he been required to engage in self-criticism about his deeds as a soldier? "I had only to learn the spirit of patriotism, to love the country and the people," he said, according to the interpreter. "I did not have to criticize myself."

How did the meeting handle a case where someone had not done his part of the work?

"Nobody is against building up the coun-

try," he said.

Wasn't there ever a single member of the cooperative who was only 90 percent perfect?

"No, because what they do is for others," he said.

At a third cooperative, named Kandal Sung, in Kandal Province, again the "responsible members" of the managing committee said about half the co-op members had come from Phnom Penh. They said the evacuees had been immediately mixed with the earlier residents, sharing their houses at first until private houses could be built for the newcomers.

What were some of the names of those who came from Phnom Penh? There was some consultation with our government escort, and the local cadres finally came up with one name: Meach. The officials began looking at their watches.

We persisted: How well did a rich person adapt to a new life of manual labor?

"Even the rich can learn" to build a dam or work on an irrigation project," said one of the committee members.

Could they name one rich man who had come to the co-op and learned to work on a dam or help cultivate a field?

More consultation, and they came up with the name of Sam Bath, a merchant formerly of Phnom Penh. Unfortunately, he was out working and not available for an interview.

So much for our efforts to penetrate the big question in the minds of most Westerners.

A NATION AT WORK

The new Communist Cambodia became one huge work camp, but its people clearly were not being worked to death and starved to death as foreign critics often charged.

On the bright side, moreover, I found the country in the midst of one of the world's great housing programs. What will become of that program now is open to question.

Prior to the Vietnamese invasion, simple but attractive individual wooden houses in several styles were going up by the thousands all over the country to replace the old thatched huts that used to become infested with insects, mice, and snakes and rot away in a few seasons.

I had lived in some of those old-style peasant huts while I was a captive of Communist guerrillas for a few weeks in 1970. That experience made it possible to contrast the old life in the countryside with life under the new order.

What I found in two weeks of touring Pol Pot's Cambodia—under strict government supervision but with good opportunity for observation—was a regimented life of hard work for most Cambodians, leavened, however, by much improved housing, regular issuance of clothing, and an assurance of apparently adequate food.

I did not find the grim picture painted by the thousands of refugees who couldn't take the new order and fled to Thailand or Vietnam. In this lull between wars, those who remain appeared to be reasonably relaxed at the height of the busy harvest season. They sometimes leaned on their hoes like farm workers everywhere. And they often stared and then smiled and waved at the rare sight of Western faces.

Workers usually appeared to be operating under their own direction. There was no sign of government cadres giving orders or armed guards enforcing the working hours, although individuals seemed to know what was expected.

The daily and monthly schedule was standard throughout the thousands of hamlets and villages scattered about the country. Whistles blew at 5 a.m. to signal time to get up. By 6 or 6:30 a.m., clusters of farm workers gathered on the road to await an open truck to take them to the field to cultivate or harvest rice or other crops. Others walked

in long lines along the road and out along the narrow dikes into the rice fields.

At 11 a.m., the midday break began, and the farm workers headed for lunch at one of the huge new communal dining halls. Afterward, many could be seen relaxing or taking naps in hammocks slung under the houses on stilts. Work resumed at 1 p.m.

There could be no doubt that quitting time was 5 p.m. Wherever we were in the country, men, women, and children began filing out of the paddies at that hour to bathe in an irrigation canal, wash clothes, or tend household vegetable plots and then head for the dining hall once more.

Officials said the harvest sometimes required night work, too, when the moon was full. But we saw no work in the fields after dark.

At night, on drives through the countryside, we did see children playing and men and women, changed out of their dusty work clothing, strolling along the road or clustered around small fires in the yards.

Black shirts remained the standard uniform, with black pants for men and black, ankle-length skirts for women. An occasional bright red pair of pants or a bright green or polka dot blouse could be seen. An added touch of color was the red-brimmed palm leaf hat worn by many farm laborers on or off the job.

In addition to the enforcement of communal eating, another drastic change imposed by the new order was abolition of the weekly work cycle. In its place was a new 10-day schedule, with days off on the 10th, 20th, and 30th of every month.

For two hours or so each holiday morning, the workers could be seen attending political meetings in mess halls or under the trees. These were said to consist of criticism and self-criticism, followed by discussions of how to improve production.

Another pattern of labor, observed only at a distance, consisted of "mobile brigades," in which groups of laborers lived at remote work sites for weeks at a time. Our escorts did not permit a close look, but the brigades' temporary shacks of thatch and sheet metal could be seen where crews were rebuilding a bombed bridge, making road repairs, or harvesting.

Child labor, appearing to begin at the age of 7 or 8, was used systematically, for light farm work such as carrying firewood and tending water buffalo, as well as for factory work. No matter how young a child looked, when asked his age he always replied 13 or 14 if the government interpreter could not supply that answer first.

Authorities left it unclear exactly what education children received under the Pol Pot regime. They apparently were taught to read and write, but the only classrooms we were allowed to visit were in a technical high school in Phnom Penh. No books were in evidence. The children copied their lessons from the blackboard into notebooks.

On one occasion, we were driven at sunset for a perfunctory look at a small irrigation pumping station. The true purpose of the trip became clear when a line of about 100 boys, perhaps 8 to 12 years old, the leaders carrying red Cambodian flags, came marching down the road.

"They are coming home from school," our escort said.

He said they had gone out at 7 a.m. and were returning at 5 p.m. Under questioning, he said that they had been working in the fields as well as studying in the classroom, in a combination of learning and practical experience. He said he did not know how the time was divided.

On another day, in an unplanned encounter, we saw a similar group of children walking along a road, each carrying a heavy branch of firewood. The official guide gave this explanation of the scene:

"Cambodia needs its own technicians. That is why we combine practical experience with study, so that when they grow up they can apply theory to the concrete situation in Democratic Kampuchea (the Pol Pot regime's name for the country).

"If we sent them abroad to study, they would become accustomed to a high living standard and would expect the same standard when they returned."

One of Cambodia's biggest achievements in these three-plus years was its housing program, a sudden mass upgrading of the individual family homes from the standard that has existed for centuries.

At a typical development, carpenters were erecting 18 new wooden houses with tile roofs, set on stilts in the traditional style to keep them above the annual floods. Similar scenes were observed all over the country.

Almost everything needed for the new homes came from the immediate vicinity. Concrete footings to keep the wooden stilts out of the dirt and away from wood-boring insects had been cast just down the road. The roof tiles had been fired at a neighboring kiln.

Workmen were sawing lumber by hand from logs hauled from a nearby teak forest. All the necessary tools—saw blades, hatchets, and hammers—had been made at a local blacksmith shop, mostly from pieces of old U.S. military equipment.

In accordance with Cambodia's policy of self-reliance, everything was supplied on the spot except for two items—steel screws imported from China to install the hinges for the louvered shutters and the whetstones used to sharpen the tools.

The new houses are twice the size of some of the small huts they replace. The new ones, like the old, are one-room affairs, but they sometimes now have a small porch or balcony. Families traditionally use two wooden beds, with slats and fiber mats instead of springs and mattresses. One bed is for the parents and the other is for the children, who may number five or six. Cambodia needs more people and has no birth-control program.

Families sometimes hang a cloth between the beds to provide some privacy.

In some places, the frames of new houses could be seen going up adjoining the old grass shacks. When the new house was finished the family could move right in and demolish the old one.

Although small and simple, the new houses represent a big upward step for the peasants, if a downward step for anyone used to a city house with a bathroom, kitchen, and maybe air conditioning.

The new houses probably meant better living, too, for the hundreds of thousands of country people who were driven into the cities by the five-year war and who had suffered wartime crowding and poverty.

FEEDING THE PEOPLE

Aside from the mounting war with Vietnam, the New Cambodia's first priority had been feeding itself. Officials said it had succeeded and the country was even resuming rice exports. The current Vietnamese invasion at the height of the rice harvest, however, throws all projections into doubt.

Until the new offensive, the prospects appeared bright. We saw many new dams and canals, parts of a crash irrigation program that is bringing new areas under cultivation and permitting two or three rice harvests a year in some areas.

Foreign analysts have been skeptical of government claims of a modest rice surplus in each of the past two years. They have said any exports would be at the cost of hunger or starvation at home.

Refugees, who have accused the Pol Pot government of methodically killing off hun-

dreds of thousands of former city dwellers, said the food allowance for those who remained was far below minimum requirements.

I saw no evidence of starvation, however. My observation of hundreds of ordinary Cambodians suggested that they got an adequate diet, if a plain one.

Government officials refused access to any production or trade specialists for detailed questioning about production claims. They likewise refused to permit me to visit any of the hospitals or many small clinics they say are operating or to interview any public health authority.

Even the most complete figures on rice production, health and nutrition, moreover, would tell nothing about the human cost of increasing food production. This cost includes the forced emergency evacuation of Phnom Penh and other cities, the strict regimentation of those who survived, and the concentration on agricultural production at the expense of freedom to learn, read, travel, and practice religion.

But on the simple question of economic viability, this rich agricultural country once more appeared to be flourishing and potentially prosperous—at least until the Vietnamese invaders moved in.

The conclusion that ordinary Cambodians were adequately fed rested on more than the rather clumsy propaganda efforts of the government. The few persons I could ask about their rice rations replied in Prime Minister Pol Pot's phrase and said they "ate their fill."

We often asked to drop in unexpectedly at a mess hall at mealtime, but the only communal meals we saw had been carefully staged.

At lunchtime at a pharmaceutical plant in Phnom Penh, the workers were sitting at a lavish meal, including huge bowls of rice and four side dishes, plus dessert. They were stiffly picking at the rice, obviously waiting for another tour group of "foreign friends." Side tables were loaded with bunches of bananas and bottles of orange soda pop.

"How often do they get the orange drink?" I asked.

"On holidays," said a government escort, referring to the national days off on the 10th, 20th, and 30th of each month.

But it was Dec. 22, and I asked why they were getting it that day.

"We had some left over from the 20th," was the reply.

Disregarding such stage setting, I could tell the state of nutrition by the common sight of playful small children, sometimes running about naked in dooryards in the hot tropical sunshine, with none of the listlessness or protruding bellies that bespeak starvation or malnutrition.

At a shipyard along the Mekong river at Kompong Cham, three of the builders, men of 54, 60, and 62, looked strong and competent. One of them said he always ate his fill and then smiled as I felt his biceps. His arm was big and muscular.

Hundreds of adults observed closely throughout our travels had the alertness, vitality, and spontaneity that suggested generally good health.

I saw many pregnant and nursing women, who appeared to be in good health. The sight seemed to refute reports by some refugees that life is so austere that most women have become barren and mothers' milk has gone dry.

Rice is the heart of the Cambodian diet, and the country historically has been one of the great rice suppliers of Asia. With the war against the old Lon Nol regime, however, peasants were driven off the land and into the cities. Production dropped, and regular shipments of rice from the United States were needed to feed the swollen city population during the five-year war that ended

with Communist victory.

U.S. specialists have acknowledged that the Cambodian claim of reviving rice production to the point of resuming exports would, if true, be a spectacular achievement.

Authorities at the seaport of Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) said Cambodia exported 15,000 tons of rice in 1977, much of it to the Malagasy Republic. They said extensive flooding had cut back 1978 exports. But they said 6,000 tons had gone to Malagasy and 3,000 tons to Singapore nonetheless.

In telling the food story, Cambodian officials put heavy emphasis on dams and irrigation. Water and its mastery, they said, are the keys to solving their food problem. They took us to several new dams, including three large concrete structures they said had been built on a crash basis by thousands of workers using only hand labor.

Dams and related canals have opened many thousands of acres to new rice cultivation and permitted two or even three crops a year in regions where alternate drought and flooding had limited harvests to one a year.

One of the largest of the new dams, the Paryuth, or "Struggle," dam, about 15 miles south of Battambang in western Cambodia, had been an obvious failure, but the Cambodians showed it off proudly anyway. Record floods last September washed out one entire side of a concrete downstream flood wall, and two of the 13 huge buttresses that supported the dam itself had collapsed. The whole structure, which officials said irrigated 41,000 acres, came close to giving way.

The Cambodians attributed the failure to inexperience and boasted that their reaction demonstrated their capacity to learn from mistakes.

Officials said that when the fall floods came, operators of the dam found that a series of lift rods were not strong enough to raise the concrete floodgates and ease the strain on the structure.

An official said general flood damage was just as bad in Cambodia as it was in Laos and Vietnam, which have been seeking emergency foreign aid.

"But we don't cry for help," he said. "We mobilize our people and solve the problem."

We were taken to a rice experiment station in Battambang Province, where laboratory workers tested soil and studied insect pests, using Chinese microscopes and other equipment.

Outside, in experimental plots, workers tended new hybrid strains, tested them for yield, taste, and resistance to disease, sun, and wind, and recorded the time from planting to harvest. Some plots demonstrated the effect of various fertilizers and insecticides.

Before the invasion, seeds were sent out to other parts of the country. Instead of having an extension service, the laboratory rotated workers through its operation and returned them to their home cooperatives to take charge of converting to new methods.

As usual on my trip through Cambodia, the manager of the station insisted that no one there had special training but that all had learned from the wisdom of the peasants. But when I suggested that the chemical laboratory must have been set up by someone with formal training in chemistry, he acknowledged that to be true.

Strangely, the station had no reporting system on the use of the seed it distributed. When the manager was asked what yields were being achieved in practice, he could recall but a single report dealing with a planting in one province.

Workers at the station demonstrated a simple but ingenious manual rice-planting device being produced for distribution around the country. It planted six rows at a time. When the wooden frame was dragged through a paddy, wooden paddles turned tiny cups that deposited five seeds at a time

from six tin hoppers.

My tour of the vast ricelands, often stretching to the horizon, and the dikes and canals dividing the bright green flooded paddies of young seedlings and the golden fields ready for harvest, gave meaning to the slogan heard constantly in Cambodia: "With water we have rice; with rice we have everything."

NEW JOBS, OLD METHODS

Agriculture was not everything in the new Cambodia, despite the assertions of some of the refugees and many outside analysts. I saw a wide range of industrial growth—concentrated more in tiny and primitive cottage industries such as brick making, silk spinning, and local blacksmith shops, but including also a fairly sophisticated rubber factory near Kompong Cham.

The foreign ministry official who accompanied us around the country, Thiounn Prasith, said: "The principle of our party is to take agriculture as fundamental and to have capital from agriculture in order to build industry."

He said the plan called for modernizing agriculture within 10 to 15 years and building industry within 15 to 20 years.

What happens now remains to be seen, of course.

Prasith outlined a progressive industrial growth plan, with light industries, such as textile, glass and plywood manufacturing already in operation. Later will come such heavy industry as steel manufacturing, with emphasis on agricultural machinery, he said.

He spoke of the country's urgent need for labor-saving machinery to permit rapid growth; of farm production with limited manpower.

"We have only about 8 million people," he said. "In Kampuchea (Cambodia) there is no family planning. We need more and more people. We would like to have 20 million people in 10 years."

Cambodia placed a high priority on transportation in repairing the damage of the five-year war. It had to start almost from scratch. Most rail lines were wrecked, including the track between the capital and the seaport, recently repaired. Ships had been sunk in rivers. Roads and bridges had been smashed. Oil and gasoline imports had abruptly halted. And there were scarcely any trucks or buses that would run.

Along the main highways, bullock carts far outnumbered the motor vehicles.

Intercity telephone service had not yet been restored at the time of our visit, although makeshift telegraph lines have been strung between provincial capitals and Phnom Penh.

Officials said Phnom Penh had cable links with Singapore and Bangkok and through Peking with other cities of the world.

Partly to test the overseas communication capability, I filed a brief story to St. Louis from Phnom Penh reporting arrival there and telling of a government disclosure that the wartime Viet Cong had its secret headquarters west of the Mekong River rather than just inside Cambodian territory as U.S. intelligence believed at the time. It took the cablegram 2½ days to reach the Post-Dispatch.

One of the most impressive industrial projects was a new railway link between Phnom Penh and the seaport of Kompong Som. It was designed to cross the Elephant Mountains in the south and parallel Route 4 to the capital.

Reports that the new line was being built were picked up recently by one of the better informed Western embassies in Peking, with the added information that the Chinese were helping with the job.

Other listening posts in Peking had not heard of the project and doubted its existence. However, I saw long rows of stacked cross-ties beside Route 4 and long stretches

of the new right-of-way above the often-flooded rice paddies, showing that construction was, indeed, well along. Work apparently had been suspended until the rice harvest was completed.

Only one grader could be seen. Presumably most of the earth moving was by hand, the same way the new Cambodia built its dams.

Whether the Chinese had anything to do with the new project was impossible to determine. Neither Cambodian nor Chinese officials talked readily about the reported aid program.

Another sign of Chinese assistance was a long line of 55 medium-sized trucks on the road from Kompong Som to Kampot. A Cambodian official said they had arrived by ship from China three or four months earlier. He said they had been serviced and now were being driven north to be portioned out two or three to each cooperative.

Two tankers, one Chinese and the other from Singapore, were discharging gasoline and oil into a row of tank cars on a siding at the seaport. The only refinery in Cambodia was severely damaged by American bombs in retaliation for the capture of the *USS General B. H. Ladd* by the Cambodians in May 1975. The refinery has not been rebuilt.

One of the most advanced industrial plants we visited was the rubber factory at Chamcar Andong plantation near Kompong Cham. Machines formed latex that had dripped from the rubber trees into a white, continuous belt. Women with shears cut the belt into short sections and hung them on a rack that was then rolled into a big oven.

Other women, crouched on a platform, sorted the cooked rubber into grades and used power presses to pack it into bundles for shipment.

We also were taken to a relatively modern pharmaceutical plant in Phnom Penh that made both conventional medicines and native remedies, from such materials as dried lizards (cough suppressant), pale yellow wood chips (malaria), deer horn (vitamins), and water buffalo horn (rheumatism).

In a more primitive pharmaceutical plant at Kompong Cham, boys and girls who said they were 13 and 14 but looked no older than 10 were punching out tin pill boxes and plastic bottle caps one at a time on hand-operated machines, using old tin cans and shredded plastic as raw material.

Traditional river boats were being built of a teak-like wood at a yard along the Mekong River in Kompong Cham. They were 115-foot cargo ships powered by 250-horsepower diesel engines from China.

Toward the primitive end of the scale was a technical high school in Phnom Penh, where little boys and girls who looked as young as 10 were learning to tear down old automobile starters and generators and rewind the coils.

In a machine shop at the same school, children were shaping and welding sheet metal to turn out hundreds of DDT tanks for use in spraying to protect the rice crop and eradicate malaria.

A Phnom Penh textile mill using 100 Chinese looms that had been installed before the war looked fairly modern and efficient as it turned out bolts of cloth—black for workers' clothing, green poplin for army uniforms, and red for Cambodian flags, so the plant manager said.

But in the next room, a tiny girl with big dark eyes was sitting on the floor producing thread by turning a spinning wheel with her foot.

A scene on Monivong Boulevard in front of our guest house in Phnom Penh was a reminder of the make-do nature of Cambodia's fledgling industry.

An old Dodge truck had broken down. Two men worked on it for a half hour, then tried unsuccessfully to start it by pulling a rope wound around a wheel on the front of the

crankshaft, the way a power mower or our-board motor is started.

When that didn't work, they tried pushing, enlisting a half dozen other men. That failed, too.

Finally, another old truck came along, and the men tried hooking it to the broken-down truck with a piece of electrical wire. The wire broke twice, but at last it held, the towed truck gained speed, and the engine started with a gust of blue exhaust.

Our companion Malcolm Caldwell watched the backward methods with a mixture of puzzlement and admiration.

Viewing one such scene, he paraphrased Lincoln Steffens' remark after visiting the Soviet Union in 1919 and said, "I have seen the past and it works."

GOVERNING IN SECRET

Throughout our visit, we tried to penetrate the secrecy and learn how the Kafkaesque economic and governmental system worked.

The regime justified its conspiratorial ways in a 94-page "Black Paper" of "facts and evidences of the acts of aggression and annexation of Vietnam against Kampuchea."

It charged that Vietnam's Politburo had sent agents across the border into Svay Rieng and Kompong Cham provinces, where they conducted secret meetings to prepare to overthrow the Cambodian government and set up a puppet regime under Vietnamese control.

The book listed six of the alleged conspirators, some of them with aliases, including a former counselor at the Vietnamese embassy in Phnom Penh.

So secret was the government structure that members of a factory management-committee in Phnom Penh pretended not to remember the name of the minister of commerce. At other times, plant or warehouse managers gave this official's name as Van Rit, although Western sources had understood that a person named Chhour Doeun held this post.

An army regimental commander at the border town of Krek would not give the name of the army chief of staff. There was no reply when we asked Cambodian officials the name of the first vice chairman of the State Presidium, a position provided for in the published constitution.

One revolutionary leader who had been considered dead by some Cambodia-watchers appeared for a boat trip up the Mekong River and a drive to Angkor Wat and other points with our group.

Ok Sakum sometimes spelled Sokhun, was one of the intellectuals, engineers, and economists who often have been said to have been killed in internal purges. He said he worked in the ministry of foreign affairs. He mentioned Hu Nim, minister of information and Hou Yuon, minister of the interior, communal reforms and troops, as other persons who were still active in the government although believed in the West to be missing or dead. Their fate now is uncertain.

Obtaining a few names was difficult enough. Getting to meet them was nearly impossible. Despite repeated requests, I was not permitted to meet any high officials except Prime Minister Pol Pot, probably the top government leader, and Ieng Sary, deputy prime minister for foreign affairs.

I had asked to meet most of the known officials, a total of about 10, including two French-educated sisters who are married to Pol Pot and Ieng Sary and held important positions in their own right. Both are understood to speak English.

I asked in vain to meet the former head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who managed the country's tightrope neutrality policy until he was ousted in a coup in 1970 and then joined the Communists' popular front as nominal leader of a provisional revolutionary government.

Officials said he had been refusing all requests by visiting delegations who wanted to see him. Besides, he probably was traveling around the country, they said.

When the Vietnamese swept across the country, Sihanouk took refuge in Peking and later went to the United Nations in New York to represent the Cambodians in opposition to the Vietnamese.

My request for a table of organization of both the government and the Cambodian Communist Party was made on the first day of the visit. Foreign specialists were not sure of the makeup or order of rank of members of the Cambodian Central Committee or Politburo.

I understood officials to have promised to provide both lists. When they were not forthcoming, I asked Ieng Sary for them.

"If we were the United States, France or Britain, we could publish this kind of information," he said. "But in Kampuchea during the last three years there have been many moves, many developments."

"Frankly, we do not want to publish the information because we do not want the Vietnamese to hunt down our leaders. We publish names only if very necessary."

His comments may have been prophetic, given subsequent developments. Ieng Sary himself asked for political asylum in Communist China.

Ieng Sary noted that the Cambodian Communist Party was formed 18 years ago but remained secret until two years ago.

Although the leadership was shadowy, officials did provide some information about the country's political organization.

The basic economic and social unit was the cooperative, a communal organization that held the land, tools, vehicles, and most other property. It organized the work in the fields, kilns, foundries, and other workshops that provide for most of the cooperative's needs.

Families lived in individual houses except for mobile work brigades and young, unmarried men and women, who lived in segregated dormitories. Meals were always served communally, often in big dining halls at tables for seven or eight persons.

Officials said the individual cooperatives, which may have included 100,000 persons or more, operated under the direction of provincial and regional committees.

Each committee included a chairman and individuals who were in charge of production, agriculture, industry, social affairs, health, and trade. But the decisions were taken collectively.

They were vague about how members of a committee were selected.

A similar committee operated at the national level. At each level, decisions were made by committee; even the army was said to be run by a committee. The committees always had an odd number of members, to avoid an even split, officials said.

At the top of the hierarchy was Prime Minister Pol Pot, who also was secretary general of the Cambodian Communist Party.

Officials made much of the fact that Pol Pot was perhaps the only national leader in the world whose picture was not seen frequently in public places. Not one picture of the prime minister was seen except in a propaganda film, where he was seen repeatedly, with a big smile, working alongside the field hands.

The reason given was that Cambodia had no need for a cult of personality. But his official biography, printed in English, seemed intended to build his image. It said he "has a large spirit of union, shows revolutionary optimism, is deeply and firmly confident in the people, the masses, especially in the poor peasants, (and) likes to live and work in the calm."

He will have need of all those qualities if he has, indeed, gone underground to lead a new guerrilla war against the Vietnamese invaders.

And it should help not to have copies of his picture spread all over the country.

A NIGHT OF TERROR

Gunshots shattered the stillness of the almost deserted city of Phnom Penh. The time was 12:55 a.m. on Dec. 23. It was the start of a three-hour ordeal for Elizabeth Becker and me, the first two American journalists to visit Cambodia since the Communist takeover nearly four years ago.

The third Westerner in the party, Malcolm Caldwell, 47, an economist who specialized in Southeast Asia, did not make it through this ordeal. He was shot to death. The three of us were targets of a terrorist attack, an apparent effort to embarrass the government of Cambodia.

Caldwell, Miss Becker, a reporter of the Washington Post, and I had completed our two-week visit. We were preparing to leave the country, which Miss Becker and I would write about for our newspapers. We were scheduled to fly to Peking the next afternoon and then on to the United States.

The terrorists struck when we were sleeping in a government guest house in Phnom Penh.

Miss Becker was the first to see one of the intruders. Awakened by the first shots, she stepped out of her first-floor room to find herself face to face with a young Cambodian armed with a pistol and submachine gun and wearing an ammunition harness.

He pointed the pistol at her. She screamed, "No, don't!" ran into her room, slammed the door, and hid in the bathroom. Crouched in the tub, she heard sandaled footsteps climbing the stairs to the second floor.

In my second-floor bedroom, I awoke at the first shots, turned on my light, and checked the time. From my window, I could see shadowy figures running back and forth outside the garden wall in the dim glow of the streetlights.

Thinking that the guards had detected a prowler, I stepped into the hall for a better look. A young man with the same weapons later described by Miss Becker was just going out the double doors at the back of the building into a servants' area.

He seemed to motion for me to get out of the way. His gesture made me think he was one of the household guards, and it occurred to me that he had been quick to arm himself in an emergency.

The young man went out of sight, and I stepped through the screen door onto a front balcony for a better view of what was happening in the street. I saw several figures, apparently guards, at least one of them carrying a pistol.

Returning to the hallway, I stepped across to Caldwell's room and knocked. He came to the door. The light was on and he was fully dressed. We consulted briefly and decided we should stay in our rooms with the lights out.

As I began to head for my room, the intruder reappeared at the rear doors, pointed his pistol at me from a distance of about 20 feet and fired. The bullet must have come close.

I ran into my room and slammed the door, standing at one side, where I was shielded by the masonry wall. Two more shots ripped through the wooden door.

After a moment, there were three or four more shots. That must have been when Caldwell and the gunman were killed, but I was not to know the outcome until nearly three hours later.

I flipped out the lights, ran around the bed, and lay on the floor, trying to get under the bed. I could hear someone moving in the house and thought at any moment someone would come in to finish me off. I had no idea whether my two colleagues were alive or dead.

When the house seemed to go silent after a few minutes, I got to my knees and peered out the window. I could see more figures flitting back and forth outside the wall. I tip-

toed across the room and turned off the noisy air conditioner, then silently placed a chair by the window and sat watching.

As the minutes passed, I decided that the government must have been overthrown in a coup. Officials had told us of an attempted coup last May. Why else didn't guards come in to check out the grounds and the house? If that had happened, I knew no authority that could protect us and get us out of the country.

Silently, I opened the zipper of my bag and took out a Tiger Milk bar to munch in hopes the nourishment would give me energy and a dose of courage.

It was a time of tension and fear but also one of regret and decision. I was frightened. Eight years earlier, when Communist guerrillas had captured me not many miles from where I sat, I had found it almost a lark, asking how lucky a reporter could be to find himself, safe for the moment, with a unique opportunity to view the other side of the Vietnam war.

This time, it just seemed foolhardy and dangerous, one more test of luck that I didn't need. I hated myself for putting my wife and daughters through a siege of anxiety once more. I decided never to undertake any more hazardous assignments for the Post-Dispatch. And I decided if I got out of this one alive I would take two weeks off for a Caribbean vacation with my wife.

An hour and a half went by. Suddenly there was a fresh burst of activity in the street. I heard the click of weapons being cocked. Additional figures appeared from both directions and six or eight men filed rapidly through the front gate, into the yard and into the house. I could hear them downstairs and see their shadows against the garden wall.

There was a crash of glass shattering, then a sound of broken glass moving across cement, as if someone was slowly sweeping or dragging something.

A few minutes later, I heard steps on the stairs, then a rap at my door. I saw nothing to do but open it. I recognized the three men who stood there as a security man from the foreign ministry and two guards. They clapped me on the shoulder as if to say they were glad to find me all right.

They seemed to be trying to reassure me. I understood them to be trying to say in sign language that Miss Becker and Caldwell also were all right. After checking the bathroom and closets, they gestured that I should remain in the room until someone rapped again.

There was another wait of an hour and a quarter. I could hear movement in the house, with an occasional rap on another door, as if they were checking out the entire building.

I passed part of the time by making notes of everything I had seen and heard to that point. Then I thought of trying to finish a novel I had been reading but dropped that idea when I picked up the

book and was reminded of the title. It was John D. MacDonald's "One Monday We Killed Them All."

At 3:45 a.m., one of the government's Mercedes-Benz limousines pulled in front of the house. A figure got out and walked quickly into the house and up the stairs. There was another rap at my door.

It was Thiounn Prasith, the senior foreign ministry official who was in charge of our visit. The usually dapper man looked stricken and bone-tired. He took me by the hand and led me to a couple of chairs.

"Miss Becker is all right, but Mr. Caldwell is dead," he said. "I think you must come and see."

Stepping into the hall, I could see the dead gunman sprawled across the threshold of the open door of Caldwell's bedroom, the weapons beside him.

Walking a few steps farther, I could see into the lighted room. Caldwell lay on his back on the floor beside the bed, his eyes staring, his face ashen. Blood from wounds of the thighs and body soaked his clothing.

The official asked Miss Becker also to view the bodies.

I told Prasith, "I think I must take a picture." He said his people would photograph the scene and asked us to pack our things so that we could be moved to another house.

We drove a few doors to another government house, where we had discussed our program with officials on the first day of our visit. At Prasith's request, we recorded and typed statements of what we had seen and heard.

Prasith told us he had been informed that the gunman had shot himself. (I learned later that Cambodian authorities informed the British government that Cambodian government forces had killed the gunman.)

He said another intruder had been captured and a third had escaped. He said there had been three casualties on the government side: two servants wounded, apparently when the first terrorist shot his way in through the back door, and one soldier killed.

Prasith described the shooting as "a political act to discredit us in the world," and to "show that we cannot protect our friends." He said the terrorists knew that the visit of the first three Westerners to Cambodia was a significant one and that Cambodia's reputation in the world would be greatly damaged if they were assassinated. Only days later that Cambodian regime would be driven into hiding by a Vietnamese assault.

Cambodian Foreign Minister Ieng Sary, in a brief ceremony before we drove to the airport with Caldwell's body to catch the weekly Chinese plane to Peking, gave the same explanation. He called Caldwell a friend of Democratic Kampuchea, the official name of the country, and said the scholar had been working to improve

relations between Cambodia and the rest of the world.

Ieng Sary said sadly that the visit had been intended to present to the world the "concrete situation" in his country but that the terrorist incident had "cast a very dark cloud" on this effort.

The Cambodian government later attributed the terrorist act to Vietnam, its enemy in a current war in which there was a temporary lull at the time of our visit.

Questions remained:

Were the terrorists trying to kill all three of us, or was Caldwell the main target? If it was only Caldwell, that would explain why the gunman did not fire at Miss Becker and why he did not follow me into my room. Caldwell, moreover, was known as a friend of Cambodia, while we were recognized as disinterested journalists.

How could the terrorists have gained access to the guest house at 22 Monivong Boulevard in the heart of Phnom Penh, part of a government complex that should have been one of the most heavily guarded spots in the country? Prasith said there had been three guards on duty at all times, armed with pistols worn under their shirts.

Why the delay of 90 minutes before government forces entered the grounds to secure the house and check on our welfare? Why the additional 75 minutes before we were permitted to leave our rooms and learn what had happened? Prasith showed annoyance at the way the incident had been handled. He said he had not been notified until 2:30 a.m.

Was it in any sense an inside job? Planning the attack and entering the complex would have been difficult without help from someone trusted by the government, especially for an armed man in unusual dress. Miss Becker noted that he wore a black T-shirt and a baseball cap like those worn by American soldiers.

Was there any scene-setting before Miss Becker and I saw the bodies? She reported afterward that she had heard the sound of something heavy being dragged down the stairs and thought she had seen a stain where someone had tried to wipe up blood on the first floor.

Finally, was there any possibility that the government could have arranged the attack? A dispatch from Hanoi later reported that Caldwell had recently turned against Cambodia and conjectured that the government may have wanted to prevent what they feared would be an adverse report.

This seems out of the question. The Cambodian government had everything to lose from the incident. If for some unaccountable reason the authorities had wanted us killed, they could have contrived an accident or ambush to kill us all. And from lengthy conversations with Caldwell up to a few hours of his death, I know that he remained fully sympathetic to the Cambodian revolution.

From

Seven Days

May 19, 1978

Kampuchea, Three Years Old

For the First Time, a Glimpse of How Life Has Been Transformed by the Communist-led Revolutionaries of What Was Formerly Cambodia

In late March and early April, a group of Yugoslav journalists toured Kampuchea, formerly Cambodia, and then Vietnam. Their report on Kampuchea is the first by professional journalists since the Communist forces took Phnom Penh three years ago. Some of their films have appeared on CBS news but these excerpts from the Belgrade newspaper Politika are the first written account to appear in the American press.

It should be kept in mind that although Yugoslavia is also ruled by a Communist Party, in many ways Yugoslav thinking is far from that of the Kampuchean Communists; suspicions that a note of irony is intended in some statements may well be justified.

—J.S.

Phnom Penh. Before Lon Nol's 1970 pro-American coup against Prince Sihanouk, Phnom Penh had between 500,000 and 600,000 inhabitants. During the war, people poured into the cities as a result of social pressures and the American bombing. By the time the liberation forces entered in 1973, the population of Phnom Penh had reached about two million, in the opinion of most foreigners.

The population is now officially about 200,000, but as far as we could see there were lights in at most every fifth or sixth house, so it is hardly likely that the city is inhabited by more than 20,000 people, including soldiers.

The National Bank building lies in ruins; our guides told us it was destroyed two days after the liberation of the city in the course of repeated enemy diversionary attacks. The bank's safes are buried under piles of rubble. Whether they are full or, as is more probable, empty, is a matter of no concern: Kampuchea has abolished money as a means of exchange.

The door of the post office where three years ago the last dispatches of foreign correspondents were transmitted around the world is now covered with an iron screen. Desks are dusty and sparrows fly

through the silent ventilators.

Scenes of destruction alternate with repaired or undamaged objects and buildings. In front of an empty villa, its yard overgrown with weeds, stands a battered old abandoned schoolbus, but nearby workers bustle past the wavy palms on the broad avenues and trim the grass. Along with their shovels and canteens, some of the workers carry guns, carelessly thrown over their shoulders.

In a tailor shop amidst the half-destroyed cupboards lay a pile of half-sewn caps. Yet later we saw a group of young women carefully whitewashing the walls of one of the recently re-opened factories. Industry is beginning to function again—but a majority of the workers are new.

We heard several reasons for the evacuation of Phnom Penh and the country's other cities. One was that it was difficult to feed the people in postwar conditions. A second suggested that the removal of the inhabitants made it possible to destroy the foreign intelligence network, chiefly American, which was attempting to obstruct the consolidation of the new regime. A third asserts that there were about three million people in Kampuchea's cities at the time of the liberation "who ate a lot and didn't do a stitch of work." Our hosts stated that the city dwellers were involved in delinquency, criminality, speculation, prostitution and decadent behavior.

Now, our hosts told us, between two and a half and three million people who were in the cities at the time of the liberation are alongside the "poor and lower-middle peasants," in the rural co-operatives, in the rice fields, digging canals and building dams and irrigation

We visited the Leay Bo cooperative, not far from the dusty city of Takeo, in southern Kampuchea. It contains, we learned, about 10,000 people divided into work brigades. Superficially, the cooperative resembles a Chinese commune, because the political terminology em-

ployed by officials is similar. Nevertheless the differences are substantial.

While Chinese communes employ a system of payment according to work, in these cooperatives work-related payments have been eliminated. Complete equality prevails: every member of the cooperative receives one black linen suit of clothes from the state every year. According to our guides, each person receives one third of a ton of rice annually. This more or less coincides with the statement of Prime Minister Pol Pot that every Kampuchean receives 312 kilograms of rice a year. Every member of the coop receives six kilograms of salt a year. We didn't get the impression that the Kampuchean countryside is suffering any food shortages; rice is undoubtedly ample in this land rich in water and canals, and fish is similarly abundant; the climate assures that anything planted has to bear fruit, so there are also plenty of vegetables. The cooperative exchanges goods with other cooperatives on the basis of prices set by the state.

During our talk with activists of the cooperative, the women sat on one side and the men on the other. The atmosphere was, to put it mildly, very solemn, perhaps because we were the first foreigners to come there; we had considerable difficulty persuading the women to smile when we took pictures.

The conversation was held in the dining room, a newly constructed teakwood building with air circulating through the windows—which we hadn't expected to find. We were told that 650 people eat there and similar buildings existed elsewhere in the cooperative.

When we visited a village primary school, a geography class was in session for boys and a Khmer language class for girls. The teacher we were introduced to had never taught before: she had taken her present job as her party task. Obediently responding to her instruction, the children sang the song "The Rich Green Harvest in Kampuchea" for us.

"We are educating our technicians and through them we are raising our technical level," Prime Minister Pol Pot had told us in a two-hour interview. "They participate in production, they obtain concrete knowledge, positive and negative, which allows them to make progress. At the same time, this type of education can follow a definite curriculum; after they complete it, the technicians can finish their studies, even abroad in friendly countries."

He also said that the literacy rate is 100 percent, a network of clinics has been established in the villages and cooperatives and malaria has been 90 percent eradicated. Crafts, he explained, will foster "an orientation toward industrialization" in the cooperatives.

One of the most impressive aspects of Kampuchea is the construction of huge projects such as dams and complex irrigation systems. One dam site we visited had a workforce of 20,000. Many of those working at the dozen or so dams we visited were in the 900-1,200 member "mobile brigades." We were told that these brigades were comprised of young volunteers eager to help build their country. Most of the men and women in them are between 19- and 29-years old. They live in open-air shelters and often after finishing one project they move to to another. Among those we met were young former bonzes (Buddhist monks) and students from the now-suspended high schools and universities who, carried away by enthusiasm for their work, were forgetting their French but acquiring other skills.

At many of these construction sites, as in the rice fields, we saw small children working away. In fact, in the course of our travels through villages we often met boys and girls with spades and shovels instead of schoolbags in the morning.

At the Trapaing Tmar dam site, not far from Siem Reap, a city which gained fame during the war of liberation, we were told that former city-dwellers make up about 30 percent of the workforce. The construction crews work from 6 A.M. to 10:30 A.M. and from 1:30 to 5:30 in the afternoon. They have three free days a month, when there are lectures and discussions of work problems. At the project they may even become engaged and marry, with the consent of the leadership. The brigaders communicate with friends and relatives by means of local couriers who carry letters; Kampuchea currently has no internal postal system.

Some supervisors of the work groups were armed, although that was not a striking phenomenon. Many people in Kampuchea engaged in physical labor carry guns; this is probably a carryover

from the revolutionary days and it is also possible that the army has its own production units which help the civilian workers.

The emphasis on increasing rice production appears to have two basic rationales. One is economic, although that sounds illogical in a country which has abolished money. Nevertheless, rice is still the chief product which Kampuchea can sell abroad to earn money for machinery and technical equipment. The other rationale is strategic: Pol Pot has expressed the hope that the Kampuchean population will quickly grow to 15 or 20 million people (it is presently about seven or eight million). More people, naturally, require more food.

The new Kampuchean regime has five distinctive revolutionary characteristics.

One is the continuing and substantial revolutionary secrecy. Although the Communist Party, which led the revolution, publicly revealed its existence last fall, only a small number of its leaders is known. When speaking, Kampuchean Communists habitually use quiet tones, almost a half-whisper. In our travels from province to province, on our long journey through roadways in unbearable heat, we were efficiently transferred from hand to hand with the help of some secret and barely noticeable communications.

A second significant characteristic of the new regime is the absence of any civil government aside from the National Assembly. There are no district or provincial assemblies nor executive organs. Administrative affairs and political mobilization are the responsibility of the party committees. The size of the party committees does not appear to be proportional to the number of workers in a given establishment or to the number of inhabitants in the locality. One small factory in Phnom Penh has a party committee of seven people for 300 workers. The party committee in the Kampong Som harbor, with about 6,000 workers, has only five members and it is directly responsible to the Ministry of Communications.

With the exception of unions on the factory and enterprise level, there are no cultural, technical, military, sport, humanitarian, professional or other organizations in Kampuchea. Our hosts explained that because there are only two classes in the country, peasants and workers, it isn't necessary to establish special social-political organizations, except for the Communist Party, which directly administers all affairs. Workers are organized in unions, peasants in cooperatives; that is sufficient for the system to function.

The third characteristic of the regime which struck us—probably because we expected a highly-organized system of

political indoctrination—is the absence, even in mild form, of political indoctrination. According to our hosts, not one Marxist-Leninist work has been translated into Khmer during the three years since the liberation. There is no time for theory now, they say. We got the impression that ideological-political work is undeveloped at the grassroots level. When asked what political topics they had discussed recently, workers responded that they talked about national defense and fulfilling the production plan.

The political terminology in official use is closest to the Chinese. There is no doubt that Mao Tse-tung's ideas, particularly in his works written during the Chinese revolution, inspired the political and ideological thought of Pol Pot. It is also certain that the strategy and tactics of the Kampuchean liberation army, especially in the final operations surrounding the cities with the support of the rural population, indicate a significant application of the experiences of the Chinese revolution to the concrete conditions of Kampuchea.

The fourth noteworthy characteristic of this society is the principal of egalitarianism, really "collective socialism." The absence of commercial relations or of any kind of compensation according to work leads in two directions. There is highly centralized state control which obligates the state to distribute everything from rice to the one annual suit of clothes to each of its citizens. At the same time there is a fundamentalist radicalism in interpreting the concept of relying on one's own resources.

The Kampucheans have proudly rejected international economic aid because they believe that they can develop their country with their own resources. Within Kampuchea this self-reliance often takes extraordinary forms. One cooperative destroyed houses in order to re-cycle the iron stilts customarily used in Kampuchean buildings; in the neighboring cooperative there was an iron junkyard which no one had used yet. Trucks filled with bricks for housing construction adjacent to a factory were rolling through the city streets while only a mile or so away there are empty apartment buildings whose former tenants have left for a distant cooperative.

The fifth and last distinctive feature of this society—one which explains the necessity for developing utopian visions of the future—is the very evident sense of national pride. It is reminiscent of the behavior of a quiet and introverted person whose opinions were hardly taken into account earlier, but who now speaks out unexpectedly, but invariably passionately.

The Washington Post

December 29, 1978

The Cambodian Experiment: Great Change at Heavy Cost

By Elizabeth Becker

PHNOM PENH — Cambodia's single-minded effort to seal itself off from the world and make itself totally independent is unlike any other political experiment in the 20th century.

"If you look at our country through the mirror of your own, you will not understand us," Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary told me during my recent two-week visit. "Our country is poor, very poor, and our people are still poor."

But a lot of countries are poor. And what makes all that has taken place in Cambodia particularly difficult to understand is that no one seems able to offer a coherent philosophical basis for the extreme upheaval that has taken place.

The goal, leaders explain repeatedly, is to make Cambodia within 20 years a self-sufficient agricultural nation that relies on no other country, and that can ensure all of its people a comfortable if not a lavish existence.

But the price — the human and cultural cost — has been tremendous.

No one seemed able to explain satisfactorily why it was necessary to empty Cambodia's cities following the Communist victory in 1975, and send shopkeepers, scholars, engineers and housewives off to agricultural cooperatives to become laborers in the fields.

Nor could I find any explanation of why it was necessary for thousands of Cambodians to die from disease, malnutrition and summary execution in the course of fashioning this new Cambodian society.

Most of the evidence of attesting to the horrors that have taken place in Cambodia has been furnished by the thousands of refugees who have fled the country, and I saw little indication of these problems during a very strictly supervised government tour.

But I lived in Cambodia for two years, and perhaps the most telling indication of what has taken place here is that I saw not one familiar face during my two-week stay.

I also found that the Buddhist culture, which was the foundation of Cambodia for centuries, had been totally done away with, and this left me

with the sense that I was in a country which had lost what I once considered its soul.

Before 1975, the *wat* or pagoda was the center of life in Cambodia. Children were educated and orphans were raised there, and the saffron-robed monks were looked to for the ministrations of troubles.

Today, the pagodas I saw were being used as granaries. The monks, I was told, have been sent out to work like other Cambodians in the fields. One unique feature of the new Cambodia is that money has been withdrawn from general circulation. Instead, goods are exchanged through a sophisticated barter system.

I got an explanation of how this works at the Meas cooperative near Kompong Cham, one of the few we were allowed to visit. The 300 residents of this cooperative grow rice in nearby fields and weave cloth for brightly colored checked scarves and sarongs.

Since this cooperative produces more rice than its residents can eat, the rice is "sold" to the central government in Phnom Penh. The cooperative receives a credit for the rice—4 riel per ton—and uses those credits to purchase things it cannot produce such as gasoline for its tractors.

The accounts of each cooperative are kept on a national registry in Phnom Penh, an official told us.

"That is not so unusual," he said. "In your country you don't use money often. You use credit cards and checks."

Cooperatives like Preah Meas are administered by committees. These generally have three members with one person acting as a president.

At Le Bo cooperative in Takeo, we were shown what officials hope will become the norm for Cambodia in the future.

It seemed to be almost entirely self-sustaining. Besides its clean huts, the cooperative had a large bamboo chicken coop, neat vegetable plots around the homes and, we were told, a pigpen farther out in the fields.

Near the communal dining hall and patio was a foundry where agricultural implements were produced. Inventiveness was in evidence everywhere. One man was peddling a bicycle bellows while another melted down brass from spent American ammunition casings.

Just that morning, the entire cooperative had held a political education meeting.

"We passed several resolutions," the cooperative president said. He told me the cooperative members had agreed to complete the harvest by the first week in January, and had discussed how best to divide up the tasks and meet the deadline.

Production and work quotas seemed to be discussed more often at these political education meetings than Communist philosophy. At times, in fact production seemed to be almost a national obsession.

As we drove down Route 4, the road leading to the seaport of Kompong Som, I noticed that one lane had been blocked off. A work brigade was using the cement for winnowing and sorting the rice from the chaff after harvest.

Besides agricultural cooperatives, Cambodia has set up cooperatives to manage plantations and factories. I asked repeatedly who the leaders inaugurated such a radical change in the country immediately after the war. In the West, experts believe that the early economic writings of Khieu Samphan, the current Presidium president, were the inspiration.

I was told that was not correct. "During the war," one official said, "we had to put our people into cooperatives to ensure that we had enough food for them and our army. The American bombing was severe and the Vietcong was trying to buy the rice as well. That is also why we did away with money."

One of the places I particularly wanted to visit was a collective rubber plantation.

Cambodia has always been rich in

rubber and gemstones, and one of the questions I wanted to ask was why the new government was not taking advantage of these natural resources.

On a visit to the Cham Can Do rubber plantation cooperative in Kampong Cham province, I discovered that rubber was under full production and is now being exported. Sapphires, however, are not being mined, I was told, because it would require too much manpower.

At Cham Can Do, we were first escorted through a former French-run rubber factory which was operating smoothly and efficiently the day of our tour. Discarded machinery from around the country had been put to use there.

From previous reporting I had done on rubber manufacturing in Cambodia, this operation looked to me to be both efficient and producing high-quality rubber.

Officials later told us that Cambodia was exporting 35,000 tons of rubber to Singapore, China and North Korea. They said Cambodia was also exporting kapok to Japan, and rice to Madagascar and other African nations.

The lasting impression I came away with of rural life in Cambodia was a

tableau of scores of peasants, clad in black, tending abundant rice fields. Their leaders constantly told us that the people had become masters of their own lives by becoming "masters of the water."

"If you control water, you do not suffer drought in the dry season or floods in the rainy season," one official said. "You control disease because the water runs quickly and smoothly. You allow fish to be abundant. The whole atmosphere is fresh."

The government magazine, "Democratic Kampuchea," and official films are replete with photographs of the man-made dams and irrigation canal systems that have been built around the country by work brigades since 1975.

Without this irrigation system, the officials said, there would have been no possibility of becoming self-sufficient in food so quickly.

"We could not wait to send our engineers to higher schools, that would have taken years," an official explained at one of the three dam sites we visited. "We had to learn through experience and these are crude but they suit our purposes."

At a dam site I visited in Battambang province, the gate had failed to control the water during torrential

rains, and the reservoir's water had spilled over the dam and caused considerable damage.

"We were lucky the dam survived," one local leader said.

But for the most part, the dams seem to work. This year, Cambodia suffered its worst droughts in 70 years, losing 10 per cent of its crops, officials told us. But I could see as we toured the countryside that replanting had already begun, and the government said it still plans to export rice.

"Unlike Vietnam," one official said, "we will never have to beg for aid."

From all I had heard before my trip about how poorly the new system in Cambodia was working, I was a bit surprised by the general level of production throughout the country.

I have no way to be sure, of course, that all the figures given me were accurate. But the evidence I saw suggested that the figures could not be too misleading.

The methods that the new rulers of Cambodia have used to get their system working are an entirely separate matter that will continue to be discussed—and condemned—by much of the world for years to come.

But the economic system, I am forced to conclude, seems to be working.

The New York Times

November 21, 1978

On Cambodia: But, Yet

By Daniel Burstein, one of 4 U.S. journalists to visit Kampuchea in April 1978.

CHICAGO—Everyone knows about the war waged by the United States in Cambodia from 1970 to 1975. But very few people know about or understand the war that it is waging today against that country, which now calls itself Democratic Kampuchea. The war is being fought on many fronts. But it is mainly a propaganda war, a consciously organized, well-financed campaign to spread lies and misinformation about Kampuchea since the victory of its revolution in 1975.

I was the first American to visit Kampuchea since April 17, 1975. What I saw has little in common with the stories told by so many journalists and other "authorities" who have never been there.

In eight days, I traveled more than 700 miles, spending time in Phnom Penh as well as the provinces of Siem Reap, Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham and Takeo. Everywhere, I saw

people hard at work building vast agricultural and water-conservation projects. These people do not have to be forced to work at gunpoint as some have suggested in the press here. These are peasants who could not put food on their tables before the revolution and now have enough to eat.

Some of the most outrageous stories that have been presented as so-called facts in the Western press were directly contradicted by what I saw.

For example, several American newspapers and one major television network have reported that the 1,000-year-old temple at Angkor has been destroyed or, alternately, that no foreigners are allowed to visit it. Yet I went to Angkor Wat. It hasn't been destroyed.

The press has also repeatedly quoted refugee accounts that state that anyone who criticizes the Government is summarily executed. But

when I interviewed peasants in the countryside, I heard people express reservations about the evacuation of Phnom Penh. I found the people very candid in their views, even in the presence of party officials.

The most slanderous of all charges leveled against Kampuchea is that of "mass genocide," with figures often cited running into the millions of people. I believe this is a lie, which certain opinion-makers in this country believe can be turned into a "fact" by repeating it often enough.

In an interview with Deputy Premier Ieng Sary, I asked point-blank if there had been any such "mass genocide" in Kampuchea. He said absolutely not, that such stories were ludicrous. He pointed out that if there was any genocide, it was committed by the United States, which was responsible for the deaths of 800,000 people during the war.

This does not mean that there has been no violence or bloodshed since the revolution. The new Government has had to deal with many forces who oppose the revolution — former Lon Nol officials, as well as organized networks of American, Russian and Vietnamese agents trying to overthrow the Government. Such sabotage has undoubtedly been met with violent suppression. In the course of this, there may even have been some excesses, which no revolution is immune to.

But Ieng Sary's point about the real perpetrators of genocide is a good one. The United States Government certainly never shed a tear for the 800,000 Kampucheans slaughtered in the war. When some of Lon Nol's traitors are executed, however, Kampuchea became in Jimmy Carter's words, "the worst violator of human rights in the world."

The genocide myth is being fabri-

cated in large part by a network that operates out of Bangkok, headed by In Tam, one of Lon Nol's old cohorts. He controls much of what goes on in the way of interrogating refugees as they come across the border, and has even paid up to \$50 a shot for some refugees to tell good horror stories to foreigners visiting the camps. The fabrications have found their way into several American newspapers. In 1977, one paper printed what were supposed to be photographs of "executions" in Kampuchea. Even at the time they were printed, these photos had already been exposed in Thai newspapers as staged and faked.

It is not only American interests who are waging a "war" against Kampuchea today. The Soviet Union is, too. Why is it that both the United States and the Soviet Union are so antagonistic to Kampuchea? The answer is to be found in the fact that Kampuchea is

pursuing a fiercely independent course, refusing to allow either superpower even a foot in the door of their country. Yet both superpowers want to find a way to penetrate Kampuchea, because of its strategic position in Southeast Asia.

Much of what I have written here may seem farfetched to those who have read so much information expressing the opposite viewpoint. But 15 years ago, not many people questioned the information that the press was providing about the American role in Indochina. The truth eventually came out about that war, and I believe it won't be long before the truth comes out about this one.

Daniel Burstein is editor of *The Call*, a newspaper published by the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist).

Cambodia Starvation and Death

by George C. Hill and
John R. Porter

"the greatest atrocity since the Nazis herded Jews into the gas chambers."

Some commentators saw it as an attempt by the revolutionaries to punish or "purify" the city-dwellers, because of the ideology they were presumed to represent. Others asserted that the Cam-

bodia Killingfields were the execution "an atrocity of nearly 100,000 persons," while Assistant Secretary of State Philip Harkin testified that it was "beyond the bounds of moral decency."

One might have expected this kind of chorus of condemnation to have followed the discovery of skeletons of screaming 1940-

Commentaries on Kampuchea's Revolution, 1975-1978





Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution

By George C. Hildebrand
and Gareth Porter

Chapter 2: The Evacuation of Phnom Penh

The Evacuation and the Media

When the NUFK moved the people from Phnom Penh and other cities to the countryside in April 1975, the leading print and electronic media organizations in the United States lost no time in expressing their indignation. "One can only imagine the suffering and degradation," intoned the *Wall Street Journal*. "Clearly the new rulers of Cambodia have invented a new brand of cruelty."¹ The *Washington Star* labeled the evacuation "a monstrosity of epic proportions,"² while columnist Jack Anderson pronounced it "the greatest atrocity since the Nazis herded Jews into the gas chambers."³

Some commentators saw it as an attempt by the revolutionaries to punish or "purify" the city-dwellers, because of the ideology they were presumed to represent.⁴ Others asserted that the Cam-

bodian authorities were trying to transform Cambodia into a primitive agrarian communal state, eliminating the "modern" influence of the cities.⁵ Most commentators appeared to share *Newsweek's* judgment: "Clearly, any government that would send millions of city-dwellers to an uncertain fate in the ravaged countryside did not place much value on individual human lives."⁶

This attack on the new Cambodian government coincided with the official position of the Ford administration, which was interested in making the victors a target of public and congressional hostility in the wake of the U.S. defeat in Indochina. Secretary of State Kissinger called the evacuation "an atrocity of major proportions," while Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib testified that it went "beyond the bounds of moral decency."⁷

One might have expected this kind of chorus of condemnation to have followed the discovery of volumes of compelling first-

person testimony, but in fact its basis was an account written three weeks after the evacuation by a single journalist, Sydney Schanberg of the *New York Times*,⁸ which has since earned him the Pulitzer prize for foreign reporting. The article was a weak foundation for the massive historical judgment rendered by the news media. It contained no details or eyewitness reports on how the evacuation was carried out in terms of food, medical treatment, transportation, or the general treatment of the evacuees. Nor was there any extensive analysis of the reasons Schanberg attributed to the revolutionary leadership for the action. But the article did quote extensively from Western observers who were in the French embassy with Schanberg, and who denounced the evacuation as "genocide" and the Cambodian revolutionaries as "crazy."

The tone of the article—and the banner headline it received in the *Times*—were set by Schanberg's lead sentence: "The victorious Cambodian Communists, who marched into Phnom Penh on April 17 and ended five years of war in Cambodia, are carrying out a peasant revolution that has thrown the entire country into upheaval." The implications of the article were twofold: first, that the point of the agrarian revolution in Cambodia was to force everyone from the cities to become peasants—rather than to reorganize rural society in order to increase the country's productive potential; and second, that the "upheaval" created by the evacuation disrupted what would otherwise have been an orderly and painless transition from war to peace. Schanberg raised the question of whether the move was "just cold brutality, a cruel and sadistic law of the jungle," or whether it was seen by the Khmer revolutionaries as necessary in order to "build a new society literally starting from the beginning." In such an "unbending view," Schanberg declared, "people who represent the old ways and those considered weak or unfit would be expendable and would be weeded out." Perhaps, he suggested, the evacuation might have been both "cruel" and "ideological."

With his preconceived notion about a cruel and fanatical Cambodian leadership ready to carry out a genocidal purge of society to rid it of the "weak and unfit," Schanberg found it unnecessary to examine alternative explanations for the evacuation, and the reader finds no hint that conditions in Phnom Penh and the country as a whole might offer one.

The rest of the news media quickly adopted Schanberg's point of view, as well as the substance of his article.⁹ The way in which the "cruel" and "doctrinaire" character of the evacuation was turned into hard fact is a classic case of an instinctive political response by an institution that interprets events in conformity with the dominant ideological views of society. The news media did not feel it necessary to have any specific facts, or to examine the entire social and economic context of postwar Cambodia, in order to pass harsh judgment on the revolutionary government. They condemned the evacuation a priori, because commentators and editorialists expected revolutionaries to be "unbending" and to have no regard for human life, and because they were totally unprepared to examine the possibility that radical change might be required in that particular situation.

Had the media approached the story of postwar Cambodia as a problem to be investigated by assessing all the available information, they would have found it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the evacuation was the result not of doctrinaire principles unrelated to reality, but that it was prompted by a concern for the most basic and urgent needs of the population. Moreover, they would have found that food, water, rent, and medical care were provided along the way—contrary to the "death march" image fostered in the minds of most Americans.

Phnom Penh: The Need for Radical Action

The evacuation of the cities of Cambodia cannot be understood without underscoring the fact that relatively few of the nearly 3 million people allegedly "uprooted" and dispatched on a "forced march" into the countryside were true city-dwellers at all. In 1970, when the war began, Phnom Penh was a city of about 600,000; 100,000 to 150,000 of these were Vietnamese, who fled or were deported after the Lon Nol regime carried out a series of massacres against the Vietnamese community in April 1970.¹⁰ So five of every six Cambodians who lived in the capital in April 1975 were in fact peasant refugees who had fled to the city. The more than 2 million refugees in the Phnom Penh area did not have to be "forced" to return to the countryside, since they had no reason to remain in Phnom Penh once the war had stopped. The significance of this cannot be overstated, because it means that even before the war ended, the NUFK had to have a comprehensive plan for resettling this massive refugee population on agricultural land. And it had to manage this return in such a way as to minimize the disruption of the economy and to maximize the use of their labor for urgent agricultural tasks.

This resettlement was to be a monumental reorganizational task, involving between one-third and one-half of the entire population of the country. It could not be limited, moreover, to providing food for those returning to the countryside in order to tide them over until the next harvest. The countryside was greatly changed. Whole villages had been wiped out, great stretches of rice fields damaged or abandoned. More than 90 percent of the houses in the most heavily bombed parts of the country had been destroyed.¹¹ Further, the war had profoundly altered the pattern of rural settlement and cultivation, and returning refugees would have to be integrated into existing production cooperatives, often on land some distance from their original homes, or grouped together in new settlements. And this vast reverse immigration could not wait, for every day of delay would have a human cost in death and suffering.

Above all else, the NUFK leadership had to be concerned with food and health. The concentration of a large part of the population in the cities, where they were unproductive and totally dependent on foreign aid, posed grave dangers. On the one hand, any attempt to maintain an adequate supply of rice for the urban population would have disrupted the existing and highly organized system of agricultural production; on the other hand, the extremely overcrowded conditions, combined with the breakdown of all normal public services, made the outbreak of a major epidemic highly probable.

When the war ended there was only enough food in Phnom Penh to last a few days.¹² Pleading for international assistance was no answer; it would take weeks, perhaps even months, before international agencies could mobilize their resources. Nor was there any question of putting the fate of masses of hungry people in the cities in the hands of the U.S. government, whose policies had been responsible for the war and the mass starvation that had already killed so many. In addition, the United States was apparently counting on food shortages in the cities to make it possible for right-wing elements to seize power again: according to Deputy Premier Ieng Sary, a document detailing a plan to overthrow the government within six months was discovered by revolutionary forces in Phnom Penh. The plan was based on the assumption that the NUFK would not be able to feed the population of the city, and that the situation would be ripe for violent disorders within a few months.¹³

The Cambodian leaders did not need to depend on foreign relief to feed the urban population, however. Food had been stocked in the countryside in advance in order to take care of returnees. Further, secondary crops were there, with which to supplement the evacuees' diet. Some vegetables, such as green beans, could be grown in only eighty days.¹⁴ As Ieng Sary later pointed out, "By

going to the countryside, our peasants have potatoes, bananas, and all kinds of food.”

Moreover, it made little sense to try to move the food to an unproductive urban population. Ieng Sary explained, “We did not have sufficient transportation to move food into the capital.”¹⁵ The People’s National Liberation Armed Forces of Kampuchea (PNLAFK), unlike either the Vietnamese or the Laotian revolutionary armies in 1975, were largely self-sufficient in supplies, with very little outside military assistance and no known economic aid.¹⁶ During the war the only fuel available to the NUFK was captured or purchased from the FANK. Once the United States no longer provided it, the NUFK had to trade for fuel across the border in Thailand.¹⁷ Thus a massive effort to truck food into Phnom Penh would have required a large part of this very limited supply, diverting fuel from other vital needs to support a swollen urban center that would have been able to produce nothing in exchange.

Even more important, the labor of the more than 3 million people in Phnom Penh and the other cities was desperately needed in order to help bring in the dry season harvest and to prepare the rice fields for the primary rainy season crop, which would be harvested in late 1975.¹⁸ The need for agricultural labor was at a peak just as the war was ending. With only about half of the population already working in the fields, the additional efforts of the people from the cities would make the difference between a rice deficit or self-sufficiency in 1976. The 500,000 to 600,000 urban dwellers would, by growing their own food, by freeing others from the task of getting food to them, substantially increase the total produced. By remaining unproductive during the crucial months, on the other hand, they would reduce the amount of food available to everyone. For all these reasons, the NUFK leaders believed that “We had to solve the problem of food by ourselves on the basis of self-reliance.”¹⁹

As the war came a close, the Cambodian leaders were also faced with the increasing threat of the outbreak of an epidemic, fostered by a combination of unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, and general malnutrition. Garbage collection deteriorated, then came to a halt. In the last weeks, mounds of trash could be seen burning in the streets.²⁰ Lack of pure water became a serious health hazard,²¹ since, as the U.S. Inspector-General of Foreign Assistance reported in March, contaminated water supplies present “the potential for the spread of epidemics of cholera and typhoid fever.”²² (Cholera had in fact been reported in February.) The State Department report concluded: “Unsanitary living conditions in Phnom Penh caused by crowding and the influx of refugees into the city create a health hazard and present a danger of epidemics.”²³

As the collapse of the Lon Nol government approached, this danger grew. French doctors from the Calmette hospital told one Western journalist of reports of increased numbers of dead rats in the streets, and expressed fears of epidemics of cholera and typhoid.²⁴ In the days just prior to April 17, doctors began belatedly to inoculate some people on the streets against cholera, but it was a case of too little, too late.²⁵ A Khmer resident of Phnom Penh, describing the evacuation to a friend in the United States, wrote: “At the time that our families were evacuated from the city, cholera was spreading rapidly everywhere.”²⁶ The NUFK’s concern about epidemics in the city was reflected in the fact that the PNLAFK soldiers who organized the exodus administered cholera vaccine on the spot to the evacuees. As one Cambodian eyewitness recalled later, “The liberators distributed medicine, but it was insufficient, because the number of people was too large.”²⁷ Evacuees from Phnom Penh, interviewed later in Thailand, have confirmed that vaccine was given out by the NUFK.²⁸

By the time the NUFK took over Phnom Penh, moreover, the city was almost completely without normal public services. There

had been systematic sabotage of major public facilities, including the water filtration plant, the electric power plant, the national bank, and the docks, lighthouse, and other facilities at the port of Phnom Penh.²⁹ Thus the city lacked power, drinking water, and the ability to bring in goods by river.

The combined threats of starvation and epidemic were clearly on the minds of the Cambodian leaders when they planned the evacuation. According to the PNLAFK commander who negotiated the transfer of foreign nationals at the Thai border in early May, the decision was reached at a meeting in February. The commander told an American journalist that the evacuation was considered necessary to save the population of Phnom Penh from epidemic and starvation.³⁰ The same reasons were cited by Cambodian officials in discussions with Swedish Ambassador Kaj Bjoerk, the first Western diplomat to visit Phnom Penh after the war.³¹

The clearest evidence that the evacuation was prompted by concrete conditions is what was done with those cities afterward. In the first weeks after the evacuation, the cities, which were being referred to in the United States as “ghost towns” that had been left to return to jungle, were rehabilitated. Soldiers collected the accumulated rubbish, repaired public buildings and factories damaged by sabotage, and prepared for the return of the workers.³² By mid-summer there were reports that housing had been restored and that residents were moving in.³³ At the same time, factories began production, beginning with textile and dry-cell battery factories.³⁴ By mid-August some seventy small and larger factories were back in operation.³⁵ Deputy Premier Ieng Sary said in September 1975 that there were approximately 100,000 people in Phnom Penh again, with further increases expected as productive facilities were restored and expanded.³⁶ Prince Sihanouk, in an interview with the Paris newspaper *Liberation*, noted that NUFK leaders intended to increase the population of the capital to 300,000 in the near future.³⁷ Bjoerk was told in March 1976 that there were between 100,000 and 200,000 people in the city.³⁸ Thus the cities have not only not been abandoned, but have been rehabilitated and given an appropriate role in the country’s economic development.

Although it is clear that it was immediate human needs and longer term economic considerations that made the evacuation of the cities an urgent necessity, the move also helped the NUFK to quickly gain control over armed saboteurs and underground agents linked with the United States. There is considerable evidence that large numbers of these agents were planning to remain in Phnom Penh to carry out sabotage operations and to organize for a later attempt to overthrow the new government,³⁹ and the headquarters and leadership of the counter-revolutionary organization were in fact discovered and their apparatus destroyed.⁴⁰ Public facilities and a great deal of housing were damaged or razed.⁴¹ There were many reports of grenades thrown by commandoes,⁴² and foreign observers in the French embassy reported that “huge fires” were visible during the two weeks that followed the NUFK takeover, and that some neighborhoods were destroyed.⁴³ If underground agents had counted on the swollen population of Phnom Penh to provide them with easy cover for their operations, the evacuation dealt a fatal blow to the plan. They were either trapped in the city and could be tracked down, or were separated as the population was dispersed.

The “Death March” Charge

The evacuation of Phnom Penh has been repeatedly portrayed in the news media as a “death march” in which the population was forced into the countryside without providing it with food, water, or medical care, and in which the very young, the aged, the sick, and the wounded were forced to travel many miles on foot. The *New York Times* declared, in an editorial calling the move a

"crime," that "one-third to one-half of the population was forced by the Communists at gunpoint to walk into the countryside in tropical temperatures and monsoon rains without organized provision of food, water, shelter, physical security or medical care."⁴⁴ This version of the evacuation was fostered by U.S. government statements, including "intelligence documents," such as one leaked to Jack Anderson that quoted "doctors" among the refugees as saying that the authorities "provided no food, water or medicine throughout the long march."⁴⁵

This charge is supported neither by the reports of numerous witnesses in Phnom Penh and the immediate vicinity, nor by interviews with Cambodian refugees conducted by journalists in Thailand. On the contrary, these accounts portray an evacuation that was planned in detail to ease the hardship of the move. An organization for processing and assisting the evacuees was set up, including one reception center some miles from Phnom Penh and another in the region where evacuees were to be resettled. At the first center, the evacuees were registered on mimeographed sheets on which they wrote their names, ages, occupations, family backgrounds, and other information. They were then directed toward a particular region, depending on where the family was originally from. At the second center they were met by a local committee, which assigned them land to cultivate.⁴⁶

There is abundant first-hand evidence that the NUFK planned for the provision of necessities during the trip. A number of accounts, from both foreigners and Cambodian refugees, agree that rice was distributed to the evacuees along the route from stocks that had been collected in anticipation.⁴⁷ One American journalist reported seeing "relay stations and rest stops along the road out of Phnom Penh, where Khmer Rouge troops—mostly women—and Buddhist monks supplied refugees with food and water."⁴⁸ In addition, according to European observers who left the capital along with the first wave of evacuees, both rice and dried fish were sold along the way at one-third their price in Phnom Penh.⁴⁹ Father Jacques Engelmann, a Benedictine priest with nearly two decades of experience in Cambodia, wrote that, "There was enough food for everyone. At night, they would stop to cook the rice and sleep."⁵⁰ More than a dozen Cambodian refugees, interviewed in Thailand, said they had received enough food—primarily rice—on the trip.⁵¹

The image of evacuees being mistreated and driven to exhaustion is also contradicted by these accounts. None of the refugees interviewed in Thailand reported having been mistreated by the soldiers during the evacuation.⁵² Father Engelmann reported that the priests who accompanied the evacuation "were not witness to any cruelties."⁵³ Jerome and Jocelyne Steinbach, who taught in Cambodia for two years prior to the liberation of Phnom Penh and who observed the beginning of the evacuation, recount how the soldiers went about getting people ready to leave:

On April 18, a group of soldiers passed before the door and said, "You must leave." If no one answered, someone would go by a second time repeating, "You must leave." Then a third time . . . and thus throughout the day, constantly, the same phrase. Until the day when the neighborhood had to be totally cleared: then, ready or not, one had to leave immediately. But even at the last moment, there was no brutality, no anger.⁵⁴

These eyewitness accounts also indicate that the evacuees moved at a comfortable pace. A retired French military officer, married to a Khmer, reported that he saw the columns of evacuees move slowly and stop often for rest. Although the refugees wanted to stop longer than the soldiers charged with getting them to their destination would permit, the column moved only one or two kilometers between rests.⁵⁵ Two Swiss male nurses who saw the columns making their way south said that the people could move as rapidly or as slowly as they wished.⁵⁶ According to the refugees interviewed in Thailand, the trip from Phnom Penh to the first

center took eight days to cover about twenty miles, or 2.5 miles a day.⁵⁷ Even at a very slow walking pace, that would have permitted three or four hours of rest for every mile walked.

Schanberg's report reached an emotional pitch in the statement that "No one has been excluded—even the very old, the very young, the sick and the wounded have been forced out onto the roads. . . ."⁵⁸ This charge is also belied by the account of those who witnessed the evacuation firsthand. While all these categories of people were moved out of the city along with everyone else, eyewitnesses describe an organized effort to transport the sick and aged in trucks and motor cars confiscated for that purpose.⁵⁹ A New Zealander who passed through several Cambodian villages with his Khmer wife reported that they slept in the same house as an elderly woman who had been transported by truck from Phnom Penh. "She told us that she refused to leave her house if she was forced to walk, so a cadre from the PNLAFFK arranged for her to be transported by truck." The same woman told them that other elderly people had also been transported by truck.⁶⁰ The two Swiss nurses witnessed a similar scene in which four elderly people told the soldiers that they were too old to walk "even a kilometer." The soldiers immediately ordered a jeep to carry them.⁶¹ There thus appears to be ample evidence that the "death march" characterization of the evacuation is unfounded.

The Hospitals of Phnom Penh

But what of the emptying of the hospitals by the Communist forces? Western observers have charged that, regardless of the reason for the exodus, it was inexcusable to force patients to abandon the hospitals and join the throngs on the road back to the countryside. Here again, hostility to the revolutionary Cambodian government has been allowed to prevail over regard for the facts. Examination of medical realities in Cambodia at the end of the war, and of actual NUFK policy, suggests that the purpose of this move was actually to save lives and give the best possible care to the sick and the wounded.

In the first place, a survey of medical conditions and the medical facilities that existed in Phnom Penh before the NUFK took over shows without doubt that the temporary clearing of most hospitals, far from being inhumane, was an act of mercy for the patients. It was recognized early in the war that the system of medical care in the GKR zone was totally inadequate. In 1973, for example, Preah Ket Melea hospital, one of the four government hospitals in Phnom Penh, was reported to have more than three times the number of patients it could adequately handle and lacked basic medicines and routine hospital materials—antibiotics, sterile dressings, syringes, and stethoscopes.⁶² The modern equipment the hospital did have, including operating room lights and sterilization equipment, was rendered largely inoperable by continual power shortages.⁶³

Another of the four major hospitals, the Soviet-Khmer Friendship Hospital, was considered by U.S. officials to be "extremely crowded, poorly equipped, unsanitary, and understaffed" as early as October 1971.⁶⁴ For a total of 1009 patients, it had only 512 beds and 27 doctors, instead of the 80 needed to provide minimum care.⁶⁵ Four years later the situation had deteriorated even further, with 300 more patients and only 1 additional doctor. Conditions in the hospital were graphically described by one eyewitness in March 1975 as follows:

In the Khmer-Sovietique hospital, more than 1,300 patients struggled for survival last week. Doctors, nurses, medical corpsmen, drugs, and plasma were scarce; malaria, tuberculosis, and dysentery were rampant. Out of desperation, overworked staffers in some wards tied wounded men to their beds to prevent them from breaking open their wounds and sutures. Flies covered the face of one such patient, who could only shake his head feebly in a vain attempt to keep them from crawling into his mouth.⁶⁶

Medical care had always received a low priority in both GKR and U.S. policy, as was reflected in the GKR's budgetary allocations for health. The World Health Organization recommends that to provide adequate health care, 10 percent of the national budget of a developing country *not* at war be allocated to the Ministry of Health.⁶⁷ A nation involved in a highly destructive war should of course devote more than this. Nevertheless, the GKR budget allocated proportionately less for the health during the war than the Sihanouk government had spent in peacetime. The percentage varied from 2.6 percent in fiscal year 1971 to 2.8 percent in 1974.⁶⁸ In a country with a desperate need for preventive medicine in order to avoid epidemics, the GKR spent a meager \$185,000 on preventive medicine in 1973 and less than half that in 1974.⁶⁹ Moreover, in a country in which approximately 25 percent of the medical equipment was rendered inoperative during the war, and where there was never enough medicine and laboratory equipment, the total spent on both these aspects of the medical budget for government hospitals was only \$600,000 in 1973 and \$333,000 in 1974.⁷⁰

Another result of this puny medical budget was that the government could not count on the services of its doctors for more than a few hours a week. Pay for physicians was so low (the equivalent of about \$15 per month as of September 1974) and private practice so lucrative (up to \$500 per month) that virtually all doctors spent an average of less than an hour a day at government hospitals.⁷¹ The total number of physicians and health officers decreased in the first eighteen months of the war by 20 percent, while the number of nurses dropped in the same period by 42 percent.⁷² Furthermore, the GKR's nonsupport of the health system resulted in the introduction of profit considerations into all medical treatment. The Steinbachs cite the case of the soldier Sirath, severely burned in an explosion, whose mother had to pay 30,000 riels to ensure his hospitalization and then had to care for him herself, bringing in food and paying additional for all medicines.⁷³ Whenever there was a large battle, a heavy influx of war wounded would descend on Phnom Penh—since there was no adequate system of military hospitals—to lie in the corridors without treatment, sometimes for days on end. By the end of the war, in fact, Phnom Penh was officially reported to have exactly 3,526 hospital beds for the city's nearly 3 million civilians, and this not including the military's wounded.⁷⁴ Dr. French described the "rather nauseating situation" that he found in a Phnom Penh hospital after a battle at Kompong Chhnang: "We walked down corridors with stretchers of men with open wounds unattended, filth and detritus, flies and insects and everything there, and there was obviously no medical personnel to meet their needs as yet."⁷⁵ A report by the Inspector-General of Foreign Assistance gives us a further glimpse of these conditions:

The facilities were not only overcrowded; for the most part they were crude and unsanitary. There was an acute shortage of medicines and drugs. Death frequently resulted from infection and lack of proper care; medication was not being administered to patients suffering severed limbs or gross traumatic abdominal wounds. Little or inadequate antibiotic therapy was being given to patients in need of such therapy.⁷⁶

The report described rooms in which as many as thirty were crowded into a space that could comfortably accommodate no more than three: "Patients overflowed the wards and were lying on mats or stretchers in the halls and corridors, their unattended wounds exposed to the dirt and filth of aseptic conditions; the stink of pus and infection mingled with the foul odor from clogged, flooded toilets." Sanitary fixtures overflowed into the hallways and were left uncleaned. Once again they found "not nearly enough doctors to go around," and the critically wounded waited "long hours" to be treated. Hospital operating rooms were "crudely furnished, unclean and totally without sterile precautions."⁷⁷

These were the conditions in the hospitals emptied by the NUFK. But the hospitals themselves were not abandoned: this was only a temporary measure. One of the first moves by the new government in the weeks following the end of the war was the complete rehabilitation of the hospitals, in Phnom Penh as well as in other cities. Hospitals were cleaned and made sanitary for the first time in years, and then gradually restored to normal operation.⁷⁸

Nor were all the hospitals closed down, even temporarily. The one hospital in Phnom Penh that was considered to offer adequate medical care, the formerly French-run Calmette hospital, continued to operate without the French doctors. The first French doctor to reach the French embassy after being expelled from Calmette hospital told everyone that the hospital was abandoned and its patients forced to join the march to the countryside. But ten other French doctors who arrived later that same evening contradicted this report. "We have the impression that they are replacing us with their own doctors," they were quoted as saying, "and in any case, the hospital is functioning normally."⁷⁹ This was later confirmed by journalists and other foreign observers, who learned that Calmette was continuing to operate with an entirely Khmer staff.⁸⁰

The NUFK Medical System

Finally, those who have condemned the NUFK for emptying out Phnom Penh's hospitals have failed to take into account that the NUFK had its own medical system, one that was radically different from that of the GKR and that was far better adapted to the conditions of deprivation in which Cambodia found itself at the end of the war. A high official described his government's medical care system in early 1972 as consisting of one or more hospitals in every province, a fully trained doctor for each district, a medical committee for each village, and two male nurses with three years of medical training for each hamlet.⁸¹

This medical system was under the direction of Dr. Thiounn Thioeun, who was formerly the dean of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Phnom Penh and director of the Soviet-Khmer Friendship Hospital.⁸² In 1972 it was known to include at least twenty-five doctors who had left the GKR zone to join the resistance, as well as a number of Cambodian veterans of the anti-French resistance who had studied medicine at the University of Hanoi in the 1950s and 1960s.⁸³ In addition, there were paramedical teams which each year received three months training and then served in the hamlets, teaching people the elements of hygiene and preventive medicine.⁸⁴

Moreover, contrary to the impression left by the news media that the sick and wounded were left to fend for themselves, the NUFK assigned medical personnel, including surgical teams, to the reception centers outside Phnom Penh. PNLA FK soldiers told a Western journalist that one of their hospitals was located at Takhmao, which is fifteen kilometers south of the capital and had been taken over by the revolutionary forces a week before the end of the war.⁸⁵ The two Swiss nurses who were outside the city for several days during the exodus reported that there were nurses and a surgical unit at a pagoda fifteen kilometers south of Phnom Penh.⁸⁶ It is clear, therefore, that many of the sick and wounded were cared for in NUFK medical facilities and by NUFK medical personnel. In the context of the unsanitary conditions in the hospitals of Phnom Penh, this would appear to have been the most sensible short-term policy to follow.

The new government had to cope with the same severe shortage of medicines and other medical supplies that had plagued the GKR. A group of Chinese journalists who visited a field hospital near Phnom Penh in March 1975 described "an acute shortage of medicines and medical equipment." They found Dr. Thiounn Thioeun and his staff improvising substitutes for such basic

materials as gauze, surgical cotton, and adhesive tape.⁸⁷ The NUFK received no significant medical aid from other countries, but, according to a former doctor in the PNLFK, bought medical supplies either from FANK soldiers or directly from commercial outlets in Phnom Penh.⁸⁸

In addition, the NUFK had its own pharmaceutical industry, partly organized early in the war by a leading Phnom Penh pharmacist, Mme. Khau Vanny.⁸⁹ In the immediate postwar period, the revolutionary administration organized the shipment of medicines from Phnom Penh to provinces in the north and northeast by boat, canoe, and junk.⁹⁰ Today the rural-based NUFK medical infrastructure produces seventy different kinds of medicine, including those for treatment of malaria and cholera, drawing on the great variety of local medicinal herbs, plants, and trees.⁹¹

In a population of nearly 3 million, in which hundreds of thousands were physically weakened by starvation and where cholera had already begun to spread, it was impossible to avoid deaths during the evacuation. Contrary to the conception popular among American commentators, however, the authorities did avoid the massive death toll that might have been expected. Father

Engelmann summarized the reports from Catholic priests who were among the evacuees as follows: "During the first days there were deaths: some very ill, some old people, some newly born—but very few. In any event, not thousands, as certain newspapers have written."⁹² Moreover, to blame those deaths on the evacuation from the cities, as U.S. government political commentators have done, is clearly a case of misplacing the responsibility. Both the conditions that caused starvation and disease and the lack of adequate medicines were the result of U.S. policy in Cambodia, and not the fault of the revolutionary government. To have left the 3 million people in Phnom Penh would have invited a public health catastrophe of enormous proportions. The evacuation of Phnom Penh undoubtedly saved the lives of many thousands of Cambodians.

A careful examination of the facts regarding the evacuation of Cambodia's cities thus shows that the description and interpretation of the move conveyed to the American public was an inexcusable distortion of reality. What was portrayed as a destructive, backward-looking policy motivated by doctrinaire hatred was actually a rationally conceived strategy for dealing with the urgent problems that faced postwar Cambodia.

Footnotes:

1. "Cruelty in Cambodia," *Wall Street Journal*, May 15, 1975.
2. "Exodus in Cambodia," *Washington Star*, May 11, 1975.
3. Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "U.N. Ignores Cambodia Death March," *Washington Post*, June 23, 1975.
4. William Safire, "Get Out of Town," *New York Times*, May 12, 1975.
5. Tom Wicker, "Revolution in Cambodia," *New York Times*, May 12, 1975.
6. *Newsweek*, May 19, 1975, p. 30. For other editorials along the same line, see "Cambodia's Crime," *New York Times*, July 9, 1975; Max Lerner, "A New Hard Communism," *New York Post*, May 14, 1975; "The Murder of Phnom Penh," *Chicago Tribune*, May 10, 1975.
7. *New York Times*, May 14, 1975; *Baltimore Sun*, July 25, 1975.
8. *New York Times*, May 9, 1975.
9. By the end of June, it was possible for the Associated Press, in a dispatch covering Henry Kissinger's remarks on Cambodia, to report as an established fact that the evacuation was "part of a campaign to rid the population of bourgeois tendencies." *Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 1975.
10. *Le Monde*, April 15, 1970. William Sullivan of the State Department testified in 1971 that only between 3,000 and 10,000 Vietnamese remained in Phnom Penh. See *War-Related Civilian Problems on Indochina, Part II: Laos, Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 1st Session*, 1971, p. 69.
11. Press communique of the Minister of Propaganda and Information of Democratic Kampuchea, Phnom Penh Domestic Service, March 30, 1976.
12. Long Boret, the GKR Prime Minister, said on the eve of the surrender that there was only an eight days' supply of rice remaining. Agence France-Press dispatch from Bangkok, *New York Times*, May 9, 1975. AID officials in Phnom Penh reported that the stockpiles of the rice would last only six days. William Goodfellow, "Starvation in Cambodia," *New York Times*, July 14, 1975.
13. See Ieng Sary's interview with James Pringle, Newsweek International Editorial Service, *Chicago Tribune*, September 10, 1975; Indochina Resource Center transcript of remarks by Ieng Sary at a reception in New York, September 6, 1975; statement by Ieng Sary, New York, August 30 (mimeographed).
14. Transcript of remarks, New York, September 7, 1975.
15. Interview in the *Chicago Tribune*, September 10, 1975.
16. The chief of the mission in Paris, Ok Sakun, told a group of American visitors in April, including one of the authors, that his government had received no foreign economic aid. For evidence that the armed forces of the NUFK obtained the bulk of its military supplies by capture or purchase within Cambodia, see testimony of Gareth Porter in *Supplemental Assistance to Cambodia, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session*, 1975, p. 121.
17. See the report by Sri Lankan journalist Errol de Silva, who visited Cambodia in August, in the *New York Times*, September 3, 1975.
18. This fact was noted by economists in Bangkok, as reported by Agence France-Presse. See "Cambodia's Move in Emptying Cities May Fill Food Need," *New York Times*, May 9, 1975. The article appeared, ironically, on the day that Schanberg's page one story was published in the *Times*. It was ignored, while Schanberg's interpretation was widely quoted.
19. *Chicago Tribune*, September 10, 1975.
20. This was observed by William Goodfellow, who was then in Phnom Penh as Research Director of the Indochina Resource Center.
21. As of mid-1972, before the massive influx of refugees reached its peak, only 35 percent of the population of Phnom Penh had access to running water. See "United Nations Development Program Report, Problems Posed by Displaced Persons Around Phnom Penh," in *Problems of War Victims in Indochina, Part II: Cambodia and Laos, Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session*, May 9, 1972, p. 50.
22. "Cambodia: An Assessment of Humanitarian Needs and Relief Efforts," *Congressional Record*, March 20, 1975, p. S4620.
23. Ibid. Also see the report by Agence Khmer de Presse (AKP), February 2, 1975, warning of cases of cholera in several districts in the capital suburbs.
24. Richard Boyle, "Exodus May Have Saved Cambodian Lives," *Colorado Daily (Boulder)*, July 7, 1975.
25. Information provided by William Goodfellow.
26. Letter from Mrs. Sayhong Mabuchi, Tokyo, to Mr. and Mrs. Steven Heder, June 5, 1975. Translated from Khmer by Steven Heder.
27. Ibid.
28. *New York Times*, June 23, 1975.
29. Steinbach, *Phnom Penh l'histoire* (Paris: Editions Sociale, 1976), p. 43. Phnom Penh Domestic Service, May 14, 1975, provides details on the sabotage of the Phnom Penh airport.
30. *Colorado Daily*, July 7, 1975.
31. Agence France-Presse dispatch, Peking, March 6, 1976.
32. Phnom Penh Domestic Service, May 8, 13, 15, 18, 22, and 30, and June 1, 1975.
33. *Manichi* (Tokyo), August 21, 1975. The return of factory workers several months after the evacuation was later confirmed by refugees interviewed in Thailand. See *New York Times*, January 21, 1976.
34. Phnom Penh Domestic Service, June 4 and 20, 1975.
35. *Bulletin d'Information*, August 24, 1975.
36. *Chicago Tribune*, September 10, 1975.
37. *Liberation*, October 13, 1975.
38. *Toronto Globe and Mail*, March 8, 1976.

39. Ieng Sary reportedly said during his stay in Paris in September 1975 that some 20,000 men organized into commando units were discovered in Phnom Penh. See Steinbach, *Phnom Penh Libérée*, p. 42.
40. Statement by Ieng Sary, August 30, 1975; transcript of remarks by Ieng Sary, September 6, 1975.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.; see also *New York Times*, May 9, 1975.
44. "Cambodia's Crimes," *New York Times*, July 9, 1975.
45. Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, *Washington Post*, June 23, 1975.
46. *New York Times*, June 23, 1975.
47. Ibid.; *Le Monde*, May 10, 1975; *Washington Post*, July 2, 1975.
48. Richard Boyle, *Colorado Daily*, July 7, 1975.
49. *Le Monde*, May 10, 1975.
50. Paul Dreyfuss, . . . *et Saigon tomba* (Paris: Arthaud, 1975), p. 351.
51. *New York Times*, June 23, 1975.
52. Ibid.
53. Dreyfuss, . . . *et Saigon tomba*, p. 351.
54. Steinbach, *Phnom Penh Libérée*, p. 40.
55. *Le Monde*, May 10, 1975.
56. Steinbach, *Phnom Penh Libérée*, p. 44.
57. *New York Times*, June 23, 1975.
58. *New York Times*, May 9, 1975.
59. *Le Monde*, May 10, 1975. The confiscation of automobiles was reported by Agence France-Presse reporters Jean-Jacques Cazeaux and Claude Juvenal, *Washington Post*, May 8, 1975.
60. Personal communication from Shane P. Tarr, Auckland, New Zealand, September 1, 1975. One Cambodian refugee in the United States has mentioned buses used to transport people from Phnom Penh during the evacuation. See Donald Kirk, *Chicago Tribune*, June 25, 1975.
61. Steinbach, *Phnom Penh Libérée*, p. 44.
62. See the testimony by Wells Klein in *Relief and Rehabilitation of War Victims in Indochina, Part I: Crisis in Cambodia*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, April 16, 1973, p. 10.
63. Ibid.
64. Comptroller General of the United States, *Problems in the Khmer Republic (Cambodia) Concerning War Victims, Civilian Health, and War-Related Casualties*, February 2, 1972, p. 50.
65. Ibid., pp. 89-90. Dr. David French, "Report on the Cambodian Health Care System," unpublished manuscript, 1974.
66. *Newsweek*, March 10, 1975, p. 25.
67. See E.A. Vastyan, "Civilian War Casualties and Medical Care in South Vietnam," *Annals of Internal Medicine*, 74 (1971), p. 618.
68. *Problems in the Khmer Republic*, p. 47; "Statement of Dr. David French," *Humanitarian Problems in Indochina*, p. 49.
69. French, "Report on the Cambodian Health Care System," Appendix II ("Khmer National Budget for the Ministry of Health").
70. "Statement of Dr. David French," *Humanitarian Problems in Indochina*, p. 48; *Humanitarian Problems in South Vietnam and Cambodia: Two Years After the Cease-Fire*, A Study Mission Report, Subcommittee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, January 27, 1975, p. 35; French, "Report on the Cambodian Health Care System," Appendix II.
71. French, "Report on the Cambodian Health Care System," section on Ministry of Health, pp. 2-3.
72. *Problems in the Khmer Republic*, p. 47.
73. Steinbach, *Phnom Penh Libérée*, p. 79.
74. French, "Report on the Cambodian Health Care System."
75. Testimony of Dr. David French, *Humanitarian Problems in Indochina*, p. 39.
76. "Cambodia: An Assessment of Humanitarian Needs," p. S4621.
77. Ibid.
78. Phnom Penh Domestic Service, May 23, June 23, July 7, 1975; *Bulletin d'Information*, June 20, 1975.
79. Lawrence Masurel, "Phnom Penh, L'ambassade en perdition," *Paris-Match*, May 10, 1975, p. 62.
80. Interview with a representative of an international organization who was in the French embassy compound after the NUFK takeover of Phnom Penh, August 12, 1975; *Colorado Daily*, July 7, 1975.
81. Ieng Sary, *Cambodia 1972* (Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia, 1972), p. 12.
82. *My War with the CIA: The Memoirs of Prince Norodom Sihanouk*, as related to Wilfred Burchett (London: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 199.
83. *Declaration des Intellectuels Patriotes* (Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia, 1972), pp. 23-27; Indochina Resource Center, interview by William Goodfellow with Lt. Mon. Chhen, Phnom Penh, March 8, 1975.
84. *My War with the CIA*, pp. 199-200.
85. *Colorado Daily*, July 7, 1975.
86. Steinbach, *Phnom Penh Libérée*, p. 45.
87. Chinese Journalists Delegation, "Cambodia: Self-Reliance Works Miracles," *Peking Review*, May 23, 1975, p. 12.
88. Indochina Resource Center, interview by William Goodfellow with Lt. Mon Chhen, Phnom Penh, March 9, 1975.
89. *My War with the CIA*, p. 190.
90. "Voice of the NUFK," June 2, 1975, in *Cambodia—News in Brief*, Office of Information of NUFK in Peking, June 5, 1975, p. 3.
91. "Voice of the NUFK" broadcast, July 1, 1975; Phnom Penh Domestic Service, November 26, 1975.
92. Dreyfuss, . . . *et Saigon tomba*, p. 351.

Preliminary Draft of

Cambodia—Rationale for a Rural Policy Part IV

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This is from the preliminary draft of a book Caldwell was working on when he was assassinated in December 1978. There have been minor editing changes.

"Phnom Penh resembles a 'ghost city' . . . Bills in the old Cambodian currency, the riel, were lying around the streets valueless, having landed there when the authorities blew up the state bank . . . All that remained of the bank was the stone portal . . . There were no buses or mail or telegraph services, and only the main streets were open . . . Side streets and sidewalks were . . . blocked off, with vegetables growing on them . . . Phnom Penh was at least self-sufficient in food . . . there was only one shop in the city . . ." ¹ So runs a composite account of the capital city of Democratic Kampuchea as observed by the Swedish, Finnish and Danish ambassadors during a brief visit in January 1978. On the face of it, their impressions appear to confirm the view of the new regime which most commentators in the West (including those in the Soviet bloc) hold and which they disseminate incessantly by means of the only too grateful and cooperative mass media, ranging all the way from *Reader's Digest* (circulation more than 18 million) to *Pravda*—namely the view that the revolutionary regime is atavistic, anachronistic, barbaric, rustic, ascetic, anarchic, cruel, irrational, and intent upon commanding a forced march back to the Dark Ages. I hope that enough has already been said to undermine such a conclusion in this . . .

Despite all the exultant Western forecasts of famine and starvation to follow the alleged "bloodbaths" of liberation, the first figures for the main season harvest of 1975 were excellent, showing yields up to twice the prewar average at over two tons per hectare, and exceptional yields of seven tons recorded where new high yield strains were already in use. ² The total crop

amounted to 3.25 million tons of paddy (2.2 of rice), permitting 250 grams of rice per meal per adult (350 for workers on the production force)—a recovery from the dark days of the late 1960s and the war to the levels recorded for the 1950s. ³ There was already sufficient rice at this stage to allow exports to the newly-declared People's Democratic Republic of Laos to alleviate food shortages there, and by March 1976, the Thailand National Economic and Social Board was expressing anxiety about the possible impact of Kampuchean rice exports on the Thai economy. ⁴

The policies pursued by the Khmer Rouge leaders while still guerrillas also bore fruit in the shape of a greater diversity in the diet. Meat eating was boosted by countering Buddhist reluctance to take life and by encouraging the raising and slaughtering of livestock, particularly pigs (" . . . pork is allotted on the basis of one pig every two weeks for each production solidarity group of ten people" ⁵).

Early visitors to liberated Kampuchea are able to corroborate what we can gather from official pronouncements. Hamad Abdul Aziz al Aiydi, a PLO representative in Peking, visited the country in February 1976, traveling widely accompanied by leading Kampuchean figures, including Ieng Sary (Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs). In a report he wrote subsequently, he records the following impressions: "The revolutionary leaders took the initiative in evacuating the urban inhabitants to the countryside after having distributed among them all the grain on hand. Thus nobody died of hunger before the October harvest despite the multitude of acute difficulties . . . At the

same time, the People's Liberation Army was mobilized for production. . . . By the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976, the government of Kampuchea was able to secure the food supply for every citizen and have a surplus. (In February 1976, the government offered 50,000 tons of rice for export and sale.) As a result of the successful harvest in October, the confidence of both the former and new peasants grew as did enthusiasm to raise production and hopes to increase the per hectare yield in excess of three tons in the next harvest."⁶ Former rich urban-dwellers who grumble at the unaccustomed toil are told that they can go back to the big buildings and grand villas where they lived in the past "... but in this case they will have no rice until they die of hunger."

In February and March of 1976, the Swedish ambassador in Peking, Kaje Bjork, paid a 15-day visit. He found the Kampuchean revolution "more radical and more far-reaching than either the Chinese or the Russian revolutions," and said there were no small private plots such as those to be found in Russia, China and North Korea.⁷ He added that he could find no support for refugee claims that there were still food shortages in parts of the country. Bjork, and representatives of Zambia, Egypt, Tunisia, Afghanistan and the PLO who traveled with him, had meetings with Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Prince Sihanouk, and Penn Nouth (a long-time supporter of Sihanouk).

The following month, April, a Japanese journalist (Naoki Mabuchi) who crossed the border from Thailand and was detained by the authorities recorded his view that the people "all appeared to be well-fed and in good health." He concluded that photographs in Bangkok newspapers showing Kampucheans yoked to ploughs did not reflect the reality he observed of many tractors and cows in the fields. He was fed well during his captivity—thriving on a diet which was, as far as he could determine, exactly the same as that of the Kampucheans he met. A Vietnamese refugee who crossed Kampuchea from east to west in the course of February, March and April 1976, walked about 350 miles, taking jobs in the ricefields, thus earning himself food for two or three days before moving on. He did not hear atrocity stories until he reached Thailand: "I could not believe it. Walking across the country for two months I saw no sign of killing or mass extermination and nobody I spoke to told me of it. I still don't believe it happened."⁸ This man spoke fluent Khmer and was taken for a Kampuchean everywhere and accepted in the fields.

The Laotian newspaper *Khaosan Pathet Lao* reported on May 25, 1976, the Kampuchea had handed over the last lot, 3,000 tons, of a food present consisting of rice—made necessary by a hostile Thai gesture of closing the borders with its northern neighbor earlier in the year. Such acknowledgement constitutes another kind of corroboration of achievements of Democratic Kampuchea.

Another consists of refugee accounts. . . . The vast bulk emanate from rich refugees, and certainly all the ones that receive publicity in the West. Revealingly, the accounts we have from refugees of worker or peasant origin differ profoundly in point of fact and in point of interpretation. One worker who has recorded his views

in exile, Peang Sophi, gives the Khmer Rouge credit for considerable skill in effecting reorganization of production into cooperatives and in recruiting supervisory personnel.⁹ He found working conditions in the fields "not especially severe" and food rations "usually sufficient" and at times "too much." On the whole he believed that "The [Khmer Rouge] theory is good." He certainly makes clear that the revolutionary regime seeks to purge the society of alien influence (such as foreign words) and to restore pride in Khmer history—the converse of what the Western media has systematically been instilling in its captive Western audience.

Despite concentration on food production and determination to survive and thrive in proud self-reliance, Democratic Kampuchea did make some provision for trade, even in the earliest days (and in addition to trade with fraternal neighbors such as Laos). The PLO visitor . . . describes the machinery: "It is the state that shoulders full and direct responsibility for the foreign trade. Both the material income from state property and what it receives from the cooperatives . . . are the sources supplying Kampuchea's foreign trade. From the total production under the government disposal, a percentage is reserved for emergency use such as in natural catastrophies. The rest is exported to exchange for badly needed commodities and to acquire foreign hard currency which is also vital for the newly developing state. Kampuchea's most important export commodities are rice, rubber, wood, fish, wine and cigarettes. The needs of the country are technology and petroleum. While being anxious to improve the living conditions of its people, Kampuchea never relaxes its effort to eliminate the remnants of the old economic system. The state is doing its utmost to achieve self-sufficiency in various aspects of economy. Imports will be very limited and nothing will be allowed to interfere with the principle of self-reliance."

It was reported in August 1976, that Japan and Kampuchea had agreed to re-establish diplomatic links—a clear clue to trade intentions. Similarly, also in 1976, a Kampuchean trade concern was opened in Hong Kong—in the market for spare parts for machines and heavy industrial equipment, and for pharmaceuticals. \$450,000 worth of DDT was sold by Stauffer Chemical Co., with Washington's permission, in the same year; malaria was one of the major health problems of post-liberation Kampuchea. Rubber exports from Kampuchea were shipped to Singapore via Thailand.¹⁰

Domestic commerce—between cooperatives and between cooperatives and the state—did not give rise to money circulation: "Democratic Kampuchea sees that the safety of its economic and social plans requires the absence of local currency. . . . Therefore, neither domestic nor foreign currency is used inside the country. This is indeed unique in the world of today, even among the socialist countries. It sounds incredible, but as far as I am concerned, I am satisfied when I compare it with the numerous diseases striking world society today as a result of running after banknotes. . . . I was impressed by the no-money life that I enjoyed with the Kampuchea people during my visit. . . ."¹¹

Again contrary to some of the more prurient fantasies

of Western voyeurs, industrial concerns as could usefully be re-tooled to serve agriculture and the people were speedily recommissioned. Provision was made for these to be manned and made operative even in Phnom Penh (where rubber tires, basic textiles, batteries and paper were among product output was promptly resumed). Factories in the capital and elsewhere, revitalized, turned out hoes, sickles, threshers and pumps to promote agricultural production in large and steadily growing numbers.¹² At this time, according to Pol Pot, the Prime Minister, there were no plans to build new factories, instead "...we pay attention to handicraft production and to trades catering for the daily life of the people such as the weaving of textiles, towels, mosquito netting, blankets, and the making of soya sauce and fish sauce."¹³

As of 1976, various Kampuchean spokesmen summed up the situation thus: "The masses of people even now live far better than ever before despite the destruction of the war. We do not imply there is opulence but no one goes hungry. Above all, for the first time our people feel they are the real masters of their destiny. And this is the secret of the remarkable victories on the economic front during this first year of liberation."¹⁴ "There's more terrorism on the streets of New York than in Cambodia. No one has died of starvation since the liberation of Phnom Penh.... There is sufficient rice for everybody's needs. The average ration is about a pound of rice per day."¹⁵ "When harvest time (1975) came we obtained the necessary amount of food which, though not abundant, created favorable conditions for us to start the 1976 plan. In 1976, the situation improved. We have made special efforts to produce enough food for the people. As far as we can see, bright prospects are before us...."¹⁶

Now, finally, before embarking upon a theoretical appraisal of the Kampuchean "model,"¹⁷ let us briefly bring the story as far up-to-date as possible. In the interim, numerous indications of economic progress have come to light, and visitors who have had the privilege of returning for a second post-liberation visit, such as Swedish ambassador Kaj Bjork, have been able to report visible development ("...there was more land under cultivation than in early 1976... traces of war... were still considerable, but had decreased....," he was reported as having said after his return in January 1978¹⁸). The Kampuchean authorities have themselves released more information. I have assembled this composite picture.

The cooperatives originally formed during the critical war year of 1973 in the then-liberated zones now cover the country, and are the basic economic, social and political units. Most have now been upgraded from village cooperatives (sahakor phum) to commune-cooperatives (sahakor khum); 20% consist of 700 to 1,000 households, 30% of 400 to 600, and 20% of 100 to 300.¹⁹ In the cooperatives, according to the four Yugoslavian journalists who visited the country in March, 1978, life is totally communal: "Property such as bicycles, sewing machines, domestic animals are held in common.... Everything is done communally from eating (in huge communal halls) to bringing up children." "Members of the cooperative receive no money; they are paid approx-

imately a kilo (2.2 pounds) of rice a day and a pair of black pajamas a year. New wooden houses are being built in the villages. The journalists found no shortage of food in the cooperatives they visited. As foreshadowed by earlier pronouncements, the size and regularity of fields had been increased, eliminating all traces of the former haphazard jigsaw of three million fragmented pieces. Everywhere there has been enormous concentration on water control: "where there is water, the scenery is fresh, life is pleasant, humor is lively, culture is evergreen."²⁰ In each region, large, medium and small reservoirs have been constructed, together with several hundred kilometers of canals, and in suitable places dams have been thrown up to retain stream water; as a result of efforts in the 1977 dry season, Pol Pot claimed in his September 27, 1977, speech an additional 400,000 hectares of farmland had been made fully irrigated at all seasons. Compared with the pre-liberation period, when because of defective or non-existent water control²¹ only dependent upon the vagaries of the weather), two crops dependent upon the bagaries of the weather) two crops a year had become general, and in some areas three crops were already being harvested. Compared with a pre-liberation average yield of about one ton a hectare, the plan for 1978 envisages an average of 3.5, with particular parts of the country pushing much beyond this.²²

The prodigies of construction achieved have rested, faute de mieux, upon maximum mobilization of human labor. Important in this respect, over and above the cooperatives, are the mobile brigades. "The mobile brigades are composed largely of young people working in teams of up to 20,000 people. The brigades travel from one construction project to another, staying in a single place only during the rainy season."²³

Besides intense attention and effort devoted to irrigation and water conservancy and control, the productivity of agriculture has been enhanced in a variety of other ways, and its primacy has been emphasized by subordination of other sectors of the economy to its claims. In the first direction, we may note that prior to the revolution only about 10% of land in Cambodia received any fertilizer while today every cooperative makes and applies its own fertilizers (green manure, manure, compost, silt, etc.).²⁴ Application per hectare is rising. Effective insecticides have been prepared from poisonous plants and are applied from simple back-strapped bottles and hand-held nozzles. Seed for planting is carefully selected to promote better yields. Cooperatives have also made innovations in the tools and equipment vital to them in their work, inventing new ones and improving old ones "better suitable to the needs of the development of production," in the words of their record of achievement *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward*. But although mechanical aids were becoming available, Khieu Samphan, the President, emphasized in his anniversary speech in 1977 that "The cattle and buffalo are our closest comrades-in-arms in the nation-building campaign. If our cattle work hard, we can build our country rapidly."²⁵

As a result of the Herculean application of people (and their draft animals), rice availability per capita was

announced as 312 kilograms for the year 1977.²⁶ In addition, rice for export was available. Early in 1977 during visits to Malaysia and Singapore, Ieng Sary had offered the two countries 100,000 tons of rice.²⁷ It seems certain that exports will continue and rise significantly in volume, allowing the country, in Pol Pot's words, "to accumulate capital to finance our national defense and reconstruction efforts."

Secondary cultivations include: corn, rubber, sugar palm, cotton, jute, coconut, sugar cane, tobacco, kapok, mulberry (for silk worms), and grass-cloth. Corn output is put at 4 tons per hectare. Rubber acreage has been increased to 100,000; yields are claimed to be among the highest in the world (and 13,000 tons of rubber were exported to China and North Korea in 1976). Cotton supplies the domestic textile industry, while jute supplies a factory making rice-bags. Fruit of many kinds (mangos, bananas, mangoustans, durians, jack fruits, ramboutans, longans, letchis, papayas, sapodillas, watermelons, citrus fruits, pineapples, grapefruits) are cultivated, and as many different vegetables (manioc, soybeans, sweet potatoes, beans, gourds, turnips, cucumbers, tomatoes, green peppers, lettuce, onions, aubergines, cabbages, spinach, avocado-pears): "Under the slogan 'grow, grow grow everywhere and not to leave an inch of land,' the peasants of the cooperatives of agricultural production, the workers of the trade unions, the units of the Revolutionary Army, the different organisms and services grow fruit trees and vegetables. This movement extends all over the country. They grow in the fields, in the villages, alongside the roads, on the banks of the rivers, ponds and reservoirs, on the dikes, around the habitations, the factories and the working places, in the rural areas as in the cities where the slightest lots of land and the old empty areas have been transformed into gardens of fruit trees and vegetables."²⁸ The old mansions and villas of the rich in Phnom Penh were now living quarters for peasants and soldiers, the grounds also maintaining chickens and other animals.²⁹

Livestock are raised for traction and transport (oxen, buffaloes, horses and elephants) and for food and manure (pigs, chickens and ducks). Fishing is conducted collectively, in contrast with the past. Over 200 kinds of fish flourish in the fresh waters of Kampuchea, and in addition shrimp and big crayfish. "With fish, the cooperatives make salt-dry fish, smoked fish, fish pastes called 'Prahoc' and 'Phaak,' fish sauce called 'Tuk Trei.' The wastes of fish are used as manures for the culture of vegetables or are transformed into fish powder for animal food. The cooperatives make by themselves different fishing tools, such as screens, dragnets, sweep-nets, bow-nets, and even boats and equipment for conserving and transporting fish. Besides, they attach great importance to the protection and development of fish, to the safeguarding of flooded forests around the Great Lakes which are favorable to fish breeding and reproduction in the high water season. Furthermore, the cooperatives develop fish breeding in the water reservoirs and irrigation canals they have built. Many kinds of fish, lobsters, shrimp, prawns, crabs and other crustaceans as well as different shellfish (oysters, clams, etc.) lie hidden within the seacoasts of Kampuchea. . . . With

rice, fish is one of the main components of food of the people. . . . But in spite of a very important consumption, the production is well in surplus, allowing the exportation of large quantities of fresh water fish and sea fish, fresh or dry."³⁰

The secondary sector consists of cottage industry and industry proper. The former had been well developed before the imposition of French colonialism, under which it showed the precipitous decline typical of pre-colonial industry everywhere in Southeast Asia under the onslaught of restrictive ordinances and unrestrictive importation of Western manufactured goods.³¹ Today, local industry on the cooperatives caters to a whole range of needs: making tools, ploughs, harrows, carts, bucket chains and the like, and pushing ahead into the production of winnowing machines, improved hydraulic wheels, threshing machines, automatic choppers of green fertilizers, power looms, and progressively more ambitious items, registering the gradual transformation of workshops into manufactories or small factories. Cottage industry also turns out yarn, textiles, fish-sauce and soy-sauce, soap, pottery and jars, bricks and tiles, and other daily necessities.

The Kampuchean attitude to industry is best summed up in the words of Ieng Sary in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly as early as Sept. 5, 1975: "After our total victory we extended to all Kampuchea the economic policy which had already been applied in our liberated zone. This economic policy consists of considering agriculture as the base and industry as the predominant factor. Agriculture supplies the raw materials for industry, which in turn serves to develop agriculture. Our objective is to make our country a modern agricultural and industrial country." As we saw, to begin with the victorious Khmer Rouge concentrated on resuscitating existing factories. In his September 27, 1977 speech, Pol Pot summed up more recent developments as follows: "In industry, our Party . . . adheres to the concrete conditions of the country. It pays special attention to the factories which serve agriculture and the people's livelihood. Towards this end, we have built many new factories. We have repaired and modified existing factories which previously were dependent on foreign raw materials into factories which basically rely on local raw materials. . . . Our desire is to set up, consolidate and develop large, medium-sized and small industrial and handicraft networks in Phnom Penh as well as in the regions, sectors, districts and cooperatives and continuously to strengthen and expand them."

Some idea of the range of enterprises developed may be gauged from those listed and/or illustrated in *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward*. Industrial repair, construction and production are entrusted to "a new generation of men and women workers," issuing from "peasants of poor and inferior middle strata" via the Revolutionary Army, and organized in trade unions. The old dependence upon imported spare parts and upon foreign experts to supervise, to innovate and actually to work the more complex machines has been overcome. Working in close cooperation with the peasants, the trade unions, in refurbished and in brand new factories, turn out new and improved equipment for hydraulic

works, motor-pumps of all kinds, paddy planting machines, motor cultivators, seeders, harvesters, threshing machines, winnowing-machines, and grinding machines for natural fertilizer. In addition, factories produce crepe-rubber, rubber goods (truck and bicycle tires, sandals, hose pipes), jute bags, bran oil, looms, material (clothes and bedding), construction materials (cement, bricks, tiles), and household goods (utensils, pottery, earthenwares).

The small tertiary (services) sector likewise serves agriculture and is closely integrated with it (in the sense that, where possible, service workers themselves engage in food production and other agricultural pursuits). Roads and railways destroyed by the war have been rebuilt and reopened. Pochentong Airport (Phnom Penh) and the seaport at Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) have been reactivated. All forms of transport are pressed into service, from elephants to airplanes, but of course particular attention is paid to shipping of all kinds, from wooden barges to locally-manufactured all-steel ships of up to 500 tons. Information is conveyed to the people by Radio Phnom Penh, a thrice-weekly newspaper *Revolution*, and a less regular magazine.

Education, which is given high priority, is conducted in conjunction with production, in the cooperatives and factories. Pre-liberation illiteracy has been largely eliminated. Children enroll in primary schools at five years old, and are taught for two to three hours daily, the rest of the time, "They are happy with driving sparrows away from the crops, tending cattle and buffalo, collecting natural fertilizers and helping to build dams and embankments and dig reservoirs and ditches" according to Khieu Samphan.³² As education progresses, to secondary schools at the district level, work and study continue to interlock, with the latter having a major component of technical instruction (theory and technology—"in particular the technology of agriculture in the fields of rice and rubber growing, various industrial techniques and hydraulic works"). "There is as yet no college level education with the exception of medicine which is studied in hospitals in towns and in medical centers in the cooperatives."³³

Medicine has been urgently promoted since liberation. In addition to the health problems which were a legacy from the colonial and neo-colonial periods (including drug addiction and venereal diseases), the new government was faced with an appalling additional legacy from the war itself—including 240,000 badly-wounded people, among them 40,000 totally disabled.³⁴ Heavy bombing and the ground fighting together had breached the normal restraints upon malaria, which had become rampant, particularly in the virulent forms that had appeared with the Americans in Indochina. "Revolutionary doctors" and "basically trained medical technicians" man a range of medical institutions, from city hospitals to clinics, and employ both traditional medicines and modern methods: "In order to keep the masses healthy, our Party has founded the revolutionary medical corps made up of people who have undying love for

the masses and a high sense of sacrifice. Medicine is produced from local ingredients found in abundance in the form of herbs and plants. Our revolutionary medical personnel deepen their medical skills while carrying out the actual work. There is a network of hospitals and pharmaceutical centers in Phnom Penh, in the regions, sectors, districts and cooperatives throughout the country. On an average, for 100 peasant households there is a clinic of 20 beds with 3 basically trained medical technicians and a shop for making herb medicines with 3 pharmacists. Our people's health is excellent. Various diseases, particularly the diseases handed down from the old society and diseases of addiction, have been basically wiped out. We are now concentrating on the eradication of malaria. In 1976, the first year of the four-year plan for the eradication of malaria, we have already realized 70% to 80% of our programme objectives. We continue to strive to improve the conditions of life and health of our people, because we hope to increase our population to 15 to 20 million in the course of the next 10 years or more."³⁵ "Besides, a particular importance is given to the preventive medicine and to the hygienic measures. The vaccinations against the contagious diseases (cholera, smallpox...) are generalized and periodic. The hygienic measures have been carried out permanently. All muddy places have been eliminated. The cattle-sheds and the animal husbandry centers are built far from housing and kept constantly clean."³⁶

Contending that the cities are breeding-grounds for parasites, the new rulers have put all their efforts into developing the countryside. Much of what overdeveloped countries of the world regard as indispensable "essentials" have simply been dispensed with: television, telephones, and cars among them. ("The outskirts of the city are like automobile graveyards... At Phnom Penh airport lie the remains of Lon Nol's American airplanes. Turning to rust, they are evidence... of a change in attitude toward the past and traditional values."³⁷) Instead, "Cambodians appeared to be following a strong nationalistic line with its roots in the old Khmer kingdom..."³⁸

Irrational? Perverse? That remains to be seen... But let us end this section with a positive assessment: "In the course of the struggle since 1970, Cambodia has developed the political consciousness of its people, begun one of the most thoroughgoing agrarian revolutions in history, rebuilt much of the basic infrastructure necessary to a developing economy, and quickly resumed industrial production. Today it is carefully examining foreign markets for future export earnings, for which the natural wealth of the country provides a reasonable base. In addition, Cambodia has for the first time a coherent national development plan and the organizational ability to put it into effect. The country appears confident that, in accord with (its leaders') overall aims, 'a new Cambodia that is independent, peaceful, neutral, nonaligned, prosperous, having neither rich nor poor, will certainly be built in the very near future on the beautiful land of Angkor'."³⁹

Footnotes:

1. *New York Times*, 1/23/78.
2. G. Hildebrand and G. Porter, *Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution* (London: Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 85.
3. G. Hildebrand and G. Porter, op. cit., pp. 85-6.
4. *Financial Times*, 3/12/76.
5. G. Hildebrand and G. Porter, op. cit., p. 86.
6. Unpublished typescript; parts of this typescript appear in *News from Kampuchea*, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 32-39.
7. *International Herald Tribune*, 3/8/76.
8. *Financial Times*, 1/30/78.
9. See D.P. Chandler (with B. Kiernan and Muy Hong Lim): *The Early Phases of Liberation in Northwestern Cambodia: Conversation with Peanh Sophi*, Working Paper No. 10, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne.
10. *Indochina News Chronicle*, Vol. 1, No. 10, Dec. 1976.
11. See footnote 6 above.
12. Harish Chandola, "Cambodia begins new life," *Holiday*, 6/27/76.
13. *Vietnam Courier*, 52, September 1976, p. 6.
14. A spokesman of Democratic Kampuchea in Paris quoted by *Guardian* (N.Y.) correspondent, 4/28/76.
15. Thiounn Prasith, Kampuchean Ambassador to the United Nations, *International Herald Tribune*, 4/26/76.
16. Pol Pot, in *Vietnam Courier*, 52, September 1976, p. 5. C.f.: "The size of the 1975 wet season harvest makes . . . exports already feasible in 1976. . . . The 2.2 million tons of rice reaped in the first postwar years, less 1 million tons needed for domestic consumption and the amount needed for seed, will free for export five or six times the volume of the prewar period. This year (1976) . . . water control will have been established over a total cultivated area of three million hectares. In addition to careful seed selection, the use of natural fertilizers—compost, animal manure, river silt, anti-hill earth, and cave soil—is being encouraged. These measures are expected to produce five million tons of rice for export in the near future." (G. Hildebrand and G. Porter: op. cit. p. 88). For comparison, production in the peak pre-liberation post-1945 year (1956-57) was 1.5 million tons, of which, about 230,000 tons were exported.
17. Since what has happened in Kampuchea will undoubtedly be widely studied and pondered by leaders and cadres of other peasant movements, it is possible to speak of the Kampuchean model, but we ought to bear in mind that Kampuchea's leaders tirelessly reiterate that (to quote a recent formulation) ". . . only when communist and workers' parties establish guiding theories and policies to meet the specific realities of their own countries and carry out the revolution independently and in accordance with the efforts of their own people can victory be won. . . ." (Joint communique by the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea and Kampuchea on the visit of Pol Pot to Pyongyang, 10/8/77).
18. *New York Times*, 1/23/78.
19. Figures from the 9/27/77 speech in Phnom Penh celebrating the 17th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.
20. See *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward*, (Phnom Penh: 1977), p. 12.
21. In 1974, only about 3% of Cambodia's cultivated land was irrigated; today all but the most unsuitable land has been opened to irrigation, improvements in which go on all the time (see G. Hildebrand and G. Porter: op. cit., p. 62; *Ta Kung Pao*, 1/20/77 and 12/29/77; *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward*).
22. In his 1/17/78 speech in Phnom Penh commemorating the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, Pol Pot called on the people to "impetuously fulfill the 1977 plan of 3 tons and 6 tons per hectare and the 1978 plan of 3.5 tons and 7 tons per hectare"; in the absence of further clarification it is hard to know what to make of this—it has been suggested that the first figure in each case is for yield per *planting*, the other, higher one for total yield over the year of two or even three harvests. A Cambodian friend, however, suggests that the first figure is the average yield and the other for most favored districts—perhaps serving the double purpose of acting as an ideal towards which other areas should aim.
23. *International Herald Tribune*, 3/24/78.
24. G. Hildebrand and G. Porter, op. cit., p. 62: according to them, the total fertilizer used in Cambodia before the revolution would, if spread out over all the fields, have given only an average of 5 kg. per hectare (compared with the 800 kg. average of Japan); according to *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward*, application of natural fertilizers now averages 10 tons per hectare (pp. 14-15).
25. *International Herald Tribune*, 4/19/77.
26. The figure was made public in a number of speeches: for instance that by Ieng Sary at the 32nd Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 10/11/77.
27. *Le Monde*, 8/21/77 and 8/22/77.
28. *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward*, p. 29.
29. *International Herald Tribune*, 3/24/78.
30. *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward*, p. 29.
31. See S.A. Resnick, "Decline of Rural Industry under Export Expansion," *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 1970.
32. *International Herald Tribune*, 4/19/77.
33. Ieng Sary, U.N. 10/11/77: Ieng Sary, *Der Spiegel*, May 1977.
34. Communique of the Minister of Information and Propaganda, Hu Nim, 3/31/76.
35. Pol Pot, 9/27/77.
36. *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward*, p. 49.
37. *International Herald Tribune*, 3/24/78.
38. *New York Times*, 1/23/78.
39. G. Hildebrand and G. Porter, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

Far Eastern Economic Review

Asia 1979 Yearbook



Pol Pot

Nearly four years after going into self-imposed isolation, barring itself from normal international political and economic relations or even contacts, Cambodia is circumspectly and gradually opening itself to visitors. It is also looking for trade with a wider range of nations than the three or four with which it has had a minuscule exchange of rice and rubber for agricultural machinery and equipment for its small-scale industries. This unwrapping of what has been since its "liberation" an almost hermetically sealed communist state is strictly according to plan.

Cutting the country off from the global economy was a deliberate choice of the *Angka* (Organisation) as the Cambodian communist party is called. It went with the decision to send the new nation to the countryside, part of a development strategy to correct the distortions of the previous colonial economy and to restructure the country on the basis of its agriculture. The beginning of the end of economic and political isolation signals that the regime feels confident rice and other food production and the cultivation of raw materials for industry are now on a stable basis. The first phase of radical restructuring of the economy is almost over.

Cambodia has already exported 150,000 tons of rice. Three Yugoslav journalists who together toured the country extensively and examined its development strategies reported in March 1978: "Judging by everything that we have seen in [Cambodia], that country has settled the problem of food supply for the population. In certain cooperatives ... the improvised warehouses could not house the new quantities of rice so that it had to be left in the fields." They also reported that a ton of rice, according to official information, was distributed among three persons annually. This, more or less, corresponded to a statement by Pol Pot that everybody is entitled to 312 kilograms of rice annually. The Yugoslav report also said: "We did not gain the impression that in the countryside ... there is a shortage of food. Without doubt, there is a sufficient supply of rice,

Cambodia

Cambodia became a French protectorate in 1864. Independence was declared in March 1945, when the Japanese ended French power in Indochina, but after World War II the French returned. King Norodom Sihanouk, whom the French had placed on the throne in 1941, thereafter waged a campaign for complete independence. This was achieved in 1953. On March 2, 1955, believing he could lead his country more effectively from a less exalted position, Sihanouk abdicated in favour of his father, King Norodom Suramarit (1898-1960).

Head of State Sihanouk was in Moscow in March 1970 when he was ousted in a bloodless coup led by Marshal Lon Nol.

Sihanouk left soon afterwards for Peking, which became his home. On May 5, 1970, he announced the formation of the Royal Government of National Union (GRUNK), under the auspices of the National United Front of Kampuchea, with himself as Head of State.

The US-backed Lon Nol government fell as GRUNK forces finally captured Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975. A new leftist government, headed by Khieu Samphan, was installed. The Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the formation of which was revealed in 1977, is Pol Pot.

and this country, rich in waters and canals, also has fish in abundance. The climate is so good that every crop must bear fruit. Consequently, vegetable gardening is also in good supply."

A team of Japanese diplomats based in Peking and an economist attached to the mission visited Cambodia in August. The group has reported that it did not get the impression people were deprived of food. Supplies seemed to be adequate. Vegetables were abundant, with plenty of fruit, and the diet was supplemented by pig-breeding. The findings of the mission, are, of course, from a swift tour from Phnom Penh to Angkor Wat. However, the economist, who had been in Cambodia in the time of the Lon Nol regime, found agriculture in better shape than before the liberation and irrigation much better organised than at that time. The Japanese mission presumed that the Pol Pot regime was stable.

Notwithstanding the dismay of observers outside Cambodia that the country had cut itself off from the mainstream of the international community to regress to the "grassroots radicalism" of an egalitarian but low-level peasant economy, the planners in Phnom Penh apparently did not intend that the country should continue to be either isolated or primitively backward.

Broadly, the development strategy which the commu-

nist regime has adopted is very similar to a scheme set out by Head of State Khieu Samphan in a doctoral dissertation he submitted when he was a student in Paris in the 1960s. It was widely studied by the Left in Phnom Penh. Khieu Samphan projected industrial development after agriculture had been consolidated. This objective is shared by the regime. Its broadcasts reflect the formative role that Khieu Samphan's thesis plays in the nation's new development strategy. Cambodian broadcasts persistently say that, far from a withdrawal to a traditional peasant society, "our people do not seek to produce only rice, but also to produce goods for industrial use — cotton, rubber, textile fibres." In proceeding from agriculture to industrialisation, Khieu Samphan wrote, "Cambodia cannot delude itself on this point [that there is no limit to self-reliance and autonomous development] ... In the course of industrialisation it will need to import capital goods for a long time, perhaps indefinitely."

Khieu Samphan argued for autarchic development, which would be temporary but inescapable in the first phase of restructuring the economy. He attributed the nation's economic backwardness to its integration, under French colonial rule and that of the comprador class it bred, into the international capitalist system "as a dependent, marginal element ...". He said: "Increased trade within the structure of the world markets dominated by large capitalist countries and the aid that sometimes goes with it will never help Cambodia." Third World economies had been integrated into the world economies "chiefly to supply cheap labour for foreign capital." The accelerator effect of establishing industries in the "colonial countries" had not benefited the indigenous people, as it was claimed it would. Instead, the draining of profits to the investing country helped the growth of entrepreneurial activity there. Integration into the world economy had also left Cambodia with a two-tiered agricultural system — the foreign-owned large-scale plantations, and below these an impoverished rural agriculture in which 87% of the population was involved. So long as global links were maintained, Khieu Samphan argued, distortions and a steady deterioration of rural poverty would continue. Khieu Samphan's solution for breaking this pattern of growth for elites, both foreign and indigenous, and deepening poverty for the masses and widening disparities of wealth, was to "withdraw from the world economy, and restructure the local economy on a self-centred basis." Once agriculture and cottage industries had been placed on firm found-

ations, Cambodia would "re-enter the world economy on its own terms." There is accordingly a method to the seeming madness of Cambodia putting up its shutters against the world.

In 1978, as in the earlier years since the liberation, the emphasis has been primarily on agriculture and the development of small industries. Some of these industries serve agriculture by producing elementary farm tools and repair facilities, and others supply unsophisticated consumer needs.

The apparent achievements of Cambodian agriculture, especially in the cultivation of rice, may be attributed to its simple but highly productive building of irrigation dams, the improvement of dykes for more effective retention of water and the construction of reservoirs. While in most parts of Asia, agriculture is a gamble on the weather, the slogan in Cambodia is: "In farming rely on the people and not on the weather."

The Yugoslav journalists, as well as Chinese reporters, revealed a massive development of irrigation facilities. The Chinese who toured the country in April wrote that every region in Cambodia has built more than one reservoir with a capacity of 100-200 million cu. metres of water, dug dozens of canals, each having a length of over 20 miles. Every province has medium-sized reservoirs, each storing 50-60 million cu. metres of water and every district has small reservoirs. The construction of these water-control projects has brought a third of the country's farmland under irrigation. In some areas, the Japanese mission revealed, there were two rice crops. The Yugoslavs said some of the new artificial lakes have about 200 million cu. metres of water.

In a review of development from April 1977-April 1978, the regime claimed that the quota set of 3 tons per hectare of rice for each crop was "almost completely fulfilled." With double-cropping in many areas output has been doubled to 6 tons per hectare annually. Many reservoirs with a capacity of 100 million cu. metres and more have been built. The more notable of these was the Trapeang Thmar reservoir at Phnum Strok in Battambang province (capacity 200 million cu. metres), reportedly completed in one year. A dam has been built on the Streng Trabek in the eastern region of Cambodia, an area with few streams. In the central region, according to this review of progress, two dams have been built at Stoeng Chinit and one each at Kompong Thmar and Kaoh Bo, on the border with Kompong Chang province. All the streams in Siem Reap pro-

Land area: 181,035 sq. km.

16% cultivated, 74% forest, 3% pasture.

Total population: 8.2m (45% under 15).

Significant ethnic minorities: none.

Birth rate per 1,000: 47.

Death rate per 1,000: 18.

Life expectancy: 45 years.

Rate of growth per year (including immigration): (est.) 2.3%.

Infant mortality rate per 1,000: 150.

Students: NA.

Total workforce: 77 (est.) 2.6m.

Social and transport: Hospital beds per

1,000: NA. Doctors per 1,000: NA.

TV receivers: NA. Radio receivers: NA.

Telephones: NA. Motor vehicles: NA.

Length of railways: 612km.

No. of locomotives: NA.

All money in US\$. Dates refer to calendar year.

GNP at market prices: 75 (est.) US\$591m.

Production indices: Manufacturing NA;

agriculture (1961-65=100) 74 48, 75 71, 76 81, 77 NA, 78 NA.

Merchandise imports: 74 US\$452m,

75 US\$117m, 76 NA, 77 NA, 78 NA.

Merchandise exports: 74 US\$15m,

75 US\$17m, 76 NA, 77 NA, 78 NA.

Net capital flow (indicate + or -):

74 public +US\$305.8m,

private -US\$0.7m;

75 public +US\$79.7m,

private -US\$0.9m;

76 public +US\$0.6m,

private +US\$0.3m;

77 public NA, private NA;

78 public NA, private NA.

Balance of payments: NA.

Foreign reserves: NA.

Outstanding foreign debt: NA.

Head of State: Khieu Samphan.

Prime Minister: Pol Pot; **Deputy Prime Ministers:** Ieng Sary

(Foreign), Vorn Vet (Economy), Son Sen (Defence);

Attorney-General: NA; **Minister of Propaganda and**

Information, Culture and Education: Yun Yat;

Public Health: Thiounn Thioeunn; **Social Action**

Mrs Ieng Thirith.

Premier Pol Pot (alias Saloth Sar) is married to Khieu Ponnary who is the sister of Ieng Thirith (Mrs Ieng Sary), the Minister of Social Action. Yun Yat is the wife of Defence Minister Son Sen.

vince, Preah Net Preah, Battambang, Sisophon and Mongkolborei districts have dams.

"Success in [Cambodian] agriculture stems from an extensive drive of large proportions in which the human physical effort exclusively formed the decisive factor," says Yugoslav journalist Slavko Stanic. "In effect this country, with the exception of motor pumps for soil irrigation, has at its disposal practically no other agricultural machinery." What has been accomplished is all the greater, Stanic remarks, if one takes into account the new reservoirs with a capacity of about 200 million cu. metres of water. These were built exclusively with human effort — as many as 20,000 engaged in a single project.

For agriculture (and its ancillary, irrigation), local labour, which includes a large number of women and children of school age, have been supplemented by mobile brigades, especially of youth. Japanese sources who visited Cambodia told the REVIEW: "It appeared that the leadership has extended to production in the post-liberation periods the guerilla war mentality." Indeed, a US State Department report on the Khmer Rouge wartime zone in Svay Rieng province acknowledges that these techniques of collectivist farming and cooperative labour had helped production outstrip previous individual efforts.

Quicker-yielding rice seeds have been introduced. Instead of the previous late maturing (five to eight months) varieties three- to four-month seeds are planted. The gov-

ernment claims that consequently two and even three crops, or more properly two and a half crops (the other half running into the next year), are now possible in some zones. However, most agricultural techniques are primitive.

The target in agriculture is modernising within the next 10-15 years. The objective is an annual yield of 8 tons per hectare. Modernising appears to be nationwide use of quicker-yielding rice seed. The movement, launched in 1977, has achieved some success in the southwest. Angkor Borei, it is claimed, has 30,000 hectares of modern rice fields. Planted with the three- to four-month variety of rice, each hectare yields an average 4 tons per crop. The programme has been extended to Veal Baray and Veal Santuk and to the region south of Kompong Thom and parts of Battambang province.

Premier Pol Pot has claimed that in 1978 the national plan for water conservancy construction has been "completed in the main." Dams, dykes and reservoirs constructed in 1978 have brought 300,000 more hectares of padi under irrigation in addition to the 400,000 hectares irrigated in 1977. A steel mill capable of supplying a quarter of the nation's requirements is under construction. The target set for the next 15-20 years, Pol Pot said, is the establishment of light industries, foodgrain processing, iron industry, machine-building and fuel, power and chemical industries. E

The Nation.

June 25, 1977

BOOKS & THE ARTS

Distortions at Fourth Hand

**NOAM CHOMSKY and
EDWARD S. HERMAN**

On May 1, 1977, *The New York Times* published an account of the "painful problems of peace" in Vietnam by Fox Butterfield. He describes the "woes" of the people of the South, their "sense of hardship" and the grim conditions of their life, concluding that "most Southerners are said to appear resigned to their fate." His evidence comes from "diplomats, refugees and letters from Vietnam." In journals of the War Resisters League and the American Friends Service Committee of March-May 1977,

Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman teach at M.I.T. and the University of Pennsylvania, respectively. They are co-authors of Counter-Revolutionary Violence: Bloodbaths in Fact and Propaganda (1973), a second edition of which will be out shortly.

**GEORGE C. HILDEBRAND and
GARETH PORTER.** *Cambodia:
Starvation and Revolution.* Monthly
Review Press (1976).

FRANCOIS PONCHAUD. *Cambodge Année Zéro.* Juilliard Press.
Paris (1977).

**JOHN BARRON and ANTHONY
PAUL.** *Murder of a Gentle Land.*
Thomas Y. Crowell (1977).

in contrast, there are lengthy reports by Carol Bragg on a visit to Vietnam earlier this year by a six-person AFSC delegation, including two who had worked in Vietnam and are fluent in Vietnamese. The group traveled widely in the South and spoke to well-known leaders of the non-Communist Third Force who are active in the press and government, as well as ordinary citizens. They report

impressive social and economic progress in the face of the enormous destruction left by the war, a "pioneering life" that is "difficult and at times discouraging," but everywhere "signs of a nation rebuilding" with commitment and dedication.

Butterfield claims that "there is little verifiable information on the new economic zones—no full-time American correspondents have been admitted since the war—but they are evidently not popular." While it is true that American correspondents are not welcomed in Vietnam, there is nonetheless ample expert eyewitness testimony, including that of journalists of international repute, visiting Vietnamese professors from Canada, American missionaries and others who have traveled through the country where they worked for many years. Jean and Simonne Lacouture published a book in 1976 on a recent visit,

critical of much of what they saw but giving a generally very positive account of reconstruction efforts and popular commitment. Max Ediger of the Mennonite Central Committee, who worked in Vietnam for many years and stayed for thirteen months after the war, testified before Congress in March 1977 on a two-week return visit in January, also conveying a very favorable impression of the great progress he observed despite the "vast destruction of soil and facilities inflicted by the past war." There have also been positive accounts of the "new economic zones" in such journals as the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and the *Canadian Pacific Affairs*.

But none of this extensive evidence appears in *The New York Times's* analysis of "conditions in Indochina two years after the end of the war there." Nor is there any discussion in the *Times* of the "case of the missing bloodbath," although forecasts of a holocaust were urged by the U.S. leadership, official experts and the mass media over the entire course of the war in justifying our continued military presence. On the other hand, protests by some former anti-war individuals against alleged human rights violations in Vietnam are given generous coverage. This choice of subject may be the only basis on which U.S.—as opposed to Soviet—dissidents can get serious attention in the mass media today.

The technical name for this farce is "freedom of the press." All are free to write as they wish: Fox Butterfield, with his ideological blinders, on the front page of the *Times* (daily circulation more than 800,000); and Carol Bragg, with her eyewitness testimony, in *New England Peacework* (circulation 2,500). Typically, reports which emphasize the destruction caused by the United States and the progress and commitment of the Vietnamese reach a tiny circle of peace activists. Reports that ignore the American role—Butterfield can only bring himself to speak of "substantial tracts of land made fallow [sic] by the war," with no agent indicated—and that find only "woes" and distress, reach a mass audience and become part of the established truth. In this way a "line" is implanted in the public mind with all the effectiveness of a system of censorship, while the illusion of an open press and society is maintained. If dictators were smarter, they would surely use the American system of thought control and indoctrination.

It was inevitable with the failure of the American effort to subdue South Vietnam and to crush the mass move-

ments elsewhere in Indochina, that there would be a campaign to reconstruct the history of these years so as to place the role of the United States in a more favorable light. The drab view of contemporary Vietnam provided by Butterfield and the establishment press helps to sustain the desired rewriting of history, asserting as it does the sad results of Communist success and American failure. Well suited for these aims are tales of Communist atrocities, which not only prove the evils of communism but undermine the credibility of those who opposed the war and might interfere with future crusades for freedom.

It is in this context that we must view the recent spate of newspaper reports, editorials and books on Cambodia, a part of the world not ordinarily of great concern to the press. However, an exception is made when useful lessons may be drawn and public opinion mobilized in directions advantageous to the established order. Such didacticism often plays fast and loose with the truth.

For example, on April 8, 1977, *The Washington Post* devoted half a page to "photographs believed to be the first of actual forced labor conditions in the countryside of Cambodia [to] have reached the West." The pictures show armed soldiers guarding people pulling plows, others working fields, and one bound man. ("It is not known if this man was killed," the caption reads.) Quite a sensational testimonial to Communist atrocities. But there is a slight problem. *The Washington Post* account of how they were smuggled out by a relative of the photographer who died in the escape attempt is entirely fanciful. The pictures had appeared a year earlier in France, Germany and Australia, as well as in the *Bangkok Post* (April 19, 1976), with the caption "True or False?" In fact, an attempt by a Thai trader to sell these photos to the *Bangkok Post* was turned down "because the origin and authenticity of the photographs were in doubt." The photos appeared in another Thai newspaper two days before the April 4th election. The *Bangkok Post* then published them, explaining in an accompanying article that "Khmer watchers" were dubious about the clothes and manner of the people depicted, and quoting "other observers" who "pointed to the possibility that the series of pictures could have been taken in Thailand with the prime objective of destroying the image of the Socialist parties" before the election.

This story was reported in the *U.S./Indochina Report* of the Indochina Resource Center in July 1976, along with the additional information that a Thai intelligence officer later admitted that the photos were indeed posed inside Thailand: "'Only the photographer and I were supposed to know,' he confided to a Thai journalist." The full details were again given in the *International Bulletin* (April 25, 1977; circulation 6,000). A letter of April 20 to *The Washington Post* on these points has not appeared. In short, the "freedom of the press" assures that readers of the *International Bulletin* will get the facts.

Even if the photographs had been authentic, we might ask why people should be pulling plows in Cambodia. The reason is clear, if unmentioned. The savage American assault on Cambodia did not spare the animal population. Hildebrand and Porter, in their *Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution*, cite a Cambodian Government report of April 1976 that several hundred thousand draft animals were killed in the rural areas. The *Post* did not have to resort to probable fabrications to depict the facts. A hundred-word item buried in *The New York Times* of June 14, 1976, cites an official U.N. report that teams of "human buffaloes" pull plows in Laos in areas where the buffalo herds, along with everything else, were decimated (by the American bombing, although this goes unmentioned in the *Times*). Much the same is true in Vietnam. Quite possibly the U.N. or the Laotian Government could supply photographic evidence, but this would not satisfy the needs of current propaganda.

The response to the three books under review nicely illustrates this selection process. Hildebrand and Porter present a carefully documented study of the destructive American impact on Cambodia and the success of the Cambodian revolutionaries in overcoming it, giving a very favorable picture of their programs and policies, based on a wide range of sources. Published last year, and well received by the journal of the Asia Society (*Asia*, March-April 1977), it has not been reviewed in the *Times*, *New York Review* or any mass-media publication, nor used as the basis for editorial comment, with one exception. *The Wall Street Journal* acknowledged its existence in an editorial entitled "Cambodia Good Guys" (November 22, 1976), which dismissed contemptuously the very idea that the Khmer Rouge could play a constructive role, as well as the notion that the United States had a major hand in the destruction, death

and turmoil of wartime and postwar Cambodia. In another editorial on the "Cambodian Horror" (April 16, 1976), the *Journal* editors speak of the attribution of postwar Cambodian difficulties to U.S. intervention as "the record extension to date of the politics of guilt." On the subject of "Unscrambling Chile" (September 20, 1976), however, the abuses of the "manfully rebuilding" Chilean police state are explained away as an unfortunate consequence of Allendista "wrecking" of the economy.

In brief, Hildebrand and Porter attribute "wrecking" and "rebuilding" to the wrong parties in Cambodia. In his Foreword to *Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution*, Asian scholar George Kahin observes that it is a book from which "anyone who is interested in understanding the situation obtaining in Phnom Penh before and after the Lon Nol government's collapse and the character and programs of the Cambodian Government that has replaced it will, I am sure, be grateful. . . ." But the mass media are not grateful for the Hildebrand-Porter message, and have shielded the general public from such perceptions of Cambodia.

In contrast, the media favorite, Barron and Paul's "untold story of Communist Genocide in Cambodia" (their subtitle), virtually ignores the U.S. Government role. When they speak of "the murder of a gentle land," they are not referring to B-52 attacks on villages or the systematic bombing and murderous ground sweeps by American troops or forces organized and supplied by the United States, in a land that had been largely removed from the conflict prior to the American attack. Their point of view can be predicted from the "diverse sources" on which they relied: namely, "informal briefings from specialists at the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council and three foreign embassies in Washington." Their "Acknowledgments" mention only the expertise of Thai and Malaysian officials, U.S. Government Cambodian experts, and Father Ponchaud. They also claim to have analyzed radio and refugee reports.

Their scholarship collapses under the barest scrutiny. To cite a few cases, they state that among those evacuated from Phnom Penh, "virtually everybody saw the consequences of [summary executions] in the form of the corpses of men, women and children rapidly bloating and rotting in the hot sun," citing,

among others, J.-J. Cazaux, who wrote, in fact, that "not a single corpse was seen along our evacuation route," and that early reports of massacres proved fallacious (*The Washington Post*, May 9, 1975). They also cite *The New York Times*, May 9, 1975, where Sydney Schanberg wrote that "there have been unconfirmed reports of executions of senior military and civilian officials. . . . But none of this will apparently bear any resemblance to the mass executions that had been predicted by Westerners," and that "Here and there were bodies, but it was difficult to tell if they were people who had succumbed to the hardships of the march or simply civilians and soldiers killed in the last battles." They do not mention the Swedish journalist, Olle Tolgraven, or Richard Boyle of Pacific News Service, the last newsman to leave Cambodia, who denied the existence of wholesale executions; nor do they cite the testimony of Father Jacques Engelmann, a priest with nearly two decades of experience in Cambodia, who was evacuated at the same time and reported that evacuated priests "were not witness to any cruelties" and that there were deaths, but "not thousands, as certain newspapers have written" (cited by Hildebrand and Porter).

Barron and Paul claim that there is no evidence of popular support for the Communists in the countryside and that people "fled to the cities" as a result of the "harsh regimen" imposed by the Communists—not the American bombing. Extensive evidence to the contrary, including eyewitness reports and books by French and American correspondents and observers long familiar with Cambodia (e.g., Richard Dudman, Serge Thion, J.-C. Pomonti, Charles Meyer) is never cited. Nor do they try to account for the amazingly rapid growth of the revolutionary forces from 1969 to 1973, as attested by U.S. intelligence and as is obvious from the unfolding events themselves.

Their quotes, where they can be checked, are no more reliable. Thus they claim that Ponchaud attributes to a Khmer Rouge official the statement that people expelled from the cities "are no longer needed, and local chiefs are free to dispose of them as they please," implying that local chiefs are free to kill them. But Ponchaud's first report on this (*Le Monde*, February 18, 1976) quotes a military chief as stating that they "are left to the absolute discretion of the local authorities," which implies nothing of the sort.

These examples are typical. Where

there is no independent confirmatory evidence, the Barron-Paul story can hardly be regarded as credible. Their version of history has already appeared in the *Reader's Digest* (circulation more than 18 million), and has been widely cited in the mass media as an authoritative account, including, among them, a front-page horror summary in *The Wall Street Journal*, an article in *TV Guide* (April 30, 1977; circulation more than 19 million) by Ernest Lefever, a foreign policy specialist who is otherwise known for his argument before Congress that we should be more tolerant of the "mistakes" of the Chilean junta "in attempting to clear away the devastation of the Allende period," and his discovery of the "remarkable freedom of expression" enjoyed by critics of the military regime (*The Miami Herald*, August 6, 1974).

Ponchaud's book is based on his own personal experiences in Cambodia from 1965 until the capture of Phnom Penh, extensive interviews with refugees and reports from the Cambodian radio. Published in France in January 1977, it has become the best-known unread book in recent history, on the basis of an account by Jean Lacouture (in *The New York Review of Books*), widely cited since in the press, which alleges that Ponchaud has revealed a policy of "autogenocide" (Lacouture's term) practiced by the Communists.

Before looking more closely at Ponchaud's book and its press treatment, we would like to point out that apart from Hildebrand and Porter there are many other sources on recent events in Cambodia that have not been brought to the attention of the American reading public. Space limitations preclude a comprehensive review, but such journals as the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, the *London Economist*, the *Melbourne Journal of Politics*, and others elsewhere, have provided analyses by highly qualified specialists who have studied the full range of evidence available, and who concluded that executions have numbered at most in the thousands; that these were localized in areas of limited Khmer Rouge influence and unusual peasant discontent, where brutal revenge killings were aggravated by the threat of starvation resulting from the American destruction and killing. These reports also emphasize both the extraordinary brutality on both sides during the civil war (provoked by the American attack) and repeated discoveries that massacre reports were false. They

also testify to the extreme unreliability of refugee reports, and the need to treat them with great caution, a fact that we and others have discussed elsewhere (cf. Chomsky: *At War with Asia*, on the problems of interpreting reports of refugees from American bombing in Laos). Refugees are frightened and defenseless, at the mercy of alien forces. They naturally tend to report what they believe their interlocutors wish to hear. While their reports must be considered seriously, care and caution are necessary. Specifically, refugees questioned by Westerners or Thais have a vested interest in reporting atrocities on the part of Cambodian revolutionaries, an obvious fact that no serious reporter will fail to take into account.

To give an illustration of just one neglected source, the London *Economist* (March 26, 1977) carried a letter by W. J. Sampson, who worked as an economist and statistician for the Cambodian Government until March 1975, in close contact with the central statistics office. After leaving Cambodia, he writes, he "visited refugee camps in Thailand and kept in touch with Khmers," and he also relied on "A European friend who cycled around Phnom Penh for many days after its fall [and] saw and heard of no . . . executions" apart from "the shooting of some prominent politicians and the lynching of hated bomber pilots in Phnom Penh." He concludes "that such executions could be numbered in hundreds or thousands rather than in hundreds of thousands," though there was "a big death toll from sickness"—surely a direct consequence, in large measure, of the devastation caused by the American attack. Sampson's analysis is known to those in the press who have cited Ponchaud at second-hand, but has yet to be reported here. And his estimate of executions is far from unique.

Expert analyses of the sort just cited read quite differently from the confident conclusions of the mass media. Here we read that "Most foreign experts on Cambodia and its refugees believe at least 1.2 million persons have been killed or have died as a result of the policies of the Communist regime since April 17, 1975" (UPI, *Boston Globe*, April 17, 1977). No source is given, but it is interesting that a 1.2 million estimate is attributed by Ponchaud to the American Embassy (presumably Bangkok), a completely worthless source, as the historical record amply demonstrates. The figure bears a suggestive similarity to the prediction by U.S. officials at the

war's end that a million would die in the next year.

In *The New York Times Magazine*, May 1, 1977, Robert Moss (editor of a dubious offshoot of Britain's *The Economist* called "Foreign Report" which specializes in sensational rumors from the world's intelligence agencies) asserts that "Cambodia's pursuit of total revolution has resulted, by the official admission of its Head of State, Khieu Samphan, in the slaughter of a million people." Moss informs us that the source of this statement is Barron and Paul, who claim that in an interview with the Italian weekly *Famiglia Cristiana* Khieu Samphan stated that more than a million died during the war, and that the population had been 7 million before the war and is now 5 million. Even if one places some credence in this reported interview nowhere in it does Khieu Samphan suggest that the million post-war deaths were a result of official policies (as opposed to the lag effects of a war that left large numbers ill, injured, and on the verge of starvation). The "slaughter" by the Khmer Rouge is a Moss-*New York Times* creation.

A *Christian Science Monitor* editorial states: "Reports put the loss of life as high as 2 million people out of 7.8 million total." Again, there is no source, but we will suggest a possibility directly. *The New York Times* analysis of "two years after the Communist victory" goes still further. David Andelman, May 2, 1977, speaks without qualification of "the purges that took hundreds of thousands of lives in the aftermath of the Communist capture of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975." Even the U.S. Government sources on which journalists often uncritically rely advance no such claim, to our knowledge. In fact, even Barron and Paul claim only that "100,000 or more" were killed in massacres and executions—they base their calculations on a variety of interesting assumptions, among them, that *all* military men, civil servants and teachers were targeted for execution; curiously, their "calculations" lead them to the figure of 1.2 million deaths as a result of "actions" of the Khmer Rouge governing authorities, by January 1, 1977 ("at a very minimum"); by a coincidence, the number reported much earlier by the American Embassy, according to Ponchaud. Elsewhere in the press, similar numbers are bandied about, with equal credibility.

Ponchaud's book is serious and worth reading, as distinct from much

of the commentary it has elicited. He gives a grisly account of what refugees have reported to him about the barbarity of their treatment at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. He also reminds us of some relevant history. For example, in this "peaceful land," peasants were massacred, their lands stolen and villages destroyed, by police and army in 1966, many then joining the *maquis* out of "their hatred for a government exercising such injustices and sowing death." He reports the enormous destruction and murder resulting directly from the American attack on Cambodia, the starvation and epidemics as the population was driven from their countryside by American military terror and the U.S.-incited civil war, leaving Cambodia with "an economy completely devastated by the war." He points out that "from the time of Sihanouk, then Lon Nol, the soldiers of the government army had already employed, with regard to their Khmer Rouge 'enemies,' bloodthirsty methods in no way different from those of Democratic Cambodia" (the Khmer Rouge). He also gives a rather positive account of Khmer Rouge programs of social and economic development, while deploring much brutal practice in working for egalitarian goals and national independence.

Ponchaud's book lacks the documentation provided in Hildebrand and Porter and its veracity is therefore difficult to assess. But the serious reader will find much to make him somewhat wary. For one thing, Ponchaud plays fast and loose with quotes and with numbers. He quotes an unattributed Khmer Rouge slogan, "One or two million young people will be enough to build the new Cambodia." In an article in *Le Monde* (February 18, 1976) he gives what appears to be the same quote, this time as follows: "To rebuild the new Cambodia, a million people are enough." Here the quote is attributed to a Khmer Rouge military commander, along with the statement misrepresented by Barron and Paul, noted above (Lacouture changes the numbers to 1.5 million to 2 million, attributes the quote to an unnamed Marxist, and concludes that it goes beyond barbarism). This is one of the rare examples of a quote that can be checked. The results are not impressive.

Ponchaud cites a Cambodian report that 200,000 people were killed in American bombings from March 7 to August 15, 1973. No source is offered, but suspicions are aroused by the fact that the Phnom Penh radio announced on May

9, 1975 that there were 200,000 casualties of the American bombing in 1973, including "killed, wounded, and crippled for life" (Hildebrand and Porter). Ponchaud cites "Cambodian authorities" who give the figures 800,000 killed and 240,000 wounded before liberation. The figures are implausible. By the usual rule of thumb, wounded amount to about three times killed; quite possibly he has the figures reversed.

More significant is Ponchaud's account of the evacuation of Phnom Penh in April 1975. He reports the explanation given by the revolutionary government: that the evacuation was motivated by impending famine. But this he rejects, on the ground that rice stocks in Phnom Penh would have sufficed for two months, with rationing (what he thinks would have happened after two months, with no new harvest, he does not say). He gives no source for this estimate, and fails to observe that "According to Long Boret, the old Government's last Premier, Phnom Penh had only eight days worth of rice on hand on the eve of the surrender" (Agence France-Presse, Bangkok; *New York Times*, May 9, 1975). Nor does he cite the testimony of U.S. AID officials that Phnom Penh had only a six-day supply of rice (William Goodfellow, *New York Times*, July 14, 1975).

In fact, where an independent check is possible, Ponchaud's account seems at best careless, sometimes in rather significant ways. Nevertheless, the book is a serious work, however much the press has distorted it.

As noted, Ponchaud relies overwhelmingly on refugee reports. Thus his account is at best second-hand with many of the refugees reporting what they claim to have heard from others. Lacouture's review gives at best a third-hand account. Commentary on Lacouture's review in the press, which has been extensive, gives a fourth-hand account. That is what is available to readers of the American press.

As an instance, consider *The Christian Science Monitor* editorial already cited, which gives a fair sample of what is available to the American public. This editorial, based on Lacouture's review, speaks of the "reign of terror against the population" instituted by the Khmer Rouge. Lacouture, like Ponchaud, emphasizes the brutality of the American war, which laid the basis for all that followed. These references disappear from the *Monitor* editorial, which pretends that the current suffering in Cambodia takes place in an historical vacuum, as a mere result of Communist savagery.

Similarly, an earlier editorial (January 26, 1977), based on Barron and Paul, also avoids any reference to American responsibility, though there is much moralizing about those who are indifferent to "one of the most brutal and concentrated onslaughts in history" in this "lovely land" of "engaging people."

It is difficult to convey the deep cynicism of this all-too-typical reporting which excises from history the American role in turning peaceful Cambodia into a land of massacre, starvation and disease. While the editors prate about morality, people are dying in Cambodia as a direct result of the policies that they supported, and indeed concealed. Hildebrand and Porter quote a Western doctor in Phnom Penh on the mass starvation that resulted from the American war: "as well as knocking off a generation of young men, the war is knocking off a generation of children"—those who will die from the permanent damage suffered from severe malnutrition, one small part of the American legacy to this "lovely land."

To appreciate fully the cynicism of the press and editorial comments, it is necessary to recall the role of the American mass media in supporting the "secret war" against Cambodia. Prior to the Nixon-Kissinger administration, Cambodian villages had been subject to U.S.- or U.S.-supported armed attack, invariably denied, but on occasion later conceded when it was discovered that Western observers were present. The massive assault against Cambodia began in March 1969, when the "secret" B-52 raids were launched. In the following weeks, the Cambodian Government made repeated efforts to bring the facts to the attention of the international press. Prince Sihanouk appealed to the press to make public these "criminal attacks" on "peaceful Cambodian farmers" and to "publicize abroad this very clear stand of Cambodia" in "oppos[ing] all bombings on Cambodian territory under whatever pretext." In January 1970, his government released an official White Book giving details of U.S. attacks on civilians up to May 1969, including names, places, dates, figures and photographs. All of this was concealed by the American press, which was later to claim that it was Richard Nixon who kept the 1969 bombardment from the press and the American people.

There was one notable exception, a *New York Times* report by William Beecher (May 9, 1969), headed "Raids in Cambodia by U.S. Unprotected,"

which reported B-52 raids on "Vietcong and North Vietnamese supply dumps and base camps in Cambodia," citing U.S. sources and disregarding Sihanouk's impassioned protest against the murder of "Khmer peasants, women and children in particular."

But let us return to the fourth-hand *Monitor* account. It also refers to "recent photographs depicting forced labor conditions in the countryside," namely, the case already discussed, adding that they "have not been positively verified." This hardly does justice to the facts. The *Monitor* also cites "reports" that 2 million people have died. The only source we can imagine for this is Lacouture's rhetorical question: "What Oriental despots or medieval inquisitors ever boasted having eliminated, in a single year, one-quarter of their own population?"—2 million people. This statement, allegedly based on Ponchaud, is quoted in the *Monitor*. Nothing supporting this appears in Ponchaud's book, as Lacouture agrees in corrections published in *The New York Review* (May 26, 1977).

The *Monitor* editorial writers had obviously never seen the book on which they based their account of events in Cambodia. Rather, like the bulk of the press, they selected what they wanted to believe. Citing Lacouture, they denounce the terror and barbarism of the Khmer Rouge, omitting his denunciation of the American attack. Lacouture does in fact compare the Khmer Rouge to the Nazis. He states that Ponchaud cites "telling articles" from a Cambodian Government newspaper and quotes a paragraph which states that "we will choose only the fruit that suit us perfectly," as distinct from the Vietnamese, who "have removed only the rotten fruit." Commenting on this passage, Lacouture states: "Perhaps Beria would not have dared to say this openly; Himmler might have done so." And he then concludes that the Cambodian revolution is "worthy of Nazi Gauleiters."

The newspaper report that elicited these judgments, on which the press uncritically relies, does appear in Ponchaud's book. The source, however, is not a Cambodian Government newspaper but a Thai newspaper, a considerable difference. The quoted paragraph was written by a Thai reporter who claims to have had an interview with a Khmer Rouge official. In his corrections, Lacouture notes the error, and adds that this Khmer Rouge official "said, as Ponchaud writes, that he found the revolutionary method of the Vietnamese 'very

slow' . . ." A more accurate statement would be that the Thai reporter *claims* that that is what was said—by now, a sufficiently remote chain of transmission to raise many doubts. How seriously would we regard a critical account of the United States in a book by a hostile European leftist based on a report in *Pravda* of a statement allegedly made by an unnamed American official? The analogy is precise. Why then should we rest any judgment on Ponchaud's account of a Thai report of an alleged statement by an unnamed Khmer Rouge official? What is certain is that the basis for Lacouture's accusations, cited above, disappears when the quotes are properly attributed: to a Thai reporter, not a Cambodian Government newspaper.

Lacouture's review contained other errors, as he notes in his corrections. Thus he attributed to "texts distributed in Phnom Penh" what in fact appear to be slogans remembered by refugees, again a rather considerable difference. None of the examples he quotes is specifically attributed by Ponchaud.

In his corrections, Lacouture raises the question whether precision on these matters is very important. "Faced with an enterprise as monstrous as the new Cambodian Government, should we see the main problem as one of deciding exactly which person uttered an inhuman phrase, and whether the regime has murdered thousands or hundreds of thousands of wretched people?" He adds that it hardly matters what were the exact numbers of the victims of Dachau or Katyn. Or perhaps, we may add, whether the victims of My Lai numbered in the hundreds or tens of thousands, if a factor of 100 is unimportant.

If, indeed, postwar Cambodia is, as he believes, similar to Nazi Germany,

then his comment is perhaps just, though we may add that he has produced no evidence to support this judgment. But if postwar Cambodia is more similar to France after liberation, where many thousands of people were massacred within a few months under far less rigorous conditions than those left by the American war, then perhaps a rather different judgment is in order. That the latter conclusion may be more nearly correct is suggested by the analyses mentioned earlier.

We disagree with Lacouture's judgment on the importance of precision on this question. It seems to us quite important, at this point in our understanding, to distinguish between official government texts and memories of slogans reported by refugees, between the statement that the regime "boasts" of having "killed" 2 million people and the claim by Western sources that something like a million have died—particularly, when the bulk of these deaths are plausibly attributable to the United States. Similarly, it seems to us a very important question whether an "inhuman phrase" was uttered by a Thai reporter or a Khmer Rouge official. As for the numbers, it seems to us quite important to determine whether the number of collaborators massacred in France was on the order of thousands, or hundreds of thousands, and whether the French Government ordered and organized the massacre. Exactly such questions arise in the case of Cambodia.

We do not pretend to know where the truth lies amidst these sharply conflicting assessments; rather, we again want to emphasize some crucial points. What filters through to the American

public is a seriously distorted version of the evidence available, emphasizing alleged Khmer Rouge atrocities and downplaying or ignoring the crucial U.S. role, direct and indirect, in the torment that Cambodia has suffered. Evidence that focuses on the American role, like the Hildebrand and Porter volume, is ignored, not on the basis of truthfulness or scholarship but because the message is unpalatable.

It is a fair generalization that the larger the number of deaths attributed to the Khmer Rouge, and the more the U.S. role is set aside, the larger the audience that will be reached. The Barron-Paul volume is a third-rate propaganda tract, but its exclusive focus on Communist terror assures it a huge audience. Ponchaud's far more substantial work has an anti-Communist bias and message, but it has attained stardom only via the extreme anti-Khmer Rouge distortions added to it in the article in *The New York Review of Books*. The last added the adequately large numbers executed and gave a "Left" authentication of Communist evil that assured a quantum leap to the mass audience unavailable to Hildebrand and Porter or to Carol Bragg. Contrary facts and even authors' corrections of misstatements are generally ignored or inadequately reported in favor of a useful lesson (we note one exception: an honest retraction of an editorial based on Lacouture in the *Boston Globe*). We noted earlier that the *Monitor* editorial and other press comments built on the Lacouture review offer at best a fourth-hand account. The chain of transmission runs from refugees (or Thai or U.S. officials), to Ponchaud, to *The New York Review*, to the press, where a mass audience is reached and "facts" are established that enter the approved version of history. □

The Kampuchea-Vietnam War—Background



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Origins of the Conflict

Traditional antagonism, colonial manipulation,
and incompatible ideology have led to open warfare.

The split between Kampuchea and Vietnam
is probably as deep as any in the world today.

BY STEPHEN R. HEDER

Behind the current conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam and their governing communist parties lie differences so profound that each revolution stands as an implicit critique of the other. That the existence of each revolutionary model challenges the basic premises of the other is the result of a complex interaction of history, politics and geography. For two such different neighbors to avoid conflict would require extraordinary good will and a mutual commitment to cooperation and compromise. Such elements have not characterized the relationships between the two parties or the states they rule. Furthermore, historically and presently, the question of how closely the two parties and states will work together has been a key source of tension. This, perhaps more than any other, is the irresolvable issue at the core of today's fighting. An examination of the contrasting histories of the two parties and of the different situations of the two states reveals why this is so.

The radical differences in domestic and international policies separating the Kampuchean and Vietnamese governments, which deeply color each side's view of the other and make even simple coexistence difficult, were shaped by the settings in

which the two parties carried out their revolutions. Perhaps most significant was the nature of the forces against which they fought. The Vietnamese revolutionaries faced a foreign enemy, while the Kampucheans sought to overthrow a neo-colonial but indigenous regime. Consequently, for the Vietnamese, the primary focus of the revolution during its formative years was not an attack on tradition or feudal class relations, but a nationalist struggle against foreign domination, which drew in a wide spectrum of the population. Class struggle and the establishment of a socialist society remained key components of the revolutionary program, but they were overshadowed for long periods by the struggle for national independence. For the Kampucheans, on the other hand, the enemy was a feudal-bureaucratic state clad in nationalist trappings. Its overthrow demanded a strategy based on radical class struggle coupled with nationalist claims even stronger than those of this state.

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The CPK's Khieu Samphan and Sihanouk in a 1973 propaganda photo. Six years before, Khieu Samphan had fled Phnom Penh to escape Sihanouk's stepped-up repression against the communists. (Photo: PAFNLC)

In Vietnam, the communist movement, while retaining its commitment to socialist revolution, early became the virtually unrivaled representative of Vietnamese nationalism. A series of competitors—the Bao Dai, Diem and Thieu regimes—conspicuously relied on foreign support for their survival. In addition, the French colonialists had helped prevent the emergence of an alternative nationalist leadership by undermining the political importance of the Vietnamese court without establishing an indigenous commercial-capitalist political regime in its place. In this setting, the party came to emphasize continuity with pre-modern traditions of gentry-led peasant opposition to foreign rule rather than class conflict and class struggle.

With the liberation of the north and partition of the country in 1954, this tendency took on a new dimension, for it was essential that socialist construction in the north not disrupt the united front for national liberation in the south. Hence, the transformation to socialism in the north had to take place cautiously and with a minimum of provocative class conflict to avoid frightening elements of the southern population who wanted to expel the Americans and destroy the regimes dependent on them but did not support socialism. Such conditions injected into the theory and practice of the Vietnamese revolution relatively high degrees of class caution and traditionalism. In practice, this is manifested in a preference for administrative measures rather than relatively violent mass movements in resolving social contradictions. In theory, it is manifested in an emphasis on the forces of production (i.e., science and technology) rather than the relations of production (i.e., class struggle and conflict) in the post-liberation stage of socialist construction.

The setting in which the Communist Party of Kampuchea

(CPK) launched its revolutionary movement was quite different and pushed it in a much more radical direction. The party was founded in 1960, and it launched its armed struggle to take power in 1968. Hence, its theory and practice—and much of its current leadership—were developed not during the period of French colonial rule or of the U.S.-backed Lon Nol regime but during the Sihanouk era. This meant that the party had to direct its revolution against a highly nationalistic autocracy which enjoyed diplomatic, economic and military support from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the National Liberation Front, the Soviet Union and China. Coopting many nationalist and anti-imperialist themes, the Sihanouk regime enjoyed a progressive image abroad, while its vaguely anti-capitalist ideology allowed it to proclaim its commitment to certain types of social reform as well. But in reality, Sihanouk's internal policies were viciously repressive and failed to resolve any of the major socio-economic problems in the countryside. Furthermore, in contrast to Vietnam, French colonial rule had strengthened the Kampuchean monarchy. After independence, the royal house was reinforced and stabilized and a repressive colonial bureaucracy modernized by aid first from the United States, then from the Soviet Union and China.

In launching a revolutionary movement against such a state, the Communists could not rely on simple nationalist and reformist themes to build up a popular base. Rather, they had to emphasize class struggle against a deeply rooted indigenous enemy with strong nationalist credentials, and the CPK's nationalist line had to outdo Sihanouk's. These tendencies toward radical class struggle and nationalism became integral elements of the Kampuchean communist movement in the period before 1970, particularly as armed struggle against the Sihanouk state expanded from a handful of armed guards for CPK cadre in 1968 to a peasant guerrilla army of 5,000-10,000 persons in 1970. These forces became the nucleus of the party and full-sized revolutionary army after the March 1970 coup which deposed Sihanouk.

The coup unexpectedly catapulted Sihanouk and members of his personal political entourage into a united front with the CPK. It did not, however, weaken the CPK's class emphasis or its extraordinarily strong nationalism. On the contrary, the party was forced to develop even more radical class and nationalist standpoints to set itself apart from the nationalist and reformist monarchism displayed by Sihanouk in his united front role. As head of state, Sihanouk had repressed the Kampuchean Communists with ferocious brutality, and the party could not allow the united front to become a means of protecting Sihanouk's political power, which drew strength from his popular image as the embodiment of Kampuchean nationalism. Hence, the very formation of the united front would require an eventual intense and violent class struggle against those elements within it which represented the social bases of the monarchy and bureaucracy. As a result, the theory and practice of the Communist Party of Kampuchea have come to reflect systematically the class and nationalist radicalism forged during this period. In its practice the CPK relies on disruptive and even violent mass-based struggles to resolve social contradictions, including such fundamental ones as those between city and countryside and between mental and manual labor. The party's theory of socialist construction stresses the absolute primacy of mass mobilization, subjective resolution and learning through practical work over technology and theoretical sophistication.

POST-REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS

Emerging from such contrasting experiences, the Vietnamese and Kampuchean communist parties took power in 1975 in equally different post-revolutionary situations. The nature of the post-liberation crisis confronting each party further widened the gulf between them. As has been the case in most other revolutionary situations, the victorious parties faced an immediate need to consolidate their power and protect themselves against their enemies. Typically in such a situation, a radical and often violent campaign is directed against potential enemies of the revolution, who may include former members of a united front or even factions within the party. But the threats confronting the Vietnamese and Kampuchean communist parties in 1975 were not on the same scale.

The Vietnamese communists came to power in the south in far more secure circumstances than those surrounding the CPK victory in Kampuchea. Not only had the Thieu regime and its forces disintegrated in a complete rout, but the existence of a consolidated socialist state in the north provided a major source of strength to the new government in the south. The Vietnamese party had in fact passed through its initial post-liberation crisis in 1956 during the radical land reform campaign in the north, an episode generally recognized as the most violent in Vietnamese revolutionary history.* This struggle against reactionary social groups was marked by serious internal party strife. Eventually the struggle was moderated and its violence partially repudiated, to be followed by a period of relative social calm. In the south, a full-scale post-revolutionary crisis has not yet occurred, although the attack on bourgeois trade in Ho Chi Minh City may be a harbinger or a first step. The delay in attacking potential enemies and the step by step pace of social and economic transformation in the south are possible because, with socialist rule well established in the north, there is no apparent threat of a counterattack which might successfully overturn or subvert the revolution.

In Kampuchea, however, the post-victory crisis was acute. The final battle between the forces of Lon Nol and those of the revolutionary army had been the biggest and bloodiest of the war, and it had left the revolutionary army badly battered. In Kampuchea, there was no socialist state in another part of the country to guarantee the fruits of victory, and both the Communists and their enemies realized that there was a real possibility that the victories won in war might be sabotaged in post-war strife. Without experience in administering major urban areas and faced with a desperate food shortage in the newly-captured cities, the Communist Party of Kampuchea moved swiftly and drastically to consolidate its position. The evacuation of the cities—strictly implemented despite what must have been serious opposition from within the united front and from many urban residents—dissipated the immediate security problem by dispersing the CPK's enemies. It also provided a means of dealing with the food emergency. But it was not only the pressing needs of the moment which persuaded the party leadership to choose this particular form of struggle. The evacuation and subsequent integration of war refugees and native city dwellers into the rural cooperative system was a radical step toward resolving the contradiction between city and

countryside, a resolution which history had made a high priority for the CPK.

Another historical factor has pushed the two revolutionary states in contrasting directions. Vietnamese revolutionaries have held state power in the north for nearly a quarter of a century. Hence in a pattern typical of governing revolutionary parties, the routinizing requirements of running a state have gradually transformed their revolutionary exuberance into either administrative efficiency or administrative stagnation. This tendency toward bureaucratization has strongly influenced even the southern cadre who moved directly from guerrilla warfare to state administration. In Kampuchea, on the other hand, the primary experience of all cadre is with quite recent and intense military and class conflict. Their administrative experience is limited, and administration remains *ad hoc*, with revolutionary zeal the overwhelming administrative theme. Experiment and chaos rather than efficiency or stagnation appear to be the outstanding characteristics of the new Kampuchean state.

ECONOMIC CHOICES

Just as their contrasting political histories shaped the Vietnamese and Kampuchean communist parties in sharply different ways, so too the economic conditions they inherited presented them with different opportunities and limitations for the post-war reconstruction period. Although both countries' economies are relatively backward and characterized by scarcity, they are far from identical. In both its rural and urban sectors, the south Vietnamese economy in 1975 was significantly more "modern"—i.e. more highly industrialized and commercialized—than the Kampuchean. Similarly, the economy of socialist north Vietnam was more advanced than that of the Kampuchean liberated zones. Yet at the same time overpopulation and land pressure in Vietnam made the situation of scarcity there fundamentally more serious than in underpopulated and relatively land-rich Kampuchea. This contrast was heightened, because both north Vietnam, which is very densely populated, and the liberated zones in the south, which covered only limited areas, had to import rice, while the liberated zones of Kampuchea, which extended over large territories, produced a rice surplus. The double contrast between Vietnamese economic modernity coupled with rice deficit and Kampuchean economic backwardness coupled with rice surplus helps explain the divergent paths taken by each government in post-war revolutionary transformation and reconstruction.

In Vietnam, analysis of the various elements of the existing economic system suggested a strategy of transformation in the south which would attempt the conversion of modern, productive facilities into components of a state socialist system. Relatively advanced commercial networks, urban infrastructure and industrial or semi-industrial complexes were already available in both south and north. Drawing managerial and in some cases material resources from the north, it was possible simply to take over components of the old southern economy, supply them with new socialist management (or socialist supervision of the old capitalist management) and integrate them into a state socialist planning system. Highlighting the value of inherited economic resources was the underlying situation of general scarcity, which had probably conditioned the Vietnamese Communists to be cautious in considering disruptive or radical measures for economic transformation. At

* For a detailed critique of exaggerated accounts of the level of violence employed, see D. Gareth Porter, *The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered*, (Cornell, 1972) [Ed.].

the same time, there appeared to be relatively little political risk in allowing old capitalists to continue to function within the limits imposed by a state socialist economy, because their close association with foreign economic interests had left them with little domestic political base. Thus, in order to break their political power it appeared sufficient to nationalize their interests and draw their enterprises into the state economy.

Kampuchea in 1975, however, possessed little that could be usefully and productively converted directly and immediately into components of a modern socialist economic system. Kampuchea had remained an undeveloped colonial backwater while French modernization efforts focused on Vietnam. Later, the Sihanouk regime had neither attracted foreign investment nor successfully mobilized the population for economic achievements. Although the country had received some industrial plants from the Soviet Union and China and had constructed some elements of a modern infrastructure, these had been heavily damaged during the war—which was even more destructive in Kampuchea than in Vietnam. With such a small modern sector, it was possible for the Kampuchean Communists to choose a reconstruction strategy which would rapidly rehabilitate those facilities considered salvageable and useful while ignoring some of the previously advanced sectors, most of which were unproductive and damaged. Furthermore, in considering the food crisis at the end of war and the highly favorable ratio of land to population, the new government was encouraged to concentrate its reconstruction efforts on the rapid transformation and expansion of agricultural production without fear of the temporary losses in production which might result from a radically disruptive policy. From a political perspective, the decision to discard much of the old regime's economically advanced sector was made more attractive because the facilities and networks in question were part of the old political power structure. Many had been part of Sihanouk's state capitalist system—and few were tainted by direct association with foreign capital. Thus with Sihanouk in the united front, there was real fear that the resurrection of these sectors as part of a socialist state enterprise system might only restore the political influence of Sihanouk's state capitalists. This fear was heightened by the fact that the economy of the liberated zones was entirely agricultural, offering no socialist industry as a counterweight to the economic power of the old industrial sector. Hence, unlike the situation in Vietnam, simple nationalization and direct conversion of the existing economic structure to a socialist system were not adequate to break the power of the revolution's long-standing enemies.

IMPLICIT MUTUAL CRITIQUE

Taken together, all these factors acted to push the Kampuchean and Vietnamese communist parties in strikingly different directions, particularly after they had seized power throughout their respective countries. Each revolutionary model points out the real or imaginable shortcomings of the other and thereby questions its legitimacy. In addition to the implicit mutual critique contained in the contrasting practice and theory of the two parties, their differing positions on the question of revisionism in the communist movement—an issue arising with powerful insistence out of the Sino-Soviet split—strengthened the theoretical basis for their criticism and suspicion of each other.

The Vietnamese party was already well established when the

debate began. While it criticized as "revisionist" Khrushchev's refusal to fully support Vietnam against the United States in the early 1960s, it did not join the debate over the proper internal policies of ruling communist parties or launch an insistent or violent campaign against "revisionism" within its own ranks. This complacency about internal revisionism dovetailed with the Vietnamese party's de-emphasis on class struggle. By consistently deploring the break between the Soviet Union and China, it downplayed the substantive issues that divided the communist giants. The Kampuchean Communist Party, on the other hand, was born and grew up in the midst of the debate. Like most other non-ruling Asian communist parties in the 1960s, it took the issue of revisionism very seriously, quickly taking a staunch and vigilant anti-revisionist position. The CPK's struggle against revisionism fit well with its radical classist tendencies.

With so many points of difference between them, even mere coexistence as neighbors became difficult. Two revolutionary leaderships dedicated to bridging the gaps between them might have been able to overcome their differences under favorable circumstances. Instead, the inherent tension between the Vietnamese and Kampuchean Communists were exacerbated by serious disagreements over foreign policy, a history of antagonistic relations between the two countries, and mutual suspicion bred by their experience of forced cooperation during the war against the United States. The irresolvable conflict hinged around the degree to which the two parties would work together after the war, for the interaction of all these factors made it impossible that this question could be resolved to the full satisfaction of both sides.

APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY

As communists and nationalists, Vietnamese and Kampuchians approach the outside world very differently. Their differences, conditioned by geography, history, and culture, have created forms of nationalism which are not only divergent but incompatible. As a result, the basic premises and goals of Vietnamese and Kampuchean foreign policy are often in conflict, particularly on such issues as international activism versus radical self-reliance, and cooperation within the socialist bloc.

A glance at the map reveals a basic reason for opposing assumptions about relations with other countries. Vietnam's long, essentially indefensible coastline, dotted with major towns, faces one of the world's more important maritime routes. Despite the traumatic nature of most of Vietnam's interactions with foreign powers, such interactions have been made unavoidable by the constant commercial and military traffic off its coast, traffic which makes Vietnam strategically important. Hence, Vietnam has had to learn to turn outside interest to its own advantage, dealing with external threats by balancing and manipulating foreign groups, even while allowing them a fairly substantial presence in Vietnam. Simple exclusion and an isolationist stance have never been feasible possibilities. Kampuchea, on the other hand, is a primarily inland country with a short coastline, conspicuously lacking the overgrown port city typical of former colonies. (Saigon provided Kampuchea's outlet for colonial exports and Kompong Som, the only port, was developed during the Sihanouk era to reduce dependence on Vietnam.) Furthermore, only traffic between Vietnam and Thailand passes along the Kampuchean coast. Hence, Kampuchea has a potential Vietnam lacks for using isolationism as a

general means for dealing with foreign threats. Like the current regime in Burma, the only other Southeast Asian country to possess similar geographical conditions, the government of Kampuchea has sharply restricted foreign contacts.

It is also possible to hypothesize—very tentatively, because the evidence is impressionistic—that the distinctive interactions between two elements in Kampuchean and Vietnamese cultural psychology reinforce the tendencies stemming from geographical conditions. While the modern elites in both countries have articulated presumably mass-based fears of national extinction and pride in their respective histories, the treatment of these themes has not been the same. It is quite likely that the variations reflect fundamental cultural-psychological configurations which directly influence patterns of foreign policy and nationalism. The fear of extinction has been expressed with far more intensity in Kampuchea than in Vietnam. This of course reflects the historical diminution of Kampuchean territory in the face of a series of successful Vietnamese (and Thai) annexations and invasions. Practically every analysis of Kampuchean history or commentary on modern Kampuchean politics written by a Kampuchean repeatedly and ominously raises the specter of the disappearance of the Kampuchean race, culture and nation. There is frequent reference to the fate of the Kingdom of Champa, which once ruled most of peninsular Southeast Asia but ceased to function as a coherent political entity in the 15th century, leaving its people, the Chams, at the mercy of foreign states.

Similarly, the traditional Kampuchean celebration of the national construction aspect of historical Kampuchean glories has been more strongly pitched than that of the Vietnamese, who have traditionally emphasized their literary and martial achievements. The spectacular Kampuchean monuments of Angkor Vat provide a kind of concrete and irrefutable proof of a magnificent history of indigenous Kampuchean construction capabilities. This proof is absent in Vietnam. Extensive archeological excavations in Vietnam have produced nothing that can be compared to Angkor, despite the richness of other aspects of Vietnam's history. Kampuchean writings on Kampuchea have been permeated with the idea that Angkor Vat bears testimony to the infinite indigenous capabilities of the Kampuchean people in the field of national construction, while Vietnamese, when taking pride in their history, have traditionally emphasized their repeated successes in expelling foreign invaders and pride in their intellectual achievements. These include their original and creative syntheses of high Chinese culture with indigenous Vietnamese traditions.

Considering these indications of national consciousness, one can suggest that the combination of intense fear of racial and national extinction with Kampuchea's historically-based mythology of greatness in national construction is compatible with a national policy strongly emphasizing national exclusiveness and self-reliance, while Vietnam's cultural tradition, with its emphases on success against foreign aggression and on synthesizing intellectual achievement, is compatible with a national policy characterized by a self-confident attitude vis-a-vis foreigners and by interest in adopting—or adapting—foreign high technology.

Another factor affecting the relative level of nationalist feeling in the two countries is the difference in degree of regional variations within them. Although the populations of both Vietnam and Kampuchea are much more homogeneous than those of most Third World countries, the people of

Kampuchea are more so than those of Vietnam. In both countries, about 85 percent of the population is composed of the dominant ethnic group, but there are more regional linguistic and cultural variations among Vietnamese than among Khmers. Both the French, who divided Vietnam into three regions, and the Americans, who supported and violently prolonged its partition into two zones, encouraged heightened consciousness of these differences. By contrast, the French in Kampuchea maintained cultural and political unity, even though they helped create an estranged Francophile elite. As a result, the residual and partially artificial elements of regionalism which complicate and weaken the potential for Vietnamese nationalism are almost totally lacking in Kampuchea.

Even during the Sihanouk era, when the bulk of the Kampuchean population lived in the countryside under stultifying quasi-feudal socio-economic conditions and relatively untouched by modern political institutions linking them to state politics, nationalism was obviously strong. With the introduction of communist political organizations to link ordinary people with the political leadership, and with a national mobilization for social, economic and military purposes, Kampuchean nationalism may well be automatically more intense and cohesive than Vietnamese nationalism. Furthermore, because it is only recently that this potential has been fully realized through a nation-wide organization of the population by a modern political apparatus, namely the CPK, the strength of Kampuchean nationalism therefore appears more surprising—and so more disruptive—than that of Vietnam, which has become predictable and familiar.

NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

Just as the nature of the governments the two revolutionary movements opposed powerfully influenced the ways in which they approached class struggle, so too those governments affected the quality of the nationalism developed by each communist party. As we have already noted, the Vietnamese communist movement became the only legitimate vehicle of modern Vietnamese nationalism. Rival parties and political groups which tried to appear more nationalist than the Communists never won any mass following or succeeded in seriously challenging the party's nationalist credentials. The regimes against which the Communists fought were too clearly the creatures of the French or the Americans to win legitimacy. Thus for the Vietnamese Communists it was relatively easy to maintain their popularity as nationalists and make it seem that their enemies could not survive without massive imperialist support.

For the Kampuchean Communists, the situation was far more complex, because their original and most important enemy, the Sihanouk regime, had strong nationalist credentials. It emphasized some of the themes which inherently tend to emerge in Kampuchean foreign policy, including isolationism, national exclusiveness, and self-reliance. In fighting this regime, the Communists adopted an extremely strong nationalist line emphasizing these themes even more forcefully. Although they could not convincingly portray Sihanouk as the puppet of foreign masters, they noted that relatively small doses of imperialist aid helped significantly to maintain him in power. After 1970, they blamed the United States' CIA for instigating the right-wing coup which toppled Sihanouk, believing it had had the opportunity because of Sihanouk's decision to reopen

relations with the U.S. in the last years of his rule. Consequently, the Kampuchean Communists developed a strong sense of threat from even a very limited imperialist presence in their country. The 1970 change of government in Phnom Penh did not free the Kampuchean Communists from the need to compete with the government for nationalist legitimacy, for even the Lon Nol regime had better nationalist credentials than the successive Saigon governments. Not only was the United States presence in Kampuchea less spectacular than in Vietnam—although the casualties caused by U.S. bombing were proportionately greater—but Lon Nol was able to use Vietnamese support of the Communists against them. Portrayed as the tools of Hanoi, the Kampuchean Communists had to prove their nationalism and independence, a challenge never faced by the Vietnamese party.

The general international outlooks of the Vietnamese and Kampuchean governments are also differently influenced by two factors derived from their positions in world politics. First, in any system or subsystem of states, ideologies of internationalism and interdependence tend to serve the interests of the larger and more powerful states within that system or subsystem. The smaller and weaker states find their interests better served by ideologies of nationalism and independence. The implications of this tendency are obvious for Vietnam and Kampuchea, with populations of 50 million and 8 million respectively, in their roles in peninsular Southeast Asia and within the socialist bloc. Second, their relationships to the foreign policy mythology of international communism have been and are distinct.

The Vietnamese Communists have been part of the traditional international communist movement since they formed their party in 1930. Although the movement was never a monolith, it was an ideal, articulated by the originators of Marxism and realized, however imperfectly, by Lenin and Stalin in the form of the Comintern. Ho Chi Minh, who worked for the Comintern as well as for his own country, and other leaders of Vietnamese communism have always shared the ideal with its implications of the need for proletarian internationalist cooperation and coordination among the parties in the socialist camp. When the Sino-Soviet split emerged, they refused to accept it as proof of the demise of this ideal, viewing it as a temporary disagreement *within* the movement rather than the irreversible splitting up of the movement. Throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s, the Vietnamese saw themselves as senior members of the movement who could use their influence to mediate the dispute. Significant propaganda and material support from both the Soviet Union and China for their struggles to liberate the south encouraged the Vietnamese in this attitude, and no member of the socialist bloc ever seemed to be aiding an armed enemy of the Vietnamese revolution. Even now in the face of the split with China, the Vietnamese do not appear to have abandoned the ideal of communist unity. China has simply been excluded from the bloc, while Vietnam has linked itself more closely to it by joining COMECON.

For the Kampuchean Communist Party, born in 1960 when the Sino-Soviet split was already serious, the Comintern was nothing more than a historical curiosity. It evidently did not attend the last world congress of Communist Parties, held amid acrimonious Sino-Soviet recriminations at the end of 1960. Throughout the 1960s it was publicly shunned by all other communist parties. Rather than providing it with propaganda or material aid, the Soviet Union and China both supported the

Sihanouk regime. In fact, Soviet diplomats in Phnom Penh denounced the CPK in 1967, and China shipped a large amount of military aid to Sihanouk in 1968, just as the Communists were about to launch an armed struggle against his government. After 1970, the Soviet Union openly and materially supported Lon Nol, maintaining a diplomatic presence in Phnom Penh until its liberation in 1975. While China supported the CPK with both military aid and propaganda against Lon Nol, it was already embarking upon rapprochement with the United States, which was engaged in the destruction of Kampuchea. With such experiences, it is hardly surprising that the Kampuchean Communists have little faith in the reliability of aid from or alliances with fellow communist parties. Hence they reject the concept of a socialist bloc and eschew membership in it, while often seeming to pay little more than lip service to the duties of proletarian internationalism, which have never had much practical import for the CPK.

Thus a reinforcing constellation of factors ranging from geography to experience with the mythology of communist internationalism operate to shape the foreign policy outlooks of the Vietnamese and Kampuchean revolutions differently. For the Vietnamese, the logical path suggested by all these factors is one of relatively mild nationalism and moderate self-reliance. Their foreign policy is characterized by international activism and emphasis upon the concepts of proletarian internationalism and the socialist bloc, with close cooperation between communist parties. The Kampuchean Communists, on the other hand, are pushed toward more intense nationalism and radical self-reliance. Their foreign policy is marked by isolationism, rejection of the concept of the socialist bloc and little attachment to the ideal of proletarian internationalism. They place strong limits on cooperation with other communist parties. Such significant disjunctures between the foreign policy outlooks of the two revolutions make the adoption of joint policies difficult. Added to the contrasting domestic tendencies of the two revolutionary movements, they become mutually negative judgments of the other's line and practice.

TENSIONS IN STATE RELATIONSHIPS

Not only are the Vietnamese and Kampuchean revolutions fundamentally different—and in many ways incompatible—for the complex reasons already described. Because the two countries are neighbors, a number of factors push them specifically to clash directly with each other. These stem from the nature of relationships between the two nations, regardless of what kind of government is in power, and from the concrete experiences of the two communist parties in interactions often marked by severe conflicts of interest.

The sheer imbalance of power between the two countries creates serious tension which could probably only be resolved by the effective abrogation of Kampuchean national sovereignty and Kampuchean inclusion in a Vietnamese or Thai sphere of influence. The refusal of the Kampucheans to play such a subordinate role keeps the tension alive, while the disparity of the threat the two countries pose to each other profoundly influences the way each views the other. For a Vietnamese regime, relations with Kampuchea are crucial to national defense but have little effect on its internal stability and political popularity. By itself, Kampuchea can never be a major threat to Vietnam, but a hostile Kampuchean regime can seriously undermine Vietnam's ability to defend itself from

attacks along its long and vulnerable coast or from China. Beyond such defense-related concerns, relations with Kampuchea *per se* have never been an overriding domestic issue in Vietnam, nor has there ever been acute popular concern with the precise location or the possibility of readjustment of the frontier with Kampuchea. Thus, a Vietnamese regime can conduct its policies toward Kampuchea relatively free of domestic political constraints.

For a Kampuchean regime, however, relations with Vietnam strongly affect its domestic legitimacy. Even in isolation, Vietnam always poses a potentially serious military threat to Kampuchea, while Kampucheans alone see themselves as no real danger to Vietnam. Moreover, the events of the 1830s and 1840s (see box) as well as the subsequent propaganda of the French and the Sihanouk regime have made relations with Vietnam an extremely delicate and important domestic political issue with inevitable repercussions on the popular legitimacy and the cohesion and stability of any Kampuchean regime. Friendship with Vietnam appears to entail certain dangers for any Kampuchean government, since such friendship exposes it to possible charges of selling out Kampuchean interests to Vietnam. Such charges can appear more or less spontaneously at the mass level and undermine the regime's nationalist credentials among the population. At the top, a government's friendship with Vietnam can provide an issue for subordinate or rival factions which want to challenge the ruling group. A Vietnamese regime does not face this problem. For Vietnamese leaders, friendship with Kampuchea is domestically costless.

Thus Kampuchean political leaders have much less domestic political maneuvering room available in their relations with Vietnam than do their Vietnamese counterparts, who face no such political risks or sacrifices in entering close bilateral relations. If the risks and sacrifices appear worthwhile for other reasons, it may be possible for all concerned to gloss over the importance of domestic Kampuchean political constraints. Such an effort might be justified by the prospect of still greater risks and sacrifices in other quarters or of great benefits and security as compensation. Without such compelling considerations, the domestic implications of Kampuchean friendship with Vietnam are more prominent and obvious. Under such circumstances, what are known in diplomatic parlance as "correct" relations may be the maximum that are in the domestic political interests of a Kampuchean leadership.

The issue of Kampuchea's border with Vietnam concentrates and focuses the constraints on relations between the two countries. Indeed, since the Sihanouk era, when an intense public education effort focused on the history and problems of Kampuchea's frontiers, the border issue has consistently been for Kampucheans the key barometer of the state of Vietnamese-Kampuchean relations. Even more important than assessing Vietnam's true attitude toward Kampuchea, this standard has been used as a popular measure of a Kampuchean ruling group's fidelity to Kampuchean national interests. Concessions on the border issue entail even greater and more certain risks and sacrifices than friendship with Vietnam, since even the appearance of concession can be destabilizing, perhaps inviting a coup by those who would renounce or reverse the apparent concession. These implications of the border issue reduce the potential for flexibility of any Kampuchean regime almost to the vanishing point. The Vietnamese, however, may be insensitive to the difficulties experienced by the Kampucheans on this score, failing to realize that what would be

reasonable in terms of Vietnamese domestic politics is provocative and even treasonable in Kampuchea.

PARTY RELATIONS

Much more than these lasting national tensions bedevil the bilateral relations between the Vietnamese and Kampuchean communist parties, however. Their histories, both before and after the constitution of an independent Communist Party of Kampuchea in 1960, have been marked by frequent and often deep conflicts of interest revolving around the separate needs of the revolutionary movement in each country. Inevitably, these conflicts reflected the relative strength of the two nations, as well as the differing views of the two parties on what was required to drive first the French and then the Americans out of Indochina as a whole. This history does much to explain the CPK's hostility toward Vietnam.

In 1930, the newly founded Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), led by Ho Chi Minh, took on the task of establishing itself as the communist movement in both Laos and Kampuchea. Until 1945, however, little was accomplished in Kampuchea other than the recruitment of Vietnamese residents there. After World War II, the ICP helped encourage and provide with cadres a Kampuchean independence movement which was communist and integrated into the ICP. However, since so little had been achieved during the 1930s, the organizational work had to begin virtually from scratch, and non-communist groups succeeded in declaring Kampuchean independence first in 1945. Returning to Kampuchea, the French dissolved the independence government, and its supporters fled to Vietnamese and Thai frontier areas, where ICP cadres tried to recruit them. In Vietnam, recruiting efforts were hampered by conflicts between Vietnamese and Kampucheans in 1946 over the degree of autonomy to be granted to the larger ethnic Khmer community in south Vietnam and by successful French military operations against Viet Minh bases. In Thailand, where a left-wing government had provided a haven for the communists, a right-wing military coup disrupted ICP recruitment in 1947.

Deprived of their frontier bases, the Vietnamese supported a communist-led resistance movement in three relatively autonomous zones within Kampuchea. Rivalry and discord between these zones apparently weakened the movement and prevented the consolidation of its communist leadership. A further handicap arose because the Vietnamese, by their very presence as advisors and instructors, often provoked Kampuchean anti-Vietnamese nationalism. King Sihanouk, an increasingly dynamic figure, exploited the divisions among the communists to win support for his rival strategy for achieving Kampuchean independence without armed struggle or significant social reform. As a result of such problems, the communist movement which emerged in Kampuchea was characterized by internal conflict and high-level defections, and it was never formally constituted as a communist party. The Vietnamese supervised the foundation of an entity known as the Khmer People's Party in 1951, when the ICP became the Vietnam Worker's Party (VWP), but this organization was a united front apparatus apparently designed as a preliminary to a communist party.

Between 1954 and 1960 — from the Geneva Conference to the founding of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) — the Kampuchean communists suffered a series of disasters, many of which they blamed on their Vietnamese mentors. Under pressure from the Soviets and Chinese, the Vietnamese

had acquiesced in the seating of Sihanouk at Geneva as the representative of Kampuchea. In the final Geneva agreement, Vietnamese communists were allowed to consolidate their power in the north, while Kampuchea was granted independence under Sihanouk's rule with no recognition of the communists.

After Geneva, it appears that the Vietnam Workers Party, now holding state power in north Vietnam, advised the Kampucheans to dissolve their resistance organizations and fall back on parliamentary and journalistic struggles. Facing a situation similar to that of VWP cadres in south Vietnam, the Kampuchean communists were confronted with a choice between exile in north Vietnam, where they would be cut off from their society and its politics, or repression at home, where they had few or no means to defend themselves effectively. Much of the leadership of the Kampuchean communist movement chose the relative safety of exile. As the exile dragged into years, showing increasing signs of becoming permanent, they suffered severe demoralization and lost touch with the realities at home. Many of those at home, on the other hand, were little more than the victims of those realities.

As was the case in southern Vietnam, the sacrifices made at Geneva to win peace and ensure the establishment of a socialist state in north Vietnam had been followed by much worse: after partial withdrawal into exile and almost total disarmament came repression and decimation. Parliaments, newspapers and journals, legal activities, international opinion and organizations, and the strong rear base in north Vietnam all proved to have little protective value. After a few years of repression, all that was left of the pre-Geneva communist movement in many parts of Kampuchea was a handful of embittered cadres. What had been achieved with Vietnamese aid and advice up to 1954 had been lost. The losses could credibly be blamed upon what the Vietnamese had done at and since Geneva.

During this period, the developing vacuum in the Kampuchean communist movement was filled in part from new sources, the most important of which were French universities. Beginning in 1953, when a young Kampuchean who would later adopt the name Pol Pot returned from France to join the maquis, and continuing until 1959, when Khieu Samphan came home, the communist movement was invigorated with Kampucheans who did not come out of the ICP tradition. In this period after the division of the ICP into three national movements and after the Geneva settlement, these cadres could not be formally associated with the Vietnam Worker's Party.

As a result, when the Kampuchean communists held their first national congress in September 1960 to found the Communist Party of Kampuchea, there were many among them whose feelings toward the VWP were either bitter or indifferent. Although there were undoubtedly some ex-ICP cadres who remained loyal to the "ICP tradition" despite what had happened, others preferred to forget it. For many of the Kampuchean communists who had been students in France, the tradition was simply irrelevant or the object of scorn.

NEW GRIEVANCES

The foundation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea might nevertheless have opened a new era of relative warmth and friendship between Kampuchean and Vietnamese communists. By adopting a line of combined political struggle and armed self-defense, the new communist party eliminated one of

the major causes of bitterness in the post-Geneva period: exclusive reliance on peaceful political struggle in a context of repression. But a process of healing past wounds and erasing past wrongs soon became impossible.

Sihanouk responded to the formation of the CPK by escalating his anti-communist campaign, while the Vietnamese Worker's Party found itself unable or unwilling to provide material or even propaganda support to the Kampuchean Communists. Worse, the Vietnamese Communists were becoming friendly with the Sihanouk regime. Indeed, precisely as Sihanouk's intensifying repression made it harder and harder to carry out united front activities, organize legal opposition and do underground work in the cities and towns, relations between the VWP and Sihanouk became warmer and warmer. For the Vietnamese, the need to protect the flank of their struggle to liberate the south — launched in 1960 — had become the compelling priority, making correct and even intimate relations with Sihanouk vitally important. Accordingly, they felt that the Kampuchean Communists should find some expedient way to build up their own strength while simultaneously cooperating with and supporting Sihanouk's anti-imperialist foreign policy. This the CPK was unable or unwilling to do, and relations between the two communist parties were increasingly marked by conflict of interest and suspicion rather than warmth and friendship.

A political crisis in Phnom Penh early in 1963 resulted in the CPK transferring the bulk of its efforts to the countryside, where it engaged in organizing peasants against Sihanouk and abandoned all pretense of a united front strategy in support of his anti-imperialism. Sihanouk meanwhile, looking for support against the U.S.-supported south Vietnamese and Thai regimes, took a harder line against the United States, renouncing all U.S. economic and military aid late in the year. As the U.S. stepped up its intervention against the Vietnamese revolution in the south, the need to support and encourage Sihanouk's anti-imperialism and prevent the establishment of U.S. bases in Kampuchea became more urgent for the Vietnamese Communists—just as the CPK felt itself forced to resort to complete opposition to Sihanouk if it was to survive. To the CPK it appeared that Sihanouk's anti-communism would ultimately not only outweigh his anti-imperialism but actually destroy the strongest anti-imperialist forces in Kampuchea.

The last strong link between the old ICP and the new CPK had been broken in 1962, when Sihanouk's agents killed Touk Samouth, an ex-ICP cadre who had been elected CPK party secretary in 1960. The CPK was now almost fully in the hands of former students in France, who formed a nucleus around which probably crystallized a good number of ex-ICP cadres who agreed with their ideas about the situation in Kampuchea, including the near impossibility of working with Sihanouk and the unreliability of the Vietnamese. The CPK plotted an independent course which its leadership considered appropriate to the realities of the Sihanouk regime and the socio-economic situation in Kampuchea. But this course was at best oblivious and at worst damaging to what the Vietnamese believed were the essential and immediate requirements of the liberation and reunification of Vietnam. With most of its work now done in the countryside, the CPK had become a threat to the stability of the Sihanouk regime, which the Vietnamese were cultivating as a bulwark of progressive bourgeois anti-imperialism. In theory, the contradiction should have been resolvable by proper implementation of united front tactics within Kampuchea by

the CPK. In practice, these were not forthcoming to the satisfaction of the VWP, and they probably were not available, given the intensity of Sihanouk's anti-communist repression, to which the Vietnamese appeared indifferent.

Each year the contradiction—and with it the conflicts and suspicions—grew deeper. In 1965, Sihanouk severed diplomatic relations with the U.S., and the full-scale U.S. military attack on Vietnam forced Vietnamese military personnel to seek refuge in Kampuchean territory, first with the CPK's permission and then with Sihanouk's acquiescence. At this point, ex-ICP cadres from Kampuchea began to return home from their Vietnamese exile. However, rather than leading to rapprochement between the two parties, these returnees only generated more problems. At an earlier point they might have been warmly welcomed. Now they were suspected as infiltrators sent to turn the CPK toward greater cooperation with Sihanouk.

After 1967, the basis for CPK-VWP solidarity diminished even further. In that year the CPK declared total war on the Sihanouk regime, and the war situation in Vietnam made Kampuchean territory an irreplaceable sanctuary rather than merely a convenient refuge for Vietnamese troops. In northwestern Kampuchea, peasants reacted to forced rice collection by Sihanouk's armed forces by launching a spontaneous revolt. Blaming the uprising on the Communists, Sihanouk moved to eliminate the left entirely from legitimate Kampuchean political life and drove the CPK's remaining legal cadres into the countryside. These events convinced the CPK's leadership that it was necessary to begin final preparations for full-scale armed struggle against Sihanouk. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese were preparing for the 1968 Tet offensive, in which the use of Kampuchean territory as a sanctuary and supply route was critical. Hence, they moved even closer to the Sihanouk regime.

Thus, when the CPK founded a revolutionary army and began all-out warfare against Sihanouk in January 1968, it found its decision opposed by the Vietnamese, who did not change their position until the March 1970 coup which overthrew Sihanouk. During this period, the CPK learned to work completely independently of the Vietnamese and discovered that such an independent stance was viable. In contrast to the disaster, bitterness and decimation of the late 1960s, 1968-70 was for the CPK a period of isolated defiance, self-confidence and success.

UNEASY ALLIANCE

When the March 1970 coup forced them to work closely together, relations between the Kampuchean and Vietnamese parties were probably worse than they had ever been. Each party was most likely deeply convinced that the other had consistently proved itself incapable of thinking of anyone's interests but its own. More specifically, the CPK probably believed that the VWP had showed itself unable to understand the revolutionary situation in Kampuchea, and that its foreign policy, in particular its policy toward the CPK, was governed more by Vietnamese national interests than by consideration for the needs of the Kampuchean revolution. To the VWP, the CPK's program for revolution in Kampuchea must have appeared to be little more than a blind and hopeless offensive against the Sihanouk regime, while the CPK seemed willfully oblivious to the disasters its struggle might bring upon the struggle to liberate south Vietnam and all of Indochina.

The alliance forged in April 1970 did not erase these conceptions. Although cooperation again became possible and even necessary, they did not transform suspicion into trust or fundamental conflict of interest into harmony. Disagreements between the two parties again came to the fore in 1972-73, as the Vietnamese negotiated the peace agreements with the U.S. When, after the terror bombings of Hanoi, the Vietnamese agreed to a cease-fire removing American forces from south Vietnam, the Kampucheans found the full strength of the U.S. Air Force turned against them. At the same time, they believed the Vietnamese were trying to pressure them into negotiations with the U.S. by reducing their provision of military supplies. Kampuchean uneasiness was intensified because the Vietnamese continued to negotiate with the U.S. for six months on the issue of reconstruction aid, which Kissinger insisted would be conditional on a cease-fire agreement in Kampuchea.* The Kampuchean Communists probably felt that if the Vietnamese had continued to tie down the Americans in direct combat while offering full logistical and material support to the CPK, their armed forces could soon have taken Phnom Penh and ended the war in Kampuchea. Instead, the nation was subjected to two more years of war, including the most concentrated bombing in history. Memories of Geneva, when Kampuchean interests were sacrificed, and of the late 1960s, when the Vietnamese refused to support their fight against the Sihanouk regime, were revived. Past suspicions were reconfirmed. Cooperation with Vietnam appeared to be a path full of pitfalls, and the reliability of the Vietnamese as allies appeared to be low. The Vietnamese perception of this period must have been radically different.

These experiences are exacerbated by the general tendencies in domestic and international policies which drive the two revolutions apart as well as the great disparity in the threats the two countries pose to each other, which so strongly color their attitudes toward mutual relations. Overall, the Kampucheans view the Vietnamese as prone to make decisions in their own national interest without regard to the losses such decisions inflict on Kampuchea. From the Vietnamese perspective, however, the Kampucheans seem unable to recognize the requirements of the collective good.

PRESENT CONFLICT

The differences in the two revolutions and the history of mistrust between the two parties set the parameters and tone of the present conflict. Within this context, the fundamental issue of conflict seems to be an irreconcilable difference over the extent to which the two revolutions are to cooperate with each other. This is reflected in contrasting propaganda themes. Kampuchea charges that Vietnam wants to impose an "Indochina Federation," while Vietnam protests that all it desires is a "special friendship." The first is probably an exaggeration; the second is probably a euphemism. Between the exaggeration and the euphemism lies a very concrete reality: the Vietnamese side wants more cooperation in more fields, both domestic and international, than the Kampuchean side is willing to accept. If the arguments presented here are correct, the Kampuchean side is in fact unable to accept more cooperation.

* For an alternative analysis, asserting the Vietnamese did not pressure the Kampucheans, see D. Gareth Porter, *A Peace Denied: The U.S., Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement* (Indiana, 1975) [Ed.].

Exactly how much the Vietnamese want is not clear, although some indications can be seen in the close relationship between Vietnam and Laos. For the present Kampuchean leadership, which has set itself on a course of total independence and radical self-reliance, the Vietnamese desire for closer relations is a threat, for history has made it unlikely that closer cooperation can be achieved unless that leadership is replaced.

The border issue is at once secondary and crucial to the conflict. It is secondary, because it is only a symptom of wider disagreements and because only a relatively small area is in dispute, despite the propaganda charges made at times by both sides. It is crucial, however, because of its role as a barometer for the Kampucheans. The government uses it to gauge Vietnamese attitudes, and the population employs it to measure the regime's nationalist credentials. In addition, the presence of troops along the frontier transforms it into a military flashpoint. The Vietnamese refusal to withdraw from zones in dispute as a prelude to rather than as a result of negotiations in 1975-76¹ and their request for a readjustment of a maritime frontier the Kampucheans felt had been recognized by the National Liberation Front and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1967² resulted in a cut-off of negotiations by the Kampucheans. The escalatory rounds of armed clashes which eventually followed probably began when the Kampucheans attempted to drive Vietnamese forces out of disputes zones they felt had been illegally occupied by the Vietnamese between 1965 and 1975.

Although the Kampucheans may have fired the first shots, they considered their action a response to *de facto* Vietnamese aggression by long-term occupation of Kampuchean land. They wanted to demonstrate that Vietnamese military superiority would not protect them from attack if they refused to withdraw from the disputed territory before negotiations began. By so doing, the Kampucheans hoped to convince the Vietnamese that it would be less costly to withdraw than to insist on negotiating from a position of strength.³ The Vietnamese, however, did not

withdraw. In some instances, they may have counterattacked. By early 1977, some local Kampuchean commanders apparently resorted to artillery barrages and small-scale raids into what they recognized as Vietnamese territory. From their perspective, such raids were merely a response in kind to Vietnam's prolonged *de facto* aggression against Kampuchean territory. To the Vietnamese, however, the raids were a new escalation of Kampuchean aggression, and in April they sent several thousand troops into Kampuchean border zones in response.⁴

In June, the two sides exchanged notes. The Vietnamese proposed a high-level meeting, and the Kampucheans replied by proposing that both sides pull their troops back 0.5 to one kilometer from the frontier.⁵ Since the Vietnamese ignored the proposal to disengage forces, the Kampucheans ignored the proposal to meet. Then, in mid-July 1977, the Eastern Region Committee of the Kampuchean administration decided to respond to any new Vietnamese attack with coordinated quick assaults across the frontier into Vietnamese territory.⁶ Following incidents in late July and throughout August in which the Vietnamese apparently took the battlefield initiative, and which the Kampucheans saw as provocative,⁷ such assaults were launched in late September. The intensity and scale of Vietnam's December retaliation finally led to an episode of full-scale war and the Kampuchean decision to break openly with Vietnam. Since then, large-scale fighting has flared occasionally, and the diplomatic situation has remained deadlocked. Each side has rejected the other's negotiating proposals.

Meanwhile, the Vietnamese have begun to call openly for the overthrow of the Kampuchean regime. They appear to be gathering forces, including many Kampucheans, which could be used in such an attempt. This has probably ended any chance that remained of a limited rapprochement that would have settled some differences and overlooked the rest. The conflict is probably as permanent and deep as any in the world today. □

Notes:

References are provided only for the last section of this article. For documentation of the historical analysis, see Stephen Heder, "The Historical Bases of the Kampuchean-Vietnam Conflict: Development of the Kampuchean Communist Movement and Its Relations with Vietnamese Communism, 1930-1970," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, forthcoming.

1. See Anonymous, "Intelligence," in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 27, 1976, p. 5; Ellen J. Hammer, "Indochina: Communist but Non-Aligned," in *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1976 (Vol. XXV), pp. 3-4; Milton Osborne, "Kampuchea and Vietnam," in *Pacific Community*, April 1978, (Vol. IX, No. 9), pp. 260-61; and Russell Spurr, "Comment," *FEER*, January 20, 1978, p. 13.

2. For the Kampuchean version of this problem, see its December 31, 1977 statement and Pol Pot's March 1978 interview with the Yugoslav journalists. For the Vietnamese version, see their white book *Dossier Kampuchea*. The Vietnamese position since January 1978 has been that they never recognized the so-called Brevie line, which the Kampucheans claim as the maritime frontier, as one dividing up territorial waters, even if it establishes sovereignty over ocean islands. However, in August 1977, a senior Vietnamese official, evidently referring to the 1967 statements by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, explained the matter rather differently. He stated that, "At the time we agreed to the Brevie line, we were not aware of the problems of territorial water, continental shelf, etc.—these new phenomena." Apparently on this basis, the Vietnamese have been asking to reopen negotiations on the maritime frontier question. Nayan Chanda, "That's Far Enough, Says Hanoi," in *FEER*, August 19, 1977, p. 12.

3. This line of action apparently combines elements of Sihanouk era diplomacy with an adaptation of the Chinese belligerence strategy for deterring stronger adversaries. See the explanation by Chea San of the Kampuchean adoption in late 1965 of a blow-for-blow policy of counter-attacks against Thai and Vietnamese territory, as presented in the journal *Kambuja* (Phnom Penh), January 15, 1966, pp. 13, 100; February 15, 1966, p. 9; and Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence* (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press, 1975), p. 202.

4. Don Oberdorfer, "Hanoi is Massing Troops at Border with Cambodia," *Washington Post*, April 8, 1978, p. 14.

5. For information on the Vietnamese note, see *Dossier Kampuchea*. For information on the Kampuchean note, see the March 17, 1978, letter from Ieng Sary to the governments of the members of the non-aligned movement.

6. See "Decisions Concerning the Report of the Eastern Region Conference Mid-Year 1977," p.84. This document was captured by the Vietnamese during military operations in Kampuchea and copies have circulated among the foreign press.

7. Intelligence sources in Thailand began reporting Vietnamese attacks on Kampuchean forces, including forces on Kampuchean territory in late July 1977. For example, see *Ban Muang* (Bangkok), July 28, 1977, pp.1-2. The Thai delegation publicized these and early August clashes at the ASEAN meeting. See, for example, the Reuters dispatch from Kuala Lumpur, dated August 6, 1977; and Rodney Tasker, "Enter the Japanese," *FEER*, August 19, 1977, p. 22. Thai sources also reported Vietnamese raids into Kampuchean territory that occurred in late August. See Anonymous, "This Week," *FEER*, September 16, 1977, p. 7. The Kampucheans obliquely referred to the fighting in an early August radio broadcast. See Phnom Penh radio, August 8, 1977, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report, Asia and Pacific*, August 9, 1977, p. H 1-2.



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SOVIET-VIETNAMESE DESIGNS ON SOUTH EAST ASIA

Part One: BACKGROUND TO THE HANOI CLIQUE'S EXPANSIONISM

The Danger to the Security of South East Asia; the Heroic Independence Struggle of Kampuchea — A Mighty Obstacle to Moscow-Hanoi Plans.

— by MALAYA NEWS SERVICE —

Soviet-Vietnamese Designs on South East Asia (Part One)

The Prime Minister of Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, visited Malaya from the end of last week to the middle of this week. He met Hussein Onn, Lee Kuan Yew and other top officials of the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore regimes. The Malayan visit was the last leg of a South East Asia itinerary which also took the Vietnamese Prime Minister to Thailand, the Phillipines and Indonesia. It is the latest chapter in an extensive programme of diplomatic and other activity in South East Asia by the Vietnamese regime.

At an earlier time and in different circumstances the people of South East Asia would have welcomed the expansion of diplomatic relations between their countries and Vietnam.

This is not the case today.

The Pham Van Dong tour is filled with insincere motives and empty smiles. It is part of a design to cover crimes already committed by Vietnam against the South East Asian people and to lay the ground for further activities which endanger the peace of South East Asia and the development of the revolutionary movement there.

For thirty years the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against French and U.S. imperialism and for national liberation and national reunification captured the imagination of the oppressed peoples in all corners of the globe. Vietnam shone as a beacon to other revolutions and became a focus of a mighty mass movement that shook the ruling class inside the U.S.A. itself and in other capitalist countries.

Now the people of South East Asia and the world are asking what has happened to Vietnam ? Where is it going ? Is it our friend or our enemy ? What really was going on behind the Vietnamese national liberation struggle, especially in the latter years ? What dark forces were at work ? How do we explain the barbarous aggression against Democratic Kampuchea, the bloody persecution of loyal Vietnamese patriots of Chinese origin or the absurd slander campaign against People's China ? Why is there political and economic chaos inside Vietnam itself ? What new assessment of the past and present events concerning Vietnam must now be made ?

That reassessment is painful and the new conclusions highly unpalatable. But facts must be faced. It is wrong to hide from reality and in relation to Vietnam today it is also extremely dangerous.

The South East Asian people and countries must uphold the utmost vigilance and implement counter measures against the expansionist plans of the Vietnamese rulers.

We must ensure that the Hanoi ruling clique is prohibited from spreading the catastrophe they have brought to Vietnam on to others. Behind Pham Van Dong's smiling mouth are vicious teeth, sharpened and gold-capped by the biggest expansionist power in the world -- the Soviet Union.

In an era which is characterized by struggle between the people and imperialism but also between different imperialisms, Vietnam stands as the sharpest example yet of how a national liberation struggle against one imperialism can change into a vehicle for new subjugation at the hands of a rival imperialism.

From the early sixties onwards the once socialist Soviet Union changed into a capitalist country and then into an imperialist, expansionist power. Now Soviet social--imperialism is the most aggressive and dangerous force in the world. Carrying on the vilest traditions of British, French, German, Japanese, American and other imperialisms, Soviet imperialism is now desperately seeking to move into every corner of the world. It is doing this by direct aggression (e.g. Czechoslovakia 1968), by semi-colonial rule (e.g. Eastern Europe), by indirect aggression using cannon-fodder from its semi-colonies (e.g. Angola 1975), by economic strangulation (e.g. Cuba in the early sixties), by internal CIA-style subversion (e.g. Zaire, Afghanistan, South Yemen 1978), by penetrating and hijacking anti-U.S. national liberation movements (e.g. Middle East and southern Africa), by other means, by combinations of these means and in numerous other countries.

It is now clear that while the Vietnamese people were fighting U.S. imperialist aggression, the Soviet imperialists successfully capitalized on that struggle to bring Vietnam and its mighty people under their claws.

The adoption of a so-called "neutral" stand by the Vietnamese communists in the great struggle between Marxism and revisionism in the international communist movement in the 60's was to prove disastrous for Vietnam. This "neutrality" on the most fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism was developed into revisionism and laid the ideological ground for Soviet imperialist penetration.

Despite an even-handed pretence towards its two great allies, China and Russia, and a thousand wishfully-thought apologies by friends around the world, it has long been obvious that the upperhand in the Vietnamese leadership is held by those who were leaning right over to the Russian revisionists.

Firsthand reports by foreign travellers to Vietnam; the stand taken by Vietnamese diplomats and touring delegations abroad, news of purges against anti-revisionist elements in the Vietnamese Workers' Party, the slavish adherence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to Soviet foreign policy, the cultivation of "fraternal relations" with dozens of rotten, revisionist "Communist Parties" in the capitalist countries, the subtle yet obvious attacks on China, as far back as five years ago, and many other signs were all a warning of which way Vietnam was going and of what was to come.

With such trends already entrenched in Vietnam there should be little surprise that the 1975 liberation was soon shown to be a very hollow victory indeed. In the three and half years since then, Vietnam has turned into a fully-fledged tool of Soviet imperialist, expansionist strategy.

Naturally Vietnam is considered quite a prize by a power, such as the USSR, which is bent on dominating the world. It is located between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It is near the Straits of Malacca which are the most strategic point in the naval and merchant sea lanes that connect East Asia (Japan, China and the eastern Soviet Union) to the Indian sub-continent, the Arab world and Europe. It borders China -- the country which ultimately must be cracked if a Russian blitzkrieg in Europe is to be consolidated.

It is an immediate gateway to the rest of South East Asia and even to Australasia and the South Pacific. It has a certain military strength and a lingering image as a revolutionary country that can still deceive some.

Apt indeed has been the Soviet media's description of Vietnam as a "reliable bastion" and "outpost" in South East Asia. Soviet social-imperialism needs and means to eliminate U.S. imperialism in this region and ultimately conquer South East Asia.

Since 1975 the Vietnamese rulers have abandoned all pretence at being neutral or independent of the Soviet Union. In 1976 Hoang Tung, editor of the Vietnamese party daily and a member of the VCP Central Committee, was to tell a Western journalist: "During the Vietnamese war it was vital for Vietnam that both China and the USSR helped North Vietnam to the full. Today it is no longer so vital for this country to follow that policy. The rapprochement with the USSR plays a very important role for Vietnam today. There is a tangibly strong Soviet interest coinciding with Vietnamese interests -- to reduce Chinese influence in this part of the world. We begin more and more to lean towards the USSR", he concluded.

The coincidences of interests between the Soviet Union and Vietnam is now glaring.

Politically, Vietnam supports every international move of the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Cuban aggression in Africa is hailed by Hanoi as a socialist achievement. The downfall of the pro-Soviet Mrs. Gandhi is bemoaned in Hanoi as a setback to the forces of peace and progress. Vietnam alone joins up with the hapless Soviet neo-colony, Cuba, to try to split the non-aligned countries movement in July this year. Moscow's latest, fantastic allegations against China are almost instantly rebroadcast and reprinted by Hanoi. A vicious anti-Chinese, anti-China campaign is stirred up inside Vietnam by the Russians and the Hanoi clique. Its aim? To destroy the deep, militant friendship between the Vietnamese and Chinese peoples, to create the spectre of a so-called "Chinese threat" and to thus provide a rationalisation for the Hanoi regime to its own people for seeking so-called "Soviet protection". Overnight, Moscow and Hanoi, change their hostile stance to the Association of South East Asian Nations. The reason? To patch up Vietnam's dirty image following its aggression against Kampuchea and to try and fool the South East Asian peoples and countries that Vietnam and the Soviet Union have no expansionist ambitions towards the area.

Economically, Vietnam moves into the Soviet economic system. In June 1978 Vietnam joined COMECON -- the Soviet-controlled organisation that carries on the British imperialist theory of "comperative advantage" under the slogan of the "international division of labour".

As the British imperialists once said to Malaya "it is better for you to produce rubber" and to Australia "for you to produce wool" and "we will sell you manufactured goods, technology and services", the Russians now say to Eastern Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola and others "you sell us what is less profitable for us to produce" and "we will sell you what is most profitable for us to produce".

Soviet "experts" ply the streets of Ho Chi Minh city in their black cars and frequent its bars and brothels. They treat the Vietnamese people with the drunken arrogance of their French and American predecessors.

Consequently, Vietnamese economic development is lopsided and its people suffer terribly. In less than three years after April 1975, Kampuchea reached a rice surplus while Vietnam remains rice poor. Soviet loans and especially credits become the basis of Vietnamese economic planning. Self-reliance is a silent word.

Militarily, there is increasing evidence of integration between the Soviet military command and the Vietnamese armed forces. Recent reports tell of the establishment of a joint command in Hanoi. Thousands of Soviet military advisers flood into Vietnam and are seen in combat during the attacks on Kampuchea. Two Russian tank commanders are killed by the Kampuchean army. Vast military supplies flow from Russia into Vietnam. The giant, former U.S. naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, step by step turns into a Soviet naval station right in the heart of the South China Sea. The Soviet Union in collaboration with the Vietnamese rulers is building up a military machine in Vietnam that is being used against South East Asians already and is intended for wider use.

The trend towards the Sovietization of Vietnam is far advanced. It is not accidental nor did it begin recently. From the mid-sixties onwards when it

became clear that the Vietnamese people were going to defeat U.S. imperialism, Moscow planned to gain control of Vietnam and the rest of Indo-China. The investment necessary was small compared to the returns they have now reaped. Ideologically, militarily, politically, economically they penetrated Indo-China and in so doing they found elements in the revolutionary movements who were prepared to betray their party, their class, their people and their country to another conqueror. Now they have virtual control of Vietnam and Laos as well. The first victims of the Soviet scheme have been the revolutionary peoples of those countries which have passed in to new subjugation. The long hard years of struggle and sacrifice bore bitter fruit. Foreign domination, poverty, fascism, military conscription and death in aggressive wars abroad are what the regime in Hanoi have in store for their people.

The struggle to restore the revolution in Vietnam and bring the nation to real freedom and prosperity will be long and hard. This is the task the Vietnamese people are now taking up. For the rest of South East Asia it is vital that all illusions about the Vietnamese regime be done away with and that all possible forces be united against the danger of Soviet-Vietnamese aggression.

We have said that Vietnam is a gateway of South East Asia through which expansionists can pass. That is true. But standing just inside that gateway is a mighty obstacle that must be destroyed and removed if the expansionists' dreams are not to turn into nightmares. That obstacle is Democratic Kampuchea -- its leadership, its army and its people. The unshakeable independence and vigorous self-reliance of Democratic Kampuchea is a curse to Moscow and Hanoi. It is the great pitfall of the whole Soviet scheme laid down a decade or more ago to dominate the former Indo-China anew. It is that part of their wish that doggedly refuses to come true and that part of the script that nobody can successfully be found to act out.

Because of this the Soviet social-imperialists and the Vietnamese ruling clique have desperately tried to destroy the independence of Kampuchea by military aggression and internal subversion. In this they have failed and continue to fail.

The long complicated struggle for Kampuchea reveals with inescapable clarity the depth and extent of Soviet-Vietnam designs on the area, the bankruptcy of the Vietnamese regime and the great danger that sits on the edge of South East Asia. It sharply reaffirms that the maintenance of a truly independent, free, anti-imperialist, anti-expansionist Kampuchea is in the interests of the countries and peoples of South East Asia and further afield.

-- end of Part One



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SOVIET-VIETNAMESE DESIGNS ON SOUTH EAST ASIA

Part Two: THE KAMPUCHEAN NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE TRIUMPHS OVER THE PROLONGED VIETNAMESE ATTEMPT TO STAB IT IN THE BACK AND SWALLOW KAMPUCHEA INTO A "GREATER VIETNAM"

The Historical Origins of Vietnamese Expansionism Towards Kampuchea; the Chauvinist Nature of the Indo-China Federation; the Denial of Kampuchea's Right to National Self-Determination Inherent in the Line of the Indochinese Communist Party; the Phoney Separation of the I.C.P. in 1951; the Struggle of the Kampucheans to Form their Own, Genuine Vanguard Organisation; the Foundation of the CPK in 1960; the Fusion of Soviet Revisionism with the Indo-china Federation Idea in the 60's; Ruthless Soviet-Viet Attempts to Smash the Kampuchean Revolution in the 60's and 70's; Hanoi Attacks Liberated Areas in Early 70's and Attempts to Overthrow the CPK Leadership; the Paris Agreement as a Weapon to Smash Kampuchea; the Triumph of the Kampuchean Party, Army and People Over U.S. Imperialism, Soviet Social-imperialism and Vietnamese Expansionism.

— by MALAYA NEWS SERVICE —

Kampuchea and its industrious people have a long continuous history. In the past they made a great contribution to human civilisation. In the present they are making an even greater contribution.

For several centuries the Kampuchean People have waged hard struggles to assure the independence of their country and to protect their nationality.

In the 1850's Kampuchea came under French colonial domination. This lasted for a century. From the 1950's until the mid 1970's, Kampuchea was subjected to repeated interference and aggression by the U.S. imperialists who sought to bring the country under their control.

From 1970 - 75 the people waged an heroic independence war which culminated in the total, national liberation of Kampuchea on April 17, 1975. This date is the most splendid yet in Kampuchean history.

Since the liberation and foundation of Democratic Kampuchea, amazing achievements have occurred in building socialism.

At the same time the Kampuchean people have had to face a new threat to their independence and national survival. That threat has come from the degenerate, counter-revolutionary, ruling clique in Hanoi who are nothing but another tentacle on the octopus of Soviet social-imperialism.

Moscow and Hanoi have gone all out to destroy Democratic Kampuchea. Their reason ? This strong, independent nation must be subjugated if social-imperialism is to proceed towards dominating the rest of South East Asia.

The attempts by Vietnam and the Soviet Union to split, control and smash the Kampuchean Revolution go back many years. The present struggle is not something which has just arisen. It is certainly not a border dispute.

An analysis of the background events shows that the Kampuchean revolutionaries have had to struggle hard and long to preserve their independence and to implement a political line that would bring about the complete, genuine national liberation of their country.

The Kampuchean revolutionary experience is classic proof of the point that while fighting against one enemy (such as French or U.S. imperialism) it is essential to be on guard against newer, dangerous enemies who have the intention of stepping forward to seize the fruits of victory.

The tendency within the Vietnamese Revolution to deny the distinct national entity of Kampuchea can be traced back to the 1920's. A recent Vietnamese publication, entitled "Kampuchea Dossier", Hanoi 1978, notes that " the Vietnamese Communist Party, founded in 1930, changed its name to Indochinese Communist Party in October of the same year ". This development is described as "logical" because Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea were all under French rule.

But what was the real essence of this "logic" ? That there was only a single national question to be solved in France's South East Asian empire. The struggle between the three colonized nations of the area on the one hand and French imperialism on the other would be settled as one. Already there was a chauvinistic mentality amongst the Vietnamese Communists that Indo-China equals Vietnam. There was one nation, one leadership and one struggle. In the place of the French Indo-China would stand one country -- Vietnam. Eventually, "minorities" would be absorbed into a unitary Vietnamese nation.

Inherent in this line was a denial of Kampuchea's right to self-determination, a rejection of the principle that the national liberation of each oppressed country can only be achieved by its own people and the danger that the Kampuchean nation could face extinction.

This point can be illuminated by examining the relationship between Malaya and North Kalimantan. Both these countries were under a long period of direct British domination and in 1963 were forcibly federated through the neo-colonial "Malaysia" scheme.

But these imperialist impositions have not turned Malaya and North Kalimantan into one country. Two distinct national questions remain. This means that there must inevitably be two revolutionary struggles and two separate revolutionary leaderships. These fundamental principles are firmly recognised and adhered to by the Malayan and North Kalimantan peoples.

There may be common enemies and the struggles may even closely parallel each other. But the Malayan Revolution cannot liberate North Kalimantan and the North Kalimantan Revolution cannot liberate Malaya.

The erroneous tendency within the Vietnamese Revolution to seek a Greater Vietnam, that would incorporate Laos and Kampuchea, grew stronger in the 1930's and 1940's. It found expression in the proposal for an Indochina Federation. This was widely propagated as the shape and form of the future Indochina, following the defeat of the French.

Within the Indochinese Communist Party there were members who warned about the dangers of trying to settle three national liberation struggles as one. In 1941 the Central Committee of the Vietnamese-dominated I.C.P. proclaimed that after the French and Japanese are driven out "we must correctly carry out the policy of national self-determination with regard to the Indochinese peoples." Superficially this declaration may have appeared to satisfy the objections of those who saw the potential for national genocide against Kampuchea (or Laos) arising from the I.C.P.'s line.

But what was the real essence of this 1941 declaration ?

That Vietnam, through its I.C.P., would organise the struggle against the foreign aggressors in the three countries. Having driven out the enemy it would then dispense "self-determination" to Laos and Kampuchea. The "rights to self-determination" is suspended until after the French and Japanese are defeated and the I.C.P. seizes power. But after the expulsion of the foreigners who would effectively hold power in Kampuchea and Laos ? Another foreigner -- Vietnam.

These were dangerous ideas.

Mixed with Soviet revisionism two decades or so later they were to prove a very vile brew indeed.

Present day Vietnamese propaganda swears that all talk of the Indo-China Federation stopped in the early 1950's. It is said that in 1951 the Indochinese Communist Party "was separated" into three parties--the Vietnam Workers' Party, the Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. This development is now cited by the Vietnamese ruling circles as evidence that the Indo-China Federation ended here.

The real truth is that the "separation" was only on paper. It was a tactic to suit international appearances. The Indo-China Federation plan never died. Vietnam had every intention of running the other two parties and of keeping the I.C.P. firmly in tact. Interestingly, Vietnamese literature produced before the present controversy does not give much emphasis to the 1951 "separation". One book published in Hanoi in 1975 and entitled, 'The Long Resistance 1858-1975', says that when the 2nd. National Congress of the Indochinese Communist Party was held in 1951 "the Party hence forward officially took the name of Vietnam Workers' Party."

Here again is the same mentality that Vietnam and Indochina were the same. It is not said that the I.C.P. disbanded and three other parties took up their respective struggles. Rather, it was a case of the I.C.P. changing its name to Vietnam Workers' Party. The 1st Congress of the V.W.P. after the 1951 2nd Congress of the I.C.P. was to be numbered the 3rd Congress. Later V.W.P. Congresses followed suit in their numbering.

In the 1950's the Kampuchean people and their advanced elements carried on the struggle to form a genuinely independent, Kampuchean revolutionary leadership, free of all foreign interference. Only a self-reliant party, rooted in the soil of Kampuchea, would be capable of solving the Kampuchean people's problems and of

leading them on to a more advanced society.

After complex, tortuous struggle the Communist Party of Kampuchea was formed on the 27th September 1960. This marked a major step-forward down the long, winding road to national liberation and the socialist system. Now the Kampuchean people had their own vanguard organisation.

The Party summarized the complicated experiences of the past and laid down the strategy and tactics for Kampuchea's national democratic revolution. In 1961 it began creating underground guards. From this foundation the Kampuchean people's military power was built up. In January 1968 the Revolutionary Army was established. In 1962 Pol Pot became Acting Secretary of the CPK, following the assassination of the founding secretary. In 1963 he was elected to his present post as Secretary of the CPK. This period was characterized by political struggle moving on to political struggle combined with armed struggle.

Following the March 18 coup in 1970 which ousted Noradom Sihanouk and installed the U.S. puppet, Lon Nol, the whole struggle moved rapidly ahead.

The CPK was able to lead the army and people to resist U.S. aggression, to establish political power within a few months in 80% of the country, to lay the basis of a new Kampuchean economy, to withstand a shocking air blitz throughout 1973, to liberate the entire country in 1975 and to found Democratic Kampuchea.

In many quarters abroad there was great surprise at the rapid successes of the Kampuchean people's armed struggle. Not everyone realized where the actual leadership was coming from nor appreciated the years of tortuous struggle and preparation that had gone on before. Covered in the cold sweat of fear, the U.S. imperialists had been forced to directly invade Kampuchea only five weeks after installing Lon Nol as Prime Minister.

While dealing with the U.S. imperialists and their puppet regimes in Phnom Penh and Saigon in the years 1970 - 75, the Kampuchean people had to cope with an even more disgusting enemy -- the likes of Pham Van Dong and Le Duan. While these gentlemen paraded around as people's heroes they were already giving Vietnam and the Vietnamese away to the Russians and working hard to liquidate the revolution and nation of Kampuchea.

Throughout the 60's, the Hanoi clique never accepted the formation of the CPK and tried to crush it. Their denial of the Kampuchean people's right and necessity to liberate themselves was more emphatic than ever.

With the growing penetration of Soviet revisionist ideology and of Soviet social-imperialism itself into Vietnam, in the last half of the sixties, the hostility towards the Kampuchean Revolution was compounded. The long-standing, chauvinist, expansionist essence of the Indo-China Federation was to fuse with the global expansionism of a Soviet Union in which socialism had been overthrown. Little hegemonists married big hegemonists.

In the mid 1960's Moscow had come belatedly to the Vietnamese struggle. In the decade before, when U.S. power seemed to have stabilized in the area, the vulgar opportunists in the Kremlin were none too interested in assisting a far away Asian people. Only when the downfall of U.S. imperialism became a possibility did the Soviets decide to make an investment in Vietnam. They confidently expected a handsome return. "What is Washington's", they gloated, "can certainly become ours".

One thing especially disturbed their greed and arrogance. It was to disturb them even more as the seventies unfolded. That was the independence, strength, fighting capacity, good leadership and self-reliance of the Kampuchean Revolution.

Moscow's hatred was made clear by its failure to recognize the Kampuchean National Union Government that was set up after Lon Nol's coup. Not until the eleventh hour of Lon Nol in 1975, did Moscow seek to recognize the legitimate government of the country. In the meantime the Soviets had been caught redhanded transporting supplies to Lon Nol.

Where they stood was very clear. The last thing they really supported was an independent Kampuchea. Their slogan was this: " If the Kampuchean Revolution can not be subverted, it must be destroyed ! "

Internationally they slandered and tried to play down the Kampuchean Revolution. Many Australians from the anti-war movement well remember how certain pro-Soviet elements in the movement tried to sabotage Australian solidarity actions with Kampuchea in the early 70's. Obviously this was the official line of Moscow's so-called international "peace" movement.

Vietnam's attitude to Kampuchea was no different -- the same as ever.

This year a Vietnamese major, Tran Van Thuong, captured on a spying mission in Kampuchean waters made a revealing confession to the Kampuchean authorities. He described the content of a training course he attended in July 1972 at the Political and Military School of the Party in Hanoi. " The instructor Colonel Thoi explained that the three countries -- Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam -- are brothers within a sole 'Federation of Indochina'. Therefore we must defend and safeguard this 'Federation' and make it strong. Vietnam is powerful and is the communist country right after the Soviet Union. Afetr the war in Indochina, we should be the eldest brother of Indochina. For this reason, we must defend and preserve our prerogatives of being chief of the Communist Party of Indochina. ... In our capacity as eldest brother, we have to defend and assume the responsibility of the destiny of the Indochinese Revolution. At the same time, we must look after the young brothers. We would not allow them to do anything at their will. They have to obey us. In Indochina, Vietnam has the strongest and biggest army, people and material strength....Afetr the final victory of the Indo-China Revolution we, Vietnamese, would have to pay much attention, particularly to Kampuchea, for Kampuchea disagrees with us Everywhere in these three countries of the 'Federation' we must have Vietnamese cadres in military, political and economic fields".

From this statement of a Vietnamese army officer and party member, the unabated intention of Hanoi to destroy Kampuchea's independence can be seen again.

As far back as 1970 - 71 Hanoi's troops attacked liberated areas of Kampuchea as part of an attempt to destroy the CPK and install a stooge "party" of the Vietnam Workers' Party. This attempt was nothing but a would-be coup d'etat. Many more were to follow.

Long before the struggle against U.S. imperialism was settled, the Vietnamese revealed their vile intentions towards Kampuchea. The Paris Agreement was used by Hanoi to try and strangle the Kampuchean Revolution and prevent the CPK taking power.

Vietnam arrogantly presumed to negotiate with the U.S. imperialists on behalf of Kampuchea. Having worked out the ceasefire deal, Hanoi sought to impose it on Kampuchea. The Vietnamese applied many coercive measures to the Kampucheans, including the blocking of arms and supplies travelling from China, through Vietnam, and intended for the liberated zones of Kampuchea.

The treachery of the Vietnam Workers' Party leaders against the Kampuchean Revolution must be unmasked in its full disgrace before the world. The total extent of their crimes must be grasped and made known by all who value independence and freedom. Many people in the world were duped into believing that the Vietnamese leadership was standing on the side of Kampuchea's national liberation struggle.

Far, far from this, the Hanoi gangsters' main concern was to prevent the national liberation of Kampuchea ! " Kampuchea can stay in the U.S.A.'s hands until we can get it into ours. But it shall never be independent ".

This was the real line of the Hanoi reactionaries and their masters in Moscow. Plot and scheme to hurt the people. This is the only politics known to Brezhnev and Pham Van Dong.,

In 1973 and in early 1975 two more attempts were made to carry out coups d'etat against the Kampuchean leadership. Both failed.

Recently in a speech made on the 18th anniversary of the CPK, the Kampuchean leader, Pol Pot, commented in this way:

" From 1973 to 1975 our people struggled against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in the sole battle-field which was then Kampuchea. The situation was complex both at home and abroad. On the international arena both the U.S. imperialists and the Vietnamese mobilized world opinion to force us to negotiate a cease-fire, in line with the objectives and manoeuvres of Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. At home we had to fight at one end the same time the U.S. imperialists, the Thieu clique, the Lon Nol clique and the Vietnamese who carried out the most perfidious manoeuvres to stab us in the back and take possession of our territory. If our Party had not found a solution for such a complex situation, we would have all been subjugated either by the U.S. imperialists or the Vietnamese ".

The Kampuchean people did find a solution to this unprecedented situation. On April 17, 1975 the Revolutionary Army entered Phnom Penh and the people's government was established across Democratic Kampuchea. In the 3½ years since great achievements have been won in rebuilding the country and even greater tests have come on to the agenda. The Soviet social-imperialists and their Hanoi lackeys have tried on a vastly greater scale to smash the Kampuchean Revolution, occupy the land and destroy the nation. The Kampuchean people under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea have passed all these new tests with flying colours. They have done so with the approval and support of people throughout the world.

-- end of Part Two



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SOVIET-VIETNAMESE DESIGNS ON SOUTH EAST ASIA

Part Three: THE KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA, HEROICALLY RESIST SOCIAL-IMPERIALIST SUBVERSION AND NAKED AGGRESSION WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY SCORING GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION, 1975 - 1978

-- by MALAYA NEWS SERVICE --

With the total national liberation of Kampuchea on April 17 1975, the U.S. imperialists experienced a crushing defeat. However they were still not prepared to give up completely and immediately launched various plots to overthrow the government of Democratic Kampuchea by internal subversion and economic disruption.

The Kampuchean leadership and people were very vigilant and were aware that U.S. agents had made a plan to seize back control of Phnom Penh straight after liberation. This move was foiled by the strategic decision to evacuate most of the capital's population to the countryside. Such action was also necessary to solve the food problem. Various other plots were hatched by the U.S. imperialists but by mid-1977 all these last ditch efforts had been finished off by the Kampucheans.

In the meantime the full fury of the Moscow-Hanoi axis had been unleashed. Now that Democratic Kampuchea had actually been established they were even more desperate than in earlier years to smash the Kampuchean Revolution.

A mere six weeks after liberation, in early June 1975, Vietnamese forces attacked and occupied Kampuchea's Koh Way islands and began making repeated incursions into the mainland of Kampuchea. In the forums of the world, the Kampuchean leadership remained temporarily silent about this Vietnamese aggression in the hope that Hanoi could be dissuaded from its expansionist course. The Hanoi clique's only response was to step up the attacks and to float rumours abroad of a "border conflict".

The "border conflict" theory was nothing but a ruse to mislead public opinion, in Vietnam and overseas, and to provide a pretext for escalating the aggression. The claims that Hanoi has made over vast areas of Kampuchea's territorial waters are absurd. They run counter to all past agreements between the two countries made both in colonial and post-colonial times.

The real purpose of the Vietnamese attacks that began in June 1975 was to disrupt socialist construction in Kampuchea by drawing away substantial human and natural resources to national defence. Through this sabotage, the Vietnam Workers' Party reactionaries hoped to undermine the Party and government of Democratic Kampuchea, create instability and overthrow the socialist regime by subversion.

In addition to the CIA, the KGB and the Vietnamese had built up big espionage and subversion networks inside Kampuchea over the years. In the immediate period after the Kampuchean liberation, the social-imperialists and their lackeys thought they could bring down Democratic Kampuchea through a strategy based on internal subversion combined with limited military aggression. In September 1975, April 1976, September 1976 and April 1977 more coups were fomented against the Kampuchean leadership by Vietnamese agents. For this type of work the Vietnamese regime relied heavily on old reactionary elements. One Vietnamese agent, Khemarin, who was captured by the Kampucheans on December 4 1977, told how he worked for the CIA from 1959, eventually surrendered to the Vietnamese authorities in November 1977 and was then sent on a spying mission into Democratic Kampuchea the following month.

Inside Kampuchea the Vietnamese have supplied and activated any reactionary forces possible. In many cases these elements had been previously linked to the C.I.A. While engaging in all this political witchcraft in the two years after the Kampuchean liberation, the Hanoi clique continued to order attacks and deep incursions into Kampuchean territory. They used brutal military pressure to back up the subversion.

In the middle of 1977 Hanoi pushed even harder to bring Kampuchea down. A treaty of "special friendship and solidarity" had been "signed" with Laos and Vietnam wanted desperately to force Kampuchea to the same fate.

Kampuchea knew full well that the "friendship and solidarity" being sought was indeed "special". So "special" that the meaning of these terms is completely inverted! The "special friendship" that Vietnam sought with Kampuchea in 1977 best belongs in the same basket as the "special friendship" Nazi Germany forced on Austria in 1938.

In September 1977 another coup d'etat was hatched but failed again. Similarly, the armed attacks on Kampuchean territory all met stiff resistance from the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army and people.

The Hanoi aggressors and their Russian patrons were now reaching the dilemma which sooner or later befalls all imperialists and expansionists. With the imperial arrogance of the U.S.A. in the 1950's they had presumed to finish off their target by low-cost methods. After all they thought themselves so high and mighty and Kampuchea appeared so small. It would be nothing to get this thorn out of their side.

In their intoxication they made the classical miscalculation of all the imperialists and aggressors who have come before them. They drastically underestimated the qualitative strength of a nation united as one, under a popular regime, in the service of a just cause. Eight coups and countless military operations later, the Hanoi gangsters had been unable to bring Kampuchea down. Was their reactionary vision of a 'greater Vietnam' about to be lost forever?

Now to make matters worse Moscow was getting impatient with its S.E. Asian stages. The New Czars had spent time and money to bring Vietnam into their empire. What was wrong with Hanoi? Why couldn't the 'Kampuchean business' be settled once and for all?

It was reaching a stage where the Bring Down Kampuchea Operation must either be abandoned or escalated. Democratic Kampuchea must be accepted as a reality or attacked by much greater forces. Hanoi was nervous about the whole situation. Mutiny, desertion and low morale plagued its army. Insurrection was sweeping the Vietnamese countryside. Would the aggression and subversion against Kampuchea bring down Pol Pot or would the real victim be Le Duan? This is the dilemma they faced and continue to face until this moment.

Moscow was also worried but it dared think only of expansion and not of defeat. The Kremlin thought back a decade to Central Europe and how they cut down a national resistance there. Clearly the time had come to use the Czechoslovakia method against Democratic Kampuchea.

"Lightning attack, lightning victory" became the slogan and strategy of Moscow and Hanoi.

Towards the end of 1977 the Vietnamese airforce commenced saturation bombing of south-western Kampuchea to prepare the way for the intended blitzkrieg. Large numbers of military personnel and all manner of military equipment flowed into Vietnam from the Soviet Union. Annoyed with the past bungles of their Vietnamese running dogs, the Soviets insisted on putting key areas of battle command under direct Soviet control. Gaps in the Vietnamese ranks at lower levels were also filled in with Russian officers and technicians.

14 divisions of troops were assembled on the Kampuchean border. Full-scale attacks were launched in November 1977 on Svay Rieng province and in December on Takeo and Kampot provinces. Kampuchean territory was heavily bombarded along many other frontier areas. Fighting was bloody and intense during these two months in particular.

Despite the huge assault Kampuchea refused to be another Czechoslovakia. The tables were turned and on January 6 1978 the aggressors suffered a shocking defeat. Vietnamese casualties were many times greater than Kampuchean. Even Russian advisers lay dead. Rebellion in the Vietnamese forces was rampant. The aggressor fell back in disarray.

Further aggression continued in 1978 but the scale was reduced after the January debacle. The number of Vietnamese troops deployed has fallen as low as two divisions during some months of this year. This testifies to the seriousness of the blow struck by the Kampuchean army and people against the social-imperialists. As had been the case with the U.S. aggression against Kampuchea, the Soviet-Viet aggressor was now forced to retreat to air war. This signified that they had suffered a terrible defeat on the ground—the only theatre where victory or defeat can be decided in Kampuchea. Air strategy against agricultural countries has severe limitations, as the Americans discovered. In any case the Kampuchean ground-to-air defences have shot down many intruding Vietnamese warplanes and helicopters this year and the Kampucheans are now equipping their airforce with modern fighters. Even Vietnamese superiority in this field is under challenge.

In a desperate, half-crazy mood after January 1978, the Hanoi criminals decided to have one more go at a coup plot. The Kampuchean Deputy P.M., Ieng Sary, recently informed the United Nations General Assembly that a member of the Political Bureau of the Vietnamese 'Communist' Party was personally infiltrated into Kampuchea at the end of May to supervise the operation. The fact that a member of the highest political body in Vietnam had to directly take charge shows what a mess the Hanoi regime has got itself into. Needless to say Coup Attempt Number 9 also failed.

Despite all these disastrous warnings to the social-imperialists and their Vietnamese side-kicks the campaign to smash Democratic Kampuchea goes on. Moscow's global strategy demands the downfall of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the subjugation of the country. For the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong gang it is too late to turn back, even if they wanted to. They made love to the Russian bear so often that his claws sunk right through them. Like the hapless buffoon in the Caribbean there is no way out for them now. They presently ride like kings to the Kremlin. But when they are no longer able to carry out their master's tasks and when they are of no further use they will be chewed up and spat out by the bear. This is the fate of traitors. If they are remembered at all in Vietnamese history it will only be on the page where Thieu and Ky appear.

At this very moment Moscow and Hanoi are preparing a comeback round against Democratic Kampuchea. 12 divisions are reported to be massing on the border. Two other Vietnamese divisions, based on the soil of the Laotian people, are moving up towards the Lao-Kampuchean frontier in the north. The aggressor's risky intention is to open a second front.

Meanwhile, vast amounts of supplies are being carried up to the invasion forces. Recent visitors to Saigon say that the city and its surrounds look like they did at the height of the U.S. occupation. Troops, transport and military equipment are everywhere. Le Duan has been travelling around the south-west to flog the army and people into shape for the new push on Kampuchea. On August 11 this year he exhorted the army "to seize victory in the war on the southwest border" and urged army cadres to ensure that the troops "have a profound understanding of the new situation and new tasks". Obviously it has been difficult to convince the Vietnamese masses about the need to sacrifice themselves for a despicable war of aggression abroad.

In Hanoi the Soviets have set up a military command. Tanks, rockets, artillery, light arms, ammunition and aircraft, including the Mig 23, are pouring into Vietnam by sea and air from the Soviet Union. Two jumbo-sized cargo ships recently arrived at Cam Ranh Bay and unloaded more munitions for Vietnam than all of last year's shipments combined.

Pham Van Dong and Le Duan went off recently to see Breshnev and signed a military pact. They try to make out that Vietnam is under "threat" from China and Kampuchea and needs Soviet "protection". This is a thin cover indeed for their aggression against Kampuchea and their grisly provocations against China. The scenario being peddled by the Soviet propaganda machine to justify the attack on Kampuchea has much in common with that used nearly thirty years ago by the U.S. imperialists to cover their aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Also on the international propaganda front, the KGB and other Soviet agencies have taken over the leadership of the "chamber of horrors" slander campaign against Democratic Kampuchea. The C.I.A. or the K.G.B. cook up testimonies of "escaped Kampuchean refugees". These are usually first printed in the Western media, then republicised by the Soviet machine and then the republication is reported in the West to "prove the authenticity" of the original lies! There have even been cases where the cycle goes another round! In addition Soviet front groups in the West and Soviet agents within the bourgeois media are also directly placing slanderous stories against Democratic Kampuchea. Never has a country been subjected to such a ferocious onslaught from the combined propaganda equipment of imperialism and social-imperialism.

On the diplomatic front top level Hanoi officials have been touring the world to prepare the ground for their intended new military campaign against Kampuchea. Pham Van Dong's October "smiling diplomacy" tour throughout S.E. Asia was solely for the purpose of disguising Vietnam's aggressive intentions towards the area and of seeing if any deals could be done to get the green light for swallowing Kampuchea. Fortunately wide circles in the S.E. Asian countries are alert to Vietnam's attempted seduction and Pham Van Dong received an icy reception. His disgraceful act of laying wreaths to British imperialism's slaughter of Malayan patriots and his public denunciation of the revolutionary movement in Malaya and Thailand has dispelled all illusions amongst the peoples of the area. Having used unspeakable methods to try and force the Communist Party of Thailand and the Communist Party of Malaya to support the aggression against Kampuchea, Pham Van Dong thought he could sell them off to Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.

The experience of revolutionary, Democratic Kampuchea is indeed rare.

What has happened there in the past and what is happening there today is a concentrated, vivid and sharp reflection of the contemporary world struggle. On one side there are the masses of the Kampuchean people united, organised, resolute, ingenious, clear-sighted and full of determination to re-shape nature, society and man.

On the other side are the old and new imperialists-sordid and vile, trying to hold history back, to bully, exploit and oppress. The Kampuchean people have scored stunning victories over these enemies. While fighting U.S. imperialism they had to fight Soviet social-imperialism, at one and the same time. They were victorious over both. This is an extraordinary achievement. Its brilliance is rare in history.

The Kampuchean people have made a great contribution to the people of the world. They drove one of the fatal spikes into the backbone of U.S. imperialism. Now they are in the front-line of the struggle against the global rampage by Moscow's madmen. The Kampuchean people's defence of their homeland and the defeats they have inflicted on the puffed up might of Moscow and Hanoi are already legend. It will be remembered in its full significance for centuries to come.

The victory of the Kampuchean people over aggression is in the interests of all S.E. Asian peoples and countries and further afield. The breaking of Democratic Kampuchea is vital to the plans of the big Moscow and little Hanoi expansionists. The cause of defending Kampuchea's national independence is the cause of all who love their own national independence and of all who are opposed to imperialism, social-imperialism and expansionism. The growth of militant people-to-people friendship and state-to-state diplomatic relations with Democratic Kampuchea is a trend that deserves the strongest support.

Another big invasion of Kampuchea is about to be launched at any time. It is sure to be repulsed. No matter how many men and arms the Vietnamese throw against Kampuchea their efforts will meet with failure. Like the American imperialists before them, the new aggressors are rapidly sliding into a protracted, unwinnable war against a unified and militant people.

Consider the objective situation of Vietnam today and compare it to that of Kampuchea. Vietnam's economy is stagnant and for the foreseeable future it can only deteriorate. The Russians are in the process of ripping out Vietnam's guts. In line with their subservient position, the Hanoi clique has abandoned all pretence of a self-reliant development policy and are behaving like debased, international beggars. The food problem is severe. The people are angry and rebellious. The response of the regime is brutal, fascist suppression. The socialist system is completely overturned. Tens of thousands are pressed-ganged into the army to face death in a war which everyone knows is unjust. Mutiny and desertion overrun the capabilities of the firing squad. In the same way as Hitler stirred up anti-semitism in the 1930's to divert and split the German people, Le Duan has initiated a deranged witch-hunt against people of Chinese background for the purpose of diverting and splitting the Vietnamese masses. Foolishly they hope to confuse the Vietnamese working class and other strata by these fascist tricks. Abroad the Vietnamese regime is becoming despised and isolated. The tinsel has all fallen off and the false image has dissolved. People can see that it is nothing but a grotesque arm of Soviet thuggery against its own people, against the people of Kampuchea and potentially against others.

Inside the country, many Communists take the only course that is open to their principles. They organise, go underground and fight back. They are joined by other patriotic people. Displaying great courage, it is these men and women who carry on the highest traditions of the Vietnamese nation.

All that can be said in Vietnam's favour in comparison with Kampuchea is that the former has more troops than the latter. But in history such statistics alone are irrelevant to the outcome. Quantitative superiority is no match for qualitative superiority.

Kampuchea has a steel-like leadership, in the CPK, that has been long-tested in many a blast furnace.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea, headed by Pol Pot, has deep roots amongst the people, built up through all the arduous struggle and changing circumstances of the Kampuchean Revolution. The CPK has proved itself to be capable of vigorously expressing and protecting the masses' aspirations and interests. Within the Party are concentrated the finest characteristics of the Kampuchean working class.

Alongside the Party, and under its leadership, Kampuchea has its Revolutionary Army. Its diverse structure of regular, regional and local forces gives it great tactical flexibility against the enemy and in the struggle for production. Recruitment is voluntary and based on political consciousness and willingness to sacrifice. Its morale is high, fighting spirit unquenchable and military science adroit. It stands as quite a comparison to the conscript, mutiny-ridden army of Vietnam.

Around the Party and Army, the masses are firmly united, deriving leadership on the one hand while returning their experiences on the other. Most significant of all Kampuchea has a developing socialist system while Vietnam has fallen under the rule of social-imperialism and its local fascist agents. In Kampuchea, people's democracy rules, giving unprecedented freedom to the masses. Despite all the difficulties caused by the Soviet-Vietnamese aggression and subversion in the past three and a half years, great progress has been made in socialist construction. The basic water and food problem has been solved, light and heavy industry are being developed, widespread disease eradicated, basic literacy achieved amongst the population, communications restored in the main part and many other major developments. It can be truly said, without fear of contradiction, that the political, economic, social and cultural life of the Kampuchean nation has moved forward since liberation at a pace that nobody would have dared to predict. The people have confidence in the social system. They know that they are on a path leading to a bright future. They are aroused to the highest point of struggle and will gladly fight and sacrifice for the defence of the country and revolution. This is why Kampuchea has triumphed and will continue to triumph over those who seek to destroy it.

International factors are also running in Kampuchea's favour. The diplomatic blockade erected around Democratic Kampuchea by the two superpowers has been smashed through. The slander campaign is falling flat on its face. In every continent people talk with respect and enthusiasm about Kampuchea. They desire to learn more. The Kampuchean Revolution inspires the struggle for national liberation and national independence in many countries. It inspires the whole cause of socialism. The importance of Kampuchea's survival and growth as a sovereign nation is grasped in broad circles around the world. Every day Kampuchea wins new friends.

Welded together all of these factors make Democratic Kampuchea as tough and as brilliant as a diamond. They explain why it is certain to be victorious over all its enemies. They show why the peoples of the region and of the world are rallying to the support of this precious country in South East Asia.

— end of Part Three

The timetable for a takeover

Hanoi's decision to take Kampuchea was reached after months of careful planning

By Nayan Chanda

Vietnam's decision to back a rebel movement in Kampuchea with military might, which swept Pol Pot's regime from power in early January, was taken at a secret Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee meeting 10 months ago, the REVIEW has learned. The crucial meeting was followed by a diplomatic initiative to reassure Asean countries, the forging of economic and military ties with the Soviet Union, a gradual military build-up along the Vietnam-Kampuchea border, the creation of the Kampuchea National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS) and finally by the lightning offensive at the end of December 1978.

Communist sources close to Vietnam told the REVIEW that the announcement from Phnom Penh on December 31, 1977, accusing Vietnam of aggression and snapping official ties took Hanoi by surprise, and seemed to confirm the view that the problem with Kampuchea was not just a bilateral issue but the creation of a "bridgehead of aggression" against Vietnam. The Vietnamese party leaders reportedly argued that by pushing Kampuchea into publicly attacking Vietnam, China had taken the first step towards its long-standing goal of curbing Vietnam, and that this "threat would have to be squarely tackled."

Sources said that immediately after the open breach between Phnom Penh and Hanoi the Soviet leaders urged a swift Czechoslovakia-type operation to remove Pol Pot from power. The Vietnamese turned down the suggestion, saying that they would solve the problem in "their own and appropriate way" meaning after political and diplomatic preparations. Following the Kampuchean rejection of Vietnam's February 5, 1978, peace proposal (REVIEW, Feb. 17, '78), the party's central committee held its fourth session to decide on a course of action.

Sources would not disclose the details of the central committee resolution, but suggested that a decision was taken to back a political movement to topple Pol

Pot and if necessary to use military power to that effect. The decision to break the economic power of the Chinese-dominated business community in the south, especially in Ho Chi Minh City's sister city, Cholon, which was seen as a potential Peking tool of sabotage and subversion, was also reportedly taken during this meeting. The country-wide crackdown on private business came on March 23 (REVIEW, Apr. 14, '78).

During a visit to a Kampuchean refugee camp in Tay Ninh province in March 1978, this correspondent was told by one inmate that "Monsieur Duc," a Hanoi-trained Kampuchean communist, discussed the question of a new government in Kampuchea during meetings at the camp. During the same visit a Hanoi official told the REVIEW (Apr. 21, '78) that the end to Vietnam's conflict with Kampuchea would come in one of two ways: "Either the Kampuchean regime will change its policy or the regime will be changed by the Khmer people."

In retrospect, the unsuccessful uprising by some Kampuchean army and party men led by So Phim (REVIEW, Nov. 3, '78) in late May could have been with Vietnamese encouragement. In any case, in June Radio Hanoi started broadcasting reports of, and calls for, uprisings against the Pol Pot regime. It is believed that at this stage steps were taken to form the KNUFNS, which was officially announced by Hanoi on December 3.

On the military front, a build-up along the Kampuchean border started from mid-year and reached its height in late autumn, when Vietnamese authorities called upon all organisations to set aside food and fuel for the sake of national defence, and handed over the north-south rail link to the army for its exclusive use. While army recruitment was stepped up, the Soviet Union also started emergency deliveries of military hardware by air and sea.


After the secret full session of the central committee at the end of February 1978, the party held several Politburo and restricted central committee

meetings to evaluate the situation and later to implement the fourth session's decisions. In one such later meeting it was decided to launch a diplomatic offensive aimed at assuring neighbouring countries that Hanoi harboured no aggressive intentions. In a rather hurriedly organised tour in September-October 1978, Premier Pham Van Dong proposed to sign treaties of friendship with Asean countries, with the obvious goals of underlining its friendly relations despite the conflict with China and Kampuchea and of softening the impact of the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty which was to be signed in November.

The decision to join the Soviet bloc's Comecon was taken to ensure greater economic assistance in the coming period of crisis, while the 25-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow was aimed at securing military insurance against a possible Chinese counter-attack.

However, according to the Vietnamese party's assessment, China was unlikely to go to war with Vietnam for the sake of saving Pol Pot's regime. Apart from the reluctance of the Deng Xiaoping leadership to make sacrifices for Pol Pot, Hanoi calculated that China was too heavily committed to its "Four Modernisations" to take on a war with Vietnam. Moreover, in the Vietnamese view the Chinese generals are old, and their fighting forces flabby and without tactical experience (the last important war they fought was in Korea in the early 1950s), and most important, they lack the sophisticated missiles and aircraft Hanoi has. An open alliance with Moscow not only provided Vietnam with valuable insurance against China but also paved the way for unstinted military help.

Hanoi's leaders are also believed to have considered possible US reaction. Noting the drifting and indecisive nature of post-Vietnam US policy and US inability to stop Soviet-Cuban moves in Africa, they came to the conclusion that there was nothing to fear on that score either. Thus, by the middle of 1978 the Vietnamese war machine had started preparing for battle.



BEIJING REVIEW

Social-Imperialist Strategy in Asia

The Soviet strategy in Asia is to put down a strategic cordon around the continent, stretching from the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and up to Haishenwei (Vladivostok), and using the "Cuba of Asia," Viet Nam, as its hatchetman, seize the whole of Indochina to dominate Southeast Asia and South Asia and so edge the United States out of the continent.

DEFYING world public opinion, Hanoi hurled a dozen divisions of regular troops in its war of aggression against Kampuchea and occupied Phnom Penh, capital of Democratic Kampuchea. This naked aggression by the Vietnamese regional hegemonists against a weak sovereign neighbouring nation poses a serious threat to the peace and security of Southeast Asia and Asia as well as the rest of the world.

Hanoi's Aggression

The aggression against Kampuchea by Viet Nam, supported and instigated by Soviet social-imperialism, is an important part of the "global strategy" employed by Moscow in its bid for world hegemony. Indochina is midway between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. With a foothold in Indochina, the Soviet Union could send its fleet through the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean and on to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Its ships could also have free access east into the Pacific and south into Oceania. Moscow will thus have control of the important oil routes to Western Europe, the United States and Japan, and also complete an arc of strategic encirclement. In the days of the old tsars Russia worked desperately to find an access to the Indian Ocean, but all they managed to do was to give their warships a short stopover in Cam Ranh Bay during the Russo-Japanese war. The new tsars are much more ambitious than the old tsars. Their threat to the peace in Asia, the Pacific region and the

whole world is many times greater than that of the old tsars.

Proceeding from its "global strategy" the Soviet Union is supporting Viet Nam's aggression against Kampuchea, but its goal is not only Indochina. Is it conceivable that this ambitious superpower, bent on world hegemony, will stop with Kampuchea and its domination of the whole of Indochina? It has become increasingly clear to the governments and public of Southeast Asian nations and other Asian countries that seizure of Indochina is only the Kremlin's first step in its expansionist pursuits in Southeast Asia. The peace and security of Southeast Asian countries and the whole of Asia will be gravely imperilled once Moscow and Hanoi, the major and minor hegemonists, have their way in the war of aggression against Kampuchea.

Disturbing Moves

Europe has been the focus of Soviet-U.S. rivalry. But, there, the two sides are essentially at a stalemate, so the Soviet Union started a large flanking move to encircle Western Europe with the main object of seizing sources of strategic materials vital to the West and controlling the major sea routes linking Western Europe and the United States and those linking the two with Africa and Asia. This would isolate Western Europe and the new tsars could then wait for their opportune moment to come. With this global strategy in mind, the Soviet Union is continuing to intensify its military threat against Western Europe and at the same time stepping up its aggression and expansion in Africa and the Middle East as well as West and Southeast Asia and the Pacific region.

Moscow's acts of aggression and expansionist intrigues in Asia last year are deeply disturbing.

- It engineered three coups d'etat in two months, killing the leaders of the three sovereign states.



Stage-managed.

Cartoon by Ding Cong

- Within weeks, it signed with lightning speed "friendship and co-operation" treaties with two Asian countries and one African country contiguous to Asia. These treaties are actually military or semi-military pacts, designed to draw these countries into its drive for world hegemony.

- It tried to consolidate its footholds in South and West Asia so as to encircle Pakistan and Iran. It provided the weapons for Baluchistan insurrectionists, tried to further dismember Pakistan and force it to obey its dictates. It exploited the internal turmoil in Iran to foster pro-Soviet forces, deployed troops along the border and tried to fish in troubled waters.

- It sabotaged Arab unity by stirring up and exacerbating ill will among Arab countries, wooing some of these countries to form "strategic alliances" with it, and created tension in this region.

- It upgraded its military might in the Far East and expanded its Pacific fleet. It repeatedly dispatched warships and planes to Japanese territorial waters and air space to intimidate Japan. At the same time, dangling "economic co-operation" as a bait spiced with diplomatic pressure, it tried to weaken Japan's relations with the United States and undermine friendship and co-operation between China and Japan.

Even more serious, the Soviet Union has made Viet Nam its "outpost" for expansion into Southeast Asia. Emboldened and backed by Moscow, the regional hegemonists in Hanoi

with their obsession for an "Indochina federation," have recklessly launched a large-scale aggressive war against Kampuchea. The Soviet Union is itself shamelessly intervening in the war against Kampuchea by providing Hanoi with money, arms and advisers. Hanoi has dispatched large numbers of troops to occupy Laos and put the country under its control. The Soviet Union is also using Viet Nam against China in a most truculent manner and employing it as a Trojan horse in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations with a view to bringing these nations into its sphere of influence.

Strategic Encirclement

Consequently, the Soviet Union's counter-revolutionary strategy in Asia today is to cordon the continent from the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean right up to Haishenwei (Vladivostok) and using Viet Nam as its hatchetman, "the Cuba of Asia," in its central thrust to seize the whole of Indochina and then dominate Southeast Asia and South Asia and edge the United States out of Asia. With Viet Nam as its base, the Soviet Pacific fleet would be advanced several thousand kilometres into the Pacific. If this Soviet strategy succeeds it would be disastrous to Southeast Asia and would also put the United States and Japan at a distinct disadvantage in the Pacific and pose a serious menace to Western Europe.

So the critical situation prevailing in the Asia-Pacific region is the result of big hegemonism ganging up with the small hegemonism and making trouble there. The latter would not have been so truculent without the former's backing, while without the services of the latter, it would not be easy for the former to stir up all this trouble. Having Viet Nam as its junior partner, the Soviet Union is able to make Asians fight Asians and quicken the pace of its expansion and aggression in Asia. The role played by Viet Nam in the service of the Kremlin's Asian strategy surpasses that of Cuba in Africa. Viet Nam has become the source of war in Southeast Asia and the Kremlin's main bridgehead for aggression and expansionist pursuits in the continent.

It is obvious that if the Soviet Union succeeds in getting more strategic places as footholds in Asia, these footholds will buttress from the other end the positions it has gained in Africa and thus link its line of advance in the Pacific with that in the Indian Ocean and pave the way for a push into Oceania and

the South Pacific. This will place it in a much stronger position in its bid for world domination.

Asian Collective Security Scheme

An important move in the Kremlin's Asian strategy is to knock together an "Asian collective security system." With Hanoi now at its command, it thinks the time has come to revive its project. By concluding with one Asian country after another treaties of "peace and friendship" or of "good-neighbourliness and co-operation," it hopes to build up a network of treaties and eventually bring these countries together into a "collective security system."

Consequently, in its expansion overseas, Moscow is striving to hook certain Asian and African nations up with the Warsaw Pact, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (C.M.E.A.) and the "socialist community" under its thumb. Viet Nam's admission to the C.M.E.A., the Kremlin's pressure on member states of the

Warsaw Pact to increase their military spending and pledge "solidarity" with Viet Nam, and the use of military personnel of some Warsaw Pact countries in Soviet ventures in Africa — all shows that Moscow is contemplating the extension of its military bloc and economic grouping to cover Asia and Africa. This is a new development in the Kremlin's pursuit of its global strategy and is a reflection of the fact that its ability falls sadly short of its ambition. It, therefore, feels acutely the need for its partners in the "community" to share the burden in manpower and resources imposed on it by its worldwide expansionism.

The Soviet Union is noisily vilifying China as being guilty of "hegemonism" and "expansionism" and trying to poison China's relations with other Asian countries. At the same time, it is positioning its forces and rattling its sabre in the Asia-Pacific region. Some people point out that this is intended to encircle China. Of course, the Kremlin has China in mind in push-

Aggression on Kampuchea: Meticulously Planned

- The Soviet Union admitted Viet Nam into the "Council for Mutual Economic Assistance" on June 29 last year to shore up Hanoi economically and politically and confirmed Viet Nam as its "reliable outpost of socialism" in Southeast Asia.

- In mid-August, Moscow airlifted large quantities of arms including rockets to Viet Nam. Batch after batch of military "advisers" and personnel were sent to that country. Within a few months, the number of Soviet military "advisers" sent there exceeded 4,000. At the same time, the Soviet Union began to use the Cam Ranh base.

- Early last November, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and other Vietnamese chieftains visited Moscow where they concluded with the Soviet Union a "treaty of friendship and co-operation" which has all the characteristics of a military alliance and openly proclaims that "military co-operation" exists between the two countries. Moscow provided Hanoi with Mig-23s and two 2,000-ton escort vessels.

- In late November, at the Moscow summit of Warsaw Pact countries, the

Soviet Union compelled these countries to increase their military expenditures and called for "joint support" for Viet Nam's aggression. This was an effort to extend the commitments of its military bloc in Eastern Europe to Indochina.

- On December 3, the Vietnamese authorities concocted a puppet organization "the Kampuchean national united front for national salvation" as their organizational preparation for their massive armed aggression. Immediately after the establishment of the "front," TASS relayed the news and other Soviet mass media clamoured that "real and revolutionary patriotic forces are rising in a resolute struggle for national salvation" in Kampuchea and that they would make "most important contributions" to the overthrow of the present regime in that country.

- On December 25, the Vietnamese aggressor troops began large-scale armed attacks from several directions against Kampuchea.

- On January 7, the aggressor troops occupied Phnom Penh. Democratic Kampuchea began to launch a nationwide people's war and the fight against Vietnamese and Soviet hegemonism entered a new stage.

ing expansionism in Asia. But its more important objective is to enlarge its sphere of influence and push out the influence of its arch rival, the United States, from Asia and threaten the peace and security of Japan and other Asian nations and that of the Southeast Asian nations in particular. It is short-sighted and dangerous to overlook this.

Doomed to Failure


The Soviet Union's Asian strategy is an important part of its global counter-revolutionary strategy. It thinks that it has scored a major gain in having Viet Nam as its stooge for the pursuit of hegemony in Asia. But, contrary to its wish, this actually serves to show up the atrocious features of the Soviet expansionists.

The Bear and Cam Ranh Bay

CAM Ranh Bay lies in the Central Viet Nam Province of Phu Khanh. It faces the South China Sea in the east and straddles the sea lane between the Bashi Chan (between Taiwan and the Philippines) and the Strait of Malacca.

A deep and broad harbour, Cam Ranh Bay is known as one of the world's best. It is also a fine naval-air base in Southeast Asia.

Reports say that with the Soviet Union and Viet Nam setting the seal on their alliance by a treaty, Cam Ranh Bay has become a scene of hustle and bustle with frequent calls by Soviet warships through the Tsushima Strait. This reminds one of a piece of a history in the early 20th century when a fleet of the Russian navy sailed from Europe to fight its decisive battle with the Japanese navy in the Tsushima Strait. Before moving north, the Russian warships called at Cam Ranh.



Since the end of the Viet Nam war, the new tsars in the Kremlin, prompted by their strategy for Asian and world domination, have become obsessed with a desire to use the up-to-date naval-air base in Cam Ranh Bay that was built by the United States at a cost of up-

This also has opened the eyes of the people of Southeast Asia, the whole of Asia and the rest of the world and has thus promoted the growth of an international united front against hegemonism. Soviet social-imperialism is indulging in fantasies when it thinks that, with the weapons it has, and supported by a few hatchet-men, it can lord it over the world. Even if its acts of aggression succeed in one or two places, it cannot hope to check the historical trend against hegemonism. The Soviet Union tried to outflank Western Europe from Asia and Africa, but it led to mobilizing the countries and peoples of Europe, Asia and Africa, and Moscow has found itself besieged by the people of the world. The Soviet "Asian strategy" together with its global strategy cannot but fail.

wards of 200 million dollars in the 1960s. In the Kremlin's calculation, with this Vietnamese harbour at its disposal the Soviet forward naval position can be moved thousands of kilometres southward from Haishenwei (Vladivostok) to threaten at will the maritime routes between Southeast Asia and Japan as well as between Southeast Asia and the United States.

Thompson Scott, a former U.S. White House official and now a professor of the U.S. Taft University, quoting information from the U.S. Department of Defence, said that an agreement was reached between the Soviet Union and Viet Nam in 1976 with regard to Soviet use of Viet Nam's Cam Ranh Bay as a refuelling base for Soviet fleets. With an increasing presence of the Soviet naval squadrons in the Western Pacific, he said, there have been a considerable number of Soviet vessels visiting Cam Ranh Bay. Judging from the recent new developments of Viet Nam's joining the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the conclusion of the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty, the U.S. administration has predicted that within a year or two, Cam Ranh Bay will be available to the Soviet Union not only as a refuelling base but as a full-fledged naval base for maintenance, repairing, supply and other services. Japanese military analyst Iwano writes: "In accordance with the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty of friendship and co-operation, Moscow will naturally turn Cam Ranh Bay into a supply base for its fleets. By so doing, the Soviet navy can easily cut the oil route from the Middle East to Japan."

The New York Times

February 4, 1979

MADISON, Wis. — China's Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping sees Vietnam in a different light from the Carter Administration. Washington urges Peking not to reply to Hanoi's provocations. America fears that a Chinese response would invite a Soviet assault on China.

For Peking, however, the alternatives are not self-restraint or general war in Asia. China's leaders see the choice as either standing up now to Vietnamese expansionism (by, say, retaking disputed islands in the South China Sea) or remaining passive and permitting the Soviet Union to believe that China is a pushover.

The Soviet Union would like nothing better than to oust China's Government. For Peking to appease Moscow, with its military in a forward posture on China's borders, is to invite attack. For China, not wanting to end up as Hungary did in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, it seems that only a show of strength can force Moscow to have second thoughts about an invasion.

Just before Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, a Deputy Prime Minister of China, Keng Piao, told a delegation of American civic and world affairs leaders that I escorted that Hanoi possessed the power to take Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh.

Mr. Keng detailed how in China's view Vietnam had become a fascist state that had adopted militarist, racist and expansionist policies. He labeled Vietnam fascist, first because its ruling groups put military concerns before popular needs. Vietnam at independence had a serious food problem, but instead of demobilizing its huge army, Hanoi continued to support, out of its people's labor, an overblown military, he said.

Mr. Keng told the delegation that Hanoi's rulers, incapable of developing a rational economic-development policy, had panicked and had turned as beggars to Moscow and joined its economic bloc. China, he said, had found that Moscow's goal in that bloc

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Risk China Faces

By Edward Friedman

was to keep poor nations dependent and serving Moscow's purposes.

Mr. Keng made these points: In addition to its pro-Soviet moves, aimed at getting aid, Hanoi also took action at home to get money but its efforts undermined its base of mass support. It confiscated the valuables of families, the property of even the *petite bourgeoisie*. To deal with the popular discontent and economic stagnation this engendered, Hanoi instituted fascistic secret-police rule akin to that of the Soviet K.G.B. Vietnam's rulers, as fascists would, incited racist assaults on minority Vietnamese of Chinese descent, labeling them foreign agents; 200,000 escaped.

Mr. Keng saw Vietnam's fascism as the cause of its expansionism: A militaristic, secret-police society incapable of meeting the people's material needs soon embraces chauvinistic and imperialistic goals.

He went on: Hanoi shamelessly forced Laos toward a Hanoi-run Greater Indochina. Vietnam has virtually annexed Laos: Hanoi has five divisions stationed there. Its "advisors" runs things from the center to the grassroots. Hanoi has forced Laos to cede border territory to Vietnam. But Pol Pot's Cambodia would not let Hanoi turn into Vietnamese territory the areas of Cambodia that Hanoi's troops had occupied and had used

against Americans in Vietnam. Hanoi also insisted that Cambodians who had served the interests of Vietnamese nationalism should have a dominant voice in the new government.

Pol Pot's regime resisted and tried to liberate eastern Cambodia, he said. Vietnam responded with massive force.

Hanoi circulated propaganda, the Deputy Prime Minister continued, that little Cambodia with its feeble military had invaded Vietnam with its powerful military and 50 million people. The lie was a cover-up for Vietnamese aggression. Similarly, Hanoi bruited about that the Laotian Meo tribal leader Vang Pao was being harbored by China but that actually Vang Pao had retired to the United States. China, as even a child should see, was a figleaf that Vietnam used to hide its naked ambitions, he said.

China, as Vietnam knew, would not respond militarily unless Vietnam attacked China itself, Mr. Keng concluded. He now saw the Soviet Union as interested in strategic military bases in Vietnam while Hanoi used ever-more aggressive anti-China acts to win more Soviet aid. Mr. Keng saw Vietnam provoking border incidents with China.


I found that China's ruling groups believe that Vietnam, aligned with the Soviet Union, will keep moving forward against China as Prime Minister Nehru's India did in 1962 and Gen. Douglas MacArthur's armies did in Korea in 1950.

For Mr. Teng's administration, either Vietnam backs down or China must stop Vietnamese expansionism.

The self-restraint that President Carter calls for is seen in China as a signal to the Kremlin that China is a paper tiger, an invitation to the Russians to move aggressively into China.

Edward Friedman, professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and a specialist in Chinese politics and a guest columnist.

The War, the Resistance and International Response



CHINA and INDOCHINA

The Realities Behind the Headlines

The Invasion of Kampuchea

by Gary Hansjergen

The invasion of Kampuchea began on December 25. About 100,000 Vietnamese troops, elements of 12 divisions, attacked in three columns. The first came out of the Central Highlands into Kampuchea's northeast, where most of the earlier fighting had taken place and where much of the Kampuchean army was concentrated. The second column attacked through the Parrots Beak area west of Ho Chi Minh City, threatening Phnom Penh from the east and north. The third column attacked out of the Mekong River Delta region, striking for the port city of Kompong Som and threatening Phnom Penh from the west and south. By January 7 Vietnamese units were in Phnom Penh and were racing up both sides of Tonle Sap, the large lake in central Kampuchea, seeking out Kampuchean army strongholds and moving toward the Thai border. The Vietnamese were in control of most of the cities and national highways by the end of the second week in January.

The Vietnamese strategy — called the Blooming Lotus strategy — was mapped out and directed by General Van Tien Dung, the chief of staff, who employed it to capture Saigon in the spring of 1975. It features a lightning attack. The Vietnamese moved fast under heavy air and artillery cover. They flew an average of 100 sorties daily, using MIG-21s and captured U.S. A-37s and F-5s to drop U.S. anti-personnel cluster bombs and the like. The attack was spearheaded by massed Soviet tanks, the latest PT-76 amphibious tanks and older T-54 tanks. The Blooming Lotus strategy was to use the roads, hit and occupy the cities, bypass sharp pockets of resistance and leave them to mop-up units. The military objective was to split the Kampuchean army into small units, destroy their contact with each other and with the command, and wipe them out before they could regroup.

Vietnam's political objective was to seize the capital city of Phnom Penh, capture Kampuchean government and army leaders and secure order in the cities and enough of the country to install a puppet government, that of the National United Front for National Salvation, which could claim legitimacy at the United Nations and around the world. The key to both objectives was rapidity of progress, and that required catching Kampuchea unprepared.

Kampuchea's Strategy

As events showed, Kampuchea was well prepared. Following an initial attempt to contain the attack in northeast Kampuchea that resulted in heavy fighting, the Kampuchean forces adopted a policy of strategic retreat. The Vietnamese assault came from too many directions and was too strong. Kampuchea then abandoned a static defense and Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese were allowed to spread their forces thin and occupy cities connected by long and tenuous lines of communication and supply.

Gary Hansjergen, a member of Concerned Asian Scholars, is active in the recently-formed Kampuchea Support Committee. His article is based on his speech delivered at a forum sponsored by a coalition held February 16.

The Kampuchean strategy during the first month of the invasion was to disperse their forces and then regroup in units of 800 to 1,000 men. Western military analysts estimate that at least four-fifths of the 60,000 Kampuchean army was thus preserved. Since last August, while warning its people and the world of the upcoming Vietnamese invasion, the Kampuchean government built up stocks of supplies in the rugged mountains of southwest Kampuchea. Government leaders and the high command moved there following the abandonment of Phnom Penh; no leading cadres were killed or captured by the Vietnamese. Kampuchea allowed the Vietnamese to overextend and immediately began small-scale attacks on the flanks and rear of the Vietnamese, destroying equipment, cutting supply lines and keeping the pressure on. On January 12 Thai military intelligence commented that Kampuchean troops "opened like a wire cutter to let the steel arrowhead of the Vietnamese forces through and are closing behind it to clip off the shaft." In addition, larger-scale attacks were launched where conditions were favorable. In mid-January Kampuchea retook the port of Kompong Som and the naval base at Riem. These cities changed hands three times.

Vietnamese control of the cities means little. Since 1975 the cities have been largely emptied, and while there is some industry there, the nation has been reorganized around a network of self-sufficient agricultural cooperatives. Vietnam must control the countryside to really control Kampuchea, and that would take a force of 100,000 even if there were no armed resistance. Vietnam faces a monumental task. An indication of the state of security is that Premier Pham Van Dong's triumphant entry into Phnom Penh, originally scheduled for January 14, was postponed three times. Finally on February 17 he visited a city empty except for corpses and 6,000 Kampucheans shipped in for the occasion. Vietnam's quest for a quick victory has failed.

Hanoi's Isolation

This failure and an aggressive worldwide diplomatic effort by Kampuchea and her friends have doomed Vietnam's efforts to obtain substantial recognition of the regime it installed in Phnom Penh. In the debate at the United Nations, Vietnam was dismayed by the lack of support for its position and its puppets. No country spoke for it except Cuba and the Soviet Union, and the Security Council vote was 13-2 to support Kampuchea and condemn the invasion.

The current situation is good for the Kampucheans and bad for the Vietnamese. Kampuchean army units are fighting back everywhere. A Thai general put the situation this way: "The most intense level of activity is in the south and west of the country. But you could hardly throw a dart at a Kampuchean map blindfolded without hitting some spot where resistance is going on." Bridges and roads have been blown up. Isolated Vietnamese are exposed to hit and run attacks. As in the last years of the U.S. war in Kampuchea, the Mekong is full of sunken and grounded freighters and Vietnamese shipping requires heavy naval protection. Agence France Presse reported February 2 that an attack on Pochentong airport outside Phnom Penh destroyed airplane fuel and lubricants and killed Soviet and Cuban advisers employed in radio communication with aircraft. Democratic Kampuchean radio claimed that in January Vietnam suffered 14,000 casualties (including 300 Soviet and Cuban advisers) and lost 330 tanks and 12 aircraft. While casualty figures are difficult to verify, Western military sources believe that Vietnamese losses are substantial. According to a Bangkok Post report on February 4, Thai sources believe Vietnam added five divisions to its invasion force, raising the total to about 180,000 men.

On February 1-2 a national congress, called by the military commission of the Kampuchean Communist Party's Central Committee, met somewhere in Kampuchea to assess the first month of resistance. The fact that 183 leading commanders and 230 leading political and government cadres from all areas of the country were able to attend shows the quality of security and combat situations sufficiently stable to do without key commanders for a period.

Vietnam faces serious problems as it fights a war of aggression against an aroused and organized people who have a coordinated, well-disciplined army in the field. Its logistics and supply are a nightmare. The main supply problems are tank fuel, ammo and medicine. Vietnamese tanks use two types of fuel, all of which has to be imported from Warsaw Pact countries. Now bridges are blown and tanks are scattered. If they don't run out of fuel, the rainy season, which starts in mid-April, will immobilize all but the newest Soviet-built amphibious models.

The Rice Shortage

A second crucial difficulty is food. The Vietnamese army in Kampuchea needs an estimated 100,000 kilograms of rice daily, while at home Vietnam faces an enormous rice deficit, both from the failure of agricultural development and from disastrous floods last fall. The UN estimates the 1979 deficit to fall between 2.5 and 4 million tons, which is greater than the entire world trade in rice. Wholesale looting of rice from Kampuchean cooperatives has to be expected.

Within Vietnam, economic development plans have been disrupted. Instances of peasant resistance to government rice buying are reported. To save themselves from economic disaster the Vietnamese have turned completely to the Soviet Union. Talks in Hanoi January 31-February 2 between Pham Van Dong and I.V. Arkhipov resulted in a wide range of economic, scientific and technological agreements between the two countries and promises of Soviet aid to cover all contingencies. Tass reported that the talks "determined the fundamental orientation of cooperation to 1990" and that "Soviet/Vietnamese cooperation in fact comprises all realms of economy, science and technology and Soviet assistance to Vietnam involves all corners of Vietnam." The invasion has driven the final nail in the coffin of Vietnamese independence.

The Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation is a myth created by Hanoi for international media consumption. In the first stage of Vietnamese aggression into Kampuchea in 1977-78, no such front existed. Its birth was first announced by Hanoi on December 3, just 22 days before the invasion. Tass then reported from Moscow that "real and revolutionary patriotic forces are rising in a resolute struggle for national salvation in Kampuchea" and predicted that they would make "most important contributions" to the overthrow of the Pol Pot government. Heng Samrin, head of the front government, is an unknown. He is variously identified as a former Kampuchean army commander, division commander, regiment or battalion commander, but no independent sources describe him as holding any leading post prior to December 3. A journalist delegation from the Italian Communist Party reported only Vietnamese troops in Phnom Penh and only Vietnamese administrators in the captured cities. Refugees recently interviewed in Thailand said that troops entering their village were all Vietnamese except for a Kampuchean from South Vietnam serving as interpreter.

Associated Press reporters witnessed the naval landing on Kok Kong Island January 21. The attacking flotilla flew Kampuchean National United Front flags but consisted of Soviet-built rocket-launching destroyers, landing barges, transport vessels and patrol boats. Also an American-built patrol boat given to the south Vietnam navy in 1961 and a U.S.-built oiler given to Saigon in 1970, both captured by Vietnam in 1975. The troops landing on the island were all Vietnamese; no disguise was attempted. Western military identifications of Vietnamese invasion forces came from three sources: military analysts in Thailand who rely on electronic equipment left by the U.S. that can monitor radio conversations down to the platoon level; satellite reports; and U.S. Lockheed SR-71 high-flying reconnaissance aircraft. The London Daily Mail, which had correspondents in Vietnam on the eve of the invasion, reported January 8 that "every tactical move in Vietnam's 307th Division was planned in consultation with the senior Soviet military officers traveling with it." Estimates of the number of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact advisers working with Vietnamese range up to 4,000. Western journalists have photographed hundreds of empty ammo cases with Soviet

markings floating in the Gulf of Siam.

The Vietnamese Pretexts

Vietnam has offered a variety of excuses for its invasion. It asserts that violations of human rights in Kampuchea give it the right to support what it describes as an uprising of the Kampuchean people against its government. Through mid-February the Vietnamese ambassador to the United Nations claimed that there were no Vietnamese troops at all in Kampuchea. And finally Hanoi alleges that in fact it was invaded by Kampuchea and that China put the Kampucheans up to it, that Chinese residents in south Vietnam were preparing to rise in rebellion, and that Vietnam's role has been strictly defensive. The reality is plain. Vietnam is the aggressor and has brought on a people's war of resistance.

How Vietnam got itself into this situation is a central question. Although Moscow's courting of Hanoi only began to bear fruit in recent years, tendencies within the Vietnamese party for many years boded ill for its relation with revolutionary forces in Kampuchea and Laos.

Since the mid-60s the Soviet Union had peddled the idea of an Asian Collective Security Pact in southeast Asia, but until two years ago no country except Mongolia treated it seriously. For sometime after the end of the U.S. war in Vietnam the Soviet Union charged that the countries in the region, grouped into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, were a bloc subject to U.S. imperialist domination. Vietnam took this approach too and talked a lot about supporting revolutionary struggles in the area. Initially, however, it dissociated itself from the Soviet proposal for an Asian security pact and followed policies that sometimes did and sometimes didn't correspond with those of the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1977 both the Soviet and the Vietnamese line changed, to the surprise and guarded enthusiasm of Southeast Asian nations. Moscow cut back on its attacks on ASEAN and Hanoi for the first time sought diplomatic and trade relations with its members. It became clear that the Soviet Union and Vietnam were acting in collusion.

In the first months of 1978 Sino-Vietnamese relations broke down. With the expulsion of over 180,000 ethnic Chinese from Vietnam and mounting tension along the border, China halted its aid projects in Vietnam and the latter responded by joining Comecon, the Soviet bloc economic organization, in June 1978 — just at the time that Vietnam's first aggression against Kampuchea was stalemated. The admission of Vietnam into Comecon was not fundamentally to replace Chinese aid; only five of the 16 projects that Hanoi took to Comecon were approved, and Vietnam's trade relations with Soviet bloc countries were not significantly altered. Mainly the Comecon connection opened a pipeline of military supplies to Vietnam that started flowing at full speed in August and has continued since.

Hanoi and ASEAN

Last October Pham Van Dong toured Southeast Asia and assured each host country that an era of friendship and peace was at hand, that Vietnam would be interested in joining ASEAN and that Vietnam would give no aid to the revolutionary struggles in the region. He suggested that ASEAN be revised along the lines of the Soviet collective security proposal. Then, upon his return home, he and Le Duan, secretary of the Vietnamese party, went to Moscow and signed a "treaty of friendship and cooperation" which included a military clause. That treaty and the invasion of Kampuchea two months later halted the progress Vietnam was making in state to state relations with its neighbors, most of whom turned to the view offered earlier by China that Vietnam was playing the role of Cuba.

The invasion of Kampuchea is an ominous portent of things to come. Vietnam has mortgaged its country and its future to the Soviet Union in return for aid in carrying out its aims of dominating Indochina and extending its influence throughout Southeast Asia. The alliance with Moscow gave it a guarantee of Soviet support and involvement if China came to the aid of Kampuchea. Vietnam had to move when it did or

never. Kampuchea's internal situation was improving month by month. It has become a rice exporter. Last fall it began actively to open up diplomatic relations with the rest of the world; its isolation, intensified by U.S. and Vietnamese efforts to portray it as a gross violator of human rights and a pariah among nations, was ending. The Soviet Union took advantage of Vietnam's domestic weaknesses to tie it up with economic and military ribbons and encourage its aspirations for regional hegemony.

Vietnam's 30-year stubborn struggle against foreign intruders and for independence and unification won such prestige that its friends abroad overlooked indications that hegemonistic aims were emerging. Many American friends were prepared to believe Vietnam's protestations of non-alignment and its allegations that huge China was trying to lord it over its smaller neighbor. The invasion of Kampuchea threw facts into the face of illusion.

But Vietnam's historic aspiration for an Indochina federation is not a sufficient explanation for its rampage into Kampuchea. The role of the Soviet Union has to be understood. It took the initiative in the moves that brought the Vietnamese into their camp. In Indochina and elsewhere in the world it is on the march. Kampuchea was for it a preliminary bout which tested the strength of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance against the resolve of the U.S. and China and the people of the world. The aggressive march of the Soviet Union threatens world war and Kampuchea is one of a series of warnings of that threat — others being the assassinations in Yemen, the coup in Afghanistan, the interventions in Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa, the Soviet provocations in Japan's northern islands and against Norway. The meaning of the long list is that the Soviet Union is stepping up its military buildup and its interventions all over the world. What the Soviet Union expects from its alliance with Hanoi and the Kampuchean adventure is very concrete. It hopes that control of Kampuchean rice and fishing areas will make Vietnam stable economically and secure enough to be a real influence throughout Southeast Asia. It hopes to obtain a major naval base at Cam Ranh Bay that would enable it to threaten sea lanes traversed by oilers linking the Middle East and Japan. China is threatened from the south and all of Southeast Asia is thrown into disarray, a situation ripe for Soviet maneuvers.

But Kampuchea has something else to teach us: the lesson of resistance. The people of Kampuchea have rallied to their army and government and are waging a determined struggle for their independence. Their efforts light our way in the face of the danger of aggression and war.

Vietnam's Vietnam

In what must be one of history's greatest ironies, the Vietnamese, whose guerilla forces so recently fought the heavily-armed Americans to a bloody defeat, now find their heavily-armored columns bogged down on the roads of Kampuchea. They evidently failed to learn the very lesson they taught the Americans — that weapons and armor count for little in a war against rural guerillas in an unfriendly environment. A few weeks after their virtually unopposed drive into Phnom Penh the Vietnamese appear to have achieved little more than, literally, a hollow victory.

Far Eastern Economic Review, February 9

Statement of Government of Democratic Kampuchea

January 11, 1979

The Vietnamese enemy aggressors, annexationists, swallows of territory of Kampuchea and exterminators of the Kampuchean nation have mobilized huge forces, including a lot of tanks and heavy artillery pieces as well as planes of all kinds, such as Mig-19, -21, -23, to launch large-scale invasion and aggression against Democratic Kampuchea, causing immense devastations to the Kampuchean people, and temporarily occupied a number of cities and the capital of Phnom Penh. Concerning this situation, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea would like to issue the following statement:

The frenzied invasion by the Vietnamese aggressors supported by their master, the Soviet Union, is the most criminal act aiming at exterminating the nation and the people of Kampuchea. This situation causes indeed temporary difficulties to the Kampuchean people. But the heroic Kampuchean people and the heroic Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea have most courageously opposed the enemy in their capacity as the holders of the glorious banner of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Democratic Kampuchea, the banner of national honour and dignity of the Kampuchean people. They are resolute in fighting the Vietnamese enemy aggressors, annexationists and swallows of territories and their master with blazing hatred and loftiest revolutionary heroism. This struggle is spreading all over the country, its intensity surpassing that at the beginning of our five-year war. Endowed with this heroism, our whole people and whole Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea are determined to unite as one, endure all kinds of difficulties and sufferings, and continue to carry out the people's war in conformity with the statement made by Prime Minister Pol Pot dated January 5, 1979 to resolutely and totally annihilate the Vietnamese enemy aggressors, annexationists and swallows of territories.

At present, the heroic people and Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea are waging a resolute struggle, resolutely refuse to kneel down in front of the Vietnamese enemy. The experiences in the history of struggle of the Kampuchean people themselves as well as those in the history of the peoples the world over have clearly confirmed that any people, victim of aggression and oppression, once they are resolute to struggle, will surely triumph. We have now preserved all our effective strength. All the leaders headed by Secretary of

the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Prime Minister of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea Pol Pot are now leading the Kampuchean people in the sacred territory of Kampuchea to courageously wage the struggle, and all of them are resolutely and categorically determined to hold aloft the banner of the Kampuchean nation, the banner of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, national honour and dignity and the race of Kampuchea and to ensure their perennality, despite all difficulties and sacrifices they have to surmount and endure.

The Government of Democratic Kampuchea with Secretary Pol Pot as Prime Minister, in its capacity as the one responsible for the destiny of the whole nation and people of Kampuchea, would like to call upon:

1. All peace- and justice-loving governments and peoples the world over to support its struggle in all ways and in all forms against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors, annexationists and swallows of territories, condemn them, cut off all aid to them and categorically demand the immediate and total withdrawal of all Vietnamese aggressors from the territory of Democratic Kampuchea.

2. All Kampuchean compatriots, at home and abroad, to unite and to resolutely carry on the struggle, not to become slaves of Viet Nam, not to let their nation be wiped out, not to let the Vietnamese plunder and oppress Kampuchea at will. The Vietnamese enemy have exacerbated and are further exacerbating the contradictions with the whole nation and people of Kampuchea. These contradictions are very deep and will be deeper and deeper with each day. Therefore, the Vietnamese enemy are now in the middle of the volcano crater of national hatred of the whole nation and people of Kampuchea. The latter have clearly seen the nature of these fundamental and sharp life-and-death contradictions.

The entire Kampuchean people will form the broadest national, democratic and patriotic united front and carry the fight against the Vietnamese aggressors through to the end. They will annihilate the aggressors and liberate all the occupied territories, and thus make their contribution to the peace, security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Final victory belongs to the Kampuchean people.

The Kampuchean nation, the Kampuchean people, the Kampuchean race, the Kampuchean tradition and civilization will live for ever!

**DEMOCRATIC
KAMPUCHEA**



**WAGING
PEOPLE'S WAR**

Speech by Prince Norodom Sihanouk delivered to the U.N. Security Council

January 11, 1979

Respected Mr. President of the Security Council,
Respected Mr. Secretary General,
Respected MM. Chiefs of Delegation,
Honorable delegates,

Firstly may I be permitted to thank the members of the Council most sincerely for the genuine sympathy they have extended to the people of Democratic Kampuchea. As a result of that sympathy, today I have been granted the honor of coming here to give them an objective account of the Kampuchean problem, or, rather, the current Kampuchean-Vietnamese problem.

As indeed the whole world knows, my country is the victim of a large-scale act of flagrant aggression by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, a country which had described itself as our "brother," our "faithful companion in arms in the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle," a country which had asserted that it was a "socialist comrade," "belonging, as does Cambodia, to the camp of the non-aligned states."

In the not too distant past or, more precisely, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the principal leaders of the party and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and those of the National Liberation Front and the Provisional Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, in particular Le Duan, First Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam, Va Nguyen Giap, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat, respectively Head of State and Head of Government of the Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, have never ceased to state, to affirm, to reaffirm and even to write to Norodom Sihanouk, then Head of State of Cambodia (Kampuchea), that "now as in the future and to the very end of time" their socialist Vietnam, their revolutionary Vietnam, their anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, anti-war Vietnam held it to be and would continue to hold it to be their sacred duty scrupulously and unswervingly to respect the independence, sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of "fraternal" Kampuchea.

But, on the very morrow of the final victory, in April 1975—a victory over imperialism—and in the wake of the reunification of the two Vietnams, North and South, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam decided, cold-bloodedly, to embark upon a very special "operation," the ultimate

goal of which was nothing less than to swallow up "little" Kampuchea just as a starving boa constrictor would fling itself upon an innocent animal.

Starving—that certainly is and has been an apt description of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. All the newspapers, all television and radio networks in all the countries of the world, with the exception of course of the countries closely linked to the USSR and the USSR itself, have stressed and continue to stress repeatedly that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, ever since its victory at the end of April 1975, has been sinking ever deeper—and with that desperation—into the abyss of economic and financial failure without any possibility of recovery. Its agriculture, which has been very prosperous in the South of the country during the period of French colonialism, is on the verge of collapse; its industrialization marked by disorderly planning and a surprising confusion and its administration, to say the least, is becoming ever more corrupt.

In the circumstances, a Democratic Kampuchea in full economic upswing, possessing vast rice paddies ever more admirably and fully irrigated and innumerable fields where fruit trees, maize, sugar cane, all kinds of vegetables and other crops grow in great profusion, not to mention the wealth that lies in its subsoil and the harmonious expansion of its industrialization, could not but arouse envy in our great neighbor where an age-old tradition—a tradition held in "high esteem" by all the successive Vietnamese regimes so far—was prompting it to undertake the highly "profitable" colonization of Kampuchea.

Your Excellency Mr. President,
Your Excellency Mr. Secretary General,
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

My saying what I have just said about Vietnam does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of that country; there is a necessity which makes it my duty to create a better understanding of the reasons why my fatherland has always had to put up with acts of aggression and other armed attacks from Vietnam, which have been going on since the fifteenth century.

From the fifteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, Vietnam, in spite of the bitter and indomitable resistance of the army and people of Kampuchea, succeeded in swallowing up a good half of Kampuchea.

That half became what is known today as "South Vietnam," it used to be the south of Kampuchea.

Although this is inconceivable in the 1970s, when all the talk is of respect for the United Nations Charter and the just principles of non-alignment, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, a member, moreover, of the United Nations and a full-fledged member of the "family" of the non-aligned countries, is not embarrassed by any scruples. Greatly encouraged by its multivarious alliances, in particular a de facto military alliance with the USSR, one of the two world superpowers, drawing comfort from the total and unconditional support accorded it by the Powers of the Warsaw Pact, with the exception of Romania, respecting the "good" ancestral traditions of shamelessly swallowing up small neighbors whenever the opportunity presented itself, and motivated also, we must point out, by the keen appetite that it had nurtured for many years, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam came to the point of launching an all-out attack with all the power of its "Hitlerite" armed forces for the conquest of Kampuchea.

The irresistible advance of a host of armored tanks and cars, accompanied by a dozen infantry divisions supported by the most modern heavy artillery, preceded and protected by innumerable aircraft of all types, including MIG-21s and some MIG-23s; that advance, a veritable German-style blitzkrieg in nature, strangely reminds us of the onslaught of the Hitlerite armed forces to which so many European countries—France and Poland in particular—fell victim at the beginning of the Second World War.

All this shows how monstrous and dastardly is the current conquest of my poor little country by the big neighbor whose numerical superiority is compounded by a formidable military outfit, equipped to the teeth as it is by one of the two most formidable military powers in the world today.

Respected Mr. President of the Security Council,
Respected Mr. Secretary General,
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I wish now to say something about the so-called "National United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea" and its so-called government.

The government, press and radio of Hanoi themselves have very spontaneously been declaring to the world at large that this Front was created and existed only since the date of December 2, 1978. I repeat, December 2, 1978.

Now the formidable Guderian or Rommel-style "blitzkrieg" which was launched by the so-called Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea was unleashed against us on December 25, 1978. I repeat, December 25, 1978.

Even schoolchildren at the primary level would be unable to believe that in the extremely short space of 22 days this tiny and insignificant so-called Kampuchean Front could recruit, equip, teach, train and lick into shape such an "Olympian" armed force of so many components and furthermore equipped with machines and weapons re-

quiring a perfect mastery of electronics and ballistics, not to mention the "special" skills that can be possessed only by units which have already taken part in large-scale operations.

In the face of the insolent claim on the part of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the effect that the war that is raging in Kampuchea (Cambodia) is only a civil war without any Vietnamese involvement, the Kampuchean people, through me, has the honor of asserting vigorously that this war is purely a war of aggression, annexation, colonization and regional hegemonism unilaterally, arbitrarily and unjustly unleashed by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam against little Kampuchea.

The so-called Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation and its "Government" are, in fact, only a pitiful smokescreen designed to hide from the outside world the criminal and repugnant anti-Kampuchean undertaking of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which shows its contempt of other sovereign countries and people of the world by feeding them such obvious lies that even a child cannot give them any credence.

Those countries which have hastened to accord *de jure* recognition to the "government" of Heng Samrin, the pitiful puppet of the Vietnamese, expose themselves as the intimate accomplices that they are of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in its current attempt to annihilate independent, sovereign, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea.

The states and the mass media which prize justice, freedom and moral and political probity have in recent days made a point of clearly denouncing the deep-dyed deceit of Vietnam and of inviting the whole world to exercise pressure on it to make it give up its criminal enterprise right away, thus making it possible, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter, for Democratic Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people to recover their independence and national territorial integrity.

If by chance there is any problem dividing the Kampuchians, this problem must and should be resolved by Kampuchians alone without any interference from outside countries.

Your Excellency Mr. President,
Your Excellency Mr. Secretary General,
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I should like to present to the Council certain governmental statements from countries that love justice, independence and peace, which show first, that the so-called National United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea and its "government" are only puppets of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; secondly, that Democratic Kampuchea is clearly the victim of a flagrant act of aggression and invasion, the "work" of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; and, thirdly, that the criminal Vietnamese enterprise must be categorically condemned and everything possible done to induce Vietnam to evacuate all its armed and other forces from Kampuchea.

From Mother Jones

April 1979

The Fire at the End of the Tunnel

I.F. STONE

Stone is a journalist and author who lives in Washington, D.C. The newsletter put out by himself and his wife, I. F. Stone's Weekly, was known as one of the earliest sources of information and analysis that challenged U.S. policies in Vietnam.

“I'm against the invasion. It's imperialism. It's what we did to Latin America and what the Soviets did to Eastern Europe, and now the Vietnamese are doing it to Southeast Asia. It's the imposition of government by force by a larger and more powerful neighbor. That is imperialism. The Vietnamese have got themselves a little Vietnam. They are now the America. They have the heavy armor and the planes, and, of course, can sweep in and grab the towns very easily . . . just the way we did in Vietnam. But, once you've got the towns, you don't have the countryside. . . . And I wouldn't be surprised if this is going to last for quite a while.

I was always aware of the fact that the Vietnamese were very imperialistic people, even during the days when I was against the American war. It's only a couple of centuries since they took the Mekong Delta away from the Khmers. This is an old rivalry because Vietnam represents the furthest outpost of Chinese civilization moving south and southwest, and Cambodia represents the furthest outpost of Indian civilization moving into the same area.

I think the Soviets bear part of the responsibility too. You see, the Vietnamese couldn't move into Cambodia without some assurance that they wouldn't be attacked by China. So to prevent that, they signed this new defense treaty with Russia so that the Chinese would be afraid to move troops into Vietnam. And I'm glad the Chinese are keeping out of it so far. I hope they do keep out, because, if not, it's the way major wars are brewed. And I certainly hope America keeps out of it. Southeast Asia is a bag of worms. These people have got to sort it out for themselves.

It isn't going to help the area or the world for us to get involved and make the mess even bigger and bloodier than it was before. We ruined Cambodia. I think part of the terrible difficulties there are the result of what the American intervention did. I don't see what else the Cambodians could do, in a sense, except force everybody to begin to dig in the soil and get a food supply, after all the damage we did. Of course, a lot of people suffered; but, my God, we caused a lot of that suffering, before and after. That's what Nixon and Kissinger did. I don't think it's any better when the Vietnamese came in. Cambodia was no menace to Vietnam. That's clear. Cambodia had no army to speak of; it was not going to invade Vietnam. I don't like the big powers picking on little powers.

I just cannot swallow this invasion. The Vietnamese might have had border skirmishes, but it doesn't excuse them from taking over the whole damn country.”

NOAM CHOMSKY

Chomsky teaches at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was active against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. He is the author, with Edward S. Herman, of the forthcoming book After the Cataclysm: Post-War Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperialist Ideology, the first of a two-volume study (South End Press, Boston).

“A very tragic situation, because I think it's tragic both for Cambodia and for Vietnam. There is a disputed border. The Cambodians feel that historically they sort of got the worst end of it. From their point of view, they were defending themselves against the spreading of Vietnamese power or potential spreading of it.

The Vietnamese do not expect that they will suffer in world opinion very seriously and, in particular, that they will suffer in those segments of world opinion that are possibly sympathetic to them. For example, the European Left and different Left liberal types. These groups have been conducting an enormous and hysterical campaign about the Cambodian regime, a campaign that really was quite unprecedented in scale and, in fact, involves a fantastic overlay of lies on top of the truth. The reality was grisly enough, but it was by no means enough for them. And hysteria is not a strong enough word for it. The Vietnamese assumed that the campaign against the Cambodians had reached such proportions that, while it will be condemned as aggression, it will be tempered by a feeling that it was proper for this regime to be overthrown. I suppose that this was their estimate. All this hysterical condemnation of Cambodia didn't contribute to saving lives. But it did help to create a climate in which the Vietnamese aggression could take place.”

ELIZABETH BECKER

Becker is a reporter for The Washington Post. She returned from Cambodia in December, two days before the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia began.

“We can no longer think of Vietnam as a small and poor country. It is the fifth-largest military power in the world. The Vietnamese inaugurated the Indochina Communist Party, and they were the dominant force in it. They helped the Cambodians, yet they always presumed

they would be the leading voice in Indochina. Cambodia is underpopulated with surplus food, whereas Vietnam is more industrialized and needs food. The Indochina Federation—the organization for economic cooperation on things like dams and food—was one of the things the Vietnamese wanted and the Cambodians were upset about. Vietnam believed

there would be cooperation with Cambodia. Then, in 1976, Cambodia refused to join the Federation. What the Cambodians said to me is that if they did join, they feared their country would turn into another Laos, where there are currently 40,000 Vietnamese troops."

THIRD WORLD UNITY

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14

FEBRUARY 1979

SPECIAL NUMBER ON KAMPUCHEA

World Nations and Leaders Condemn Vietnam

ASEAN : The Foreign Ministers of the five member countries of the Associan of Southeast Asian Nations today (13/1) called strongly for the "immediate and total withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchean territory". The joint statement issued at Bankok after a special meeting of the foreign ministers on January 12-13 said : "The meeting had been held to demonstrate the solidarity and cohensiveness of ASEAN in the face of the current threat to peace and stability in the Southeast Asian region and to cooperate in the maintenance and strengthening of peace and stability in the region. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the statement issued in Jakarta on 9 January 1979 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia acting in his capacity as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing committee, on the escalation of the armed conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea. The ASEAN foreign ministers strongly deplored the armed intervention against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea.

"The ASEAN Foreign Ministers affirmed the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their future by themselves, free from interference or influence from outside powers in the exercise of their right to self-determination. Towards this end, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers call for the immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from Kampuchean territory. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers welcomed the decision of the UN Security Council to consider without delay the situation in Indochina, and strongly urged the council to take the necessary and appropriate measures to restore peace, security and stability in the area."

Bangladesh : 80 political leaders, journalists, lawyers and labour leaders in joint statement on 13/1 said : "We strongly protest against the aggression against Kampuchea by Vietnam with the blessing of the Soviet

Union. Soviet social-imperialism set Vietnamese aggressor troops against Kampuchea. This is a serious challenge and threat to the national independence and state sovereignty of small countries of the Third World. We resolutely support the government and people of Democratic Kampuchea in their struggle against the hegemonism and expansionism of Soviet social-imperialism and its running dog."

Singapore : The ASEAN no longer trusts Vietnam, said Singapore Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam. Reviewing Phan Van Dong's assurance to the ASEAN countries last year that Vietnam had forsworn aggression, he said that in light of Vietnam's attack on Kampuchea, those assurances can no longer be taken at face value. Rajaratnam made the remarks when he addressed an International Affairs Forum at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, on January 19. He added : "Vietnam must now work to restore ASEAN's confidence that Vietnam will not commit any more aggressions. The ASEAN countries have doubts about Vietnam's peaceful intentions."

He said that ASEAN had refrained from naming Vietnam as the aggressor in its communique issued in Bangkok. However, it was clearly understood that Vietnam was the aggressor in the fall of Kampuchea. "Singapore has not considered the recognition of the new regime of Kampuchea. Vietnam must withdraw its troops from Kampuchea before the recognition is considered." He said that it is true the ASEAN countries have their differences, but in a crisis ASEAN is capable of manifesting a solidarity.

The Foreign Minister told newsmen : "Other countries should not take a "detached view" of events or their implications in Kampuchea. If the rest of Southeast Asia is taken over, directly or indirectly, not just the balance of power in this region is upset, but also the world balance...Any enemy must destroy the political solidarity and economic prosperity of a country before the military moves in. This lesson has been learned in Cambodia."

Thailand : Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanan said yesterday (22/1) that Thailand will continue to recognize the Government of Democratic Kampuchea led by Prime Minister Pol Pot. Speaking at a press conference, after inspecting the Thai-Kampuchean border areas, he said : "I am not challenging any country, but I can assure you that our armed forces are ready to protect our sovereignty." He assured that he is keeping a close watch on the borders and warned potential aggressors against underestimating the strength of Thai armed forces. He said that Thailand is capable of checking the threat of any expansionist movement. The Prime Minister said : "Thailand wants Southeast Asia to be a zone of peace." He expressed the hope that the big powers would refrain from interfering in internal affairs of regional states.

Australia : The Australian acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ian Sinclair, said at Canberra his government's decision to suspend its ongoing aid programme to Vietnam and all cultural exchanges with it. He said that the decision was made after the "government has reviewed its relations with Vietnam in the light of Vietnam's military involvement in Kampuchea and its attitude to the refugee question." Earlier this month, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser deplored the Vietnamese invasion against Kampuchea and said that such invasion had created the rise of a conflict which had serious consequences for all those who lived in the region.

Malaysia : The Vietnam-led invasion of Kampuchea is not conducive to peace and stability in Southeast Asia, said Malaysian Foreign Minister Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen in a statement issued yesterday (8/1). The statement says that Malaysia is watching the situation in Kampuchea carefully. "It is Malaysia's fervent hope that no outside power will attempt to justify its interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea", he said.

Australia : Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser deplored the fighting in Kampuchea and said the Vietnamese invasion had created risk of serious intensification of the war into a regional conflict which had

serious consequences for all those who lived in the region. Speaking at Sydney airport yesterday (8/1) upon an overseas trip, Mr. Fraser said : "The very fact that Vietnam has signed an agreement that contains security elements with the Soviet Union tends to introduce the eastern bloc approach to politics in Southeast Asia."

Bangladesh : "We are deeply shocked at the news of large-scale armed attack of Vietnam on Kampuchea", said Haji Mohammed Danesh, President, and Serajul Hossain Khan, General Secretary, of Jatiya Ganomukti Union (National People's Liberation Union), in a joint statement to the press on January 6. The statement said : "We strongly feel that Vietnam has no reason or power to infringe upon independence, sovereignty or internal affairs of revolutionary people of Cambodia. We would, therefore, call upon Vietnam immediately to stop this aggression and withdraw all its troops from Cambodia. We would also call upon the Soviet Union to cease all its hegemonist activities in South and Southeast Asia."

France : A French Foreign Ministry statement on the situation on Kampuchea (8/1) says : France will support the efforts to be made to lead to a solution in conformity with international law and the U.N. Charter and in conformity with the genuine interest of all countries in the region and the total equilibrium of Asia."

The same day, the French Socialist Party also issued a statement demanding "the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchea."

Sweden : Swedish Foreign Minister Hans Blix in a speech recently denouncing the Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea said that foreign intervention in Kampuchea was a threat to the interests of all small countries. He added that the Swedish government has opposed to foreign military intervention in Kampuchea, considering it a violation of the U.N. Charter. He indicated that Sweden supported the convocation of U.N. Security Council meetings to seriously cope with the problems arising from the situation in Kampuchea.

Yugoslavia: Yugoslav President Tito expressed his tremendous worries about the latest developments in Southeast Asia when he received Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Arnaldo Forlani at Island Brioni today (13/1). Tito stressed : "Disputes between non-aligned countries and between other countries should be solved only in light of the principles of the non-aligned movement and the united nations charter and through peaceful channels. Every country must exert its effort to strengthen the process of relaxation in Europe and the world over, preventing the deterioration of the international situation and the dangerous revival of the cold war factors. Because this could produce prolonged and malicious result to the world peace and stability."

"The events in Indochina boil down essentially to an outside invasion of Kampuchea and Yugoslavia oppose resolutely all forms of foreign intervention," declared Milos Minic, Member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and President of the Yugoslav Federal Council for International Relations. Minic made the remarks at a meeting of the Active for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia follows the development of the war between Vietnam and Kampuchea with utmost attention and profound concern", Minic said. "In the difficult situation which has arisen, we consider that the conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea has now turned into a new focus of crisis and great danger to peace and security in the world." With reference to the current UN Security Council debate, Minic said that "Yugoslavia rightly expects the council to take all measures within its power to protect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence and non-alignment of Kampuchea, and all countries to leave it to the people of Kampuchea to deal with its internal question in an independent and sovereign way."

Thailand : The Prime Minister, Kriangsak Chomanan, yesterday (8/1) stated that Thailand was deeply concerned for the independence of Kampuchea. He continued that the United Nations should try to settle the present unrest in Kampuchea and that ASEAN members should show more concern over this incident. Kriangsak said that he had called a meeting of the commanders of the three services, the Secretary General of the National Security Council and the Foreign Minister to discuss the situation in Kampuchea and had given orders for certain steps to be taken. The Prime Minister warned the Vietnamese that they should not cross the Mekong river and threaten our security.

Japan : The Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda pointed out in his report at a Cabinet meeting today (9/1) : "For the sake of peace and stability in Asia, our country will never stand by and see the developments". He said that while coordinating steps with the countries of ASEAN, the Japanese government will adopt a policy of positive approach to seek a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The Foreign Minister met the Press after the Cabinet meeting. On whether the so-called new regime established in Phnom Penh yesterday will be recognized, he said : "No data show that it can be regarded as a regime representing Kampuchea."

Japanese non-government financial institutions and banks have decided not to grant any new loans to Vietnam, even if it requests.

Kuwait : Kuwait declined yesterday (8/1) a Soviet request for support in opposing the convening of a U.N. security council session on Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea. Kuwaiti deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah received Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Nikolayevich Sikachov yesterday upon the latter's request. The Soviet Ambassador asked Kuwait, a member of the U.N. security council, to turn down Kampuchea's demand for a session of the security council on the Vietnamese aggression.

The Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister said in a statement made after the meeting : "We informed the Soviet Ambassador that we are opposed to any aggression against the sovereignty and freedom of a small nation. We hold that every member of the United Nations has the right to call for a security council session as it thinks necessary. We support Kampuchea's demand. She has been subjected to an aggression which needs to be discussed at the security council. Such an aggression implies a threat to the security and territorial integrity of a sovereign state. Our viewpoint is different from that of the Soviet ambassador, judging from his talk about his country's stand on this problem."

United States : U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, accused Vietnam of invading Kampuchea and called for the withdrawal of invading foreign forces from the country, at a press conference at Washington (12/1) : "We have made it very clear that the invasion of Cambodia threatens regional peace and stability, and violates the fundamental principle of the integrity of international boundaries," Vance said. "We have repeatedly stated our support for a stable system of independent states in Southeast Asia ; and we believe that this system includes on independent Cambodia, despite the strength of our concern over the human rights situation in that country. We believe that all countries interested in peace, stability and independence should make clear their opposition to this invasion which has taken place, work towards a withdrawal of the invading foreign forces from the country, and to act to ensure the integrity of all states in the area."

WORLD PRESS ON KAMPUCHEA

Rodong Sinmun (Korea) carried an editorial condemning the Vietnamese aggression on Kampuchea, excerpts of which follows : "The Government of Democratic Kampuchea is an independent lawful government established at the general will of the Kampuchean people. Democratic Kampuchea is a sovereign and independent state recognized by Southeast Asian countries including Vietnam and a great many countries of the world and a full-fledged member of the non-aligned movement. Even according to the announcement of the Vietnamese side, the "national united front for the national salvation of Kampuchea" was formed about a month ago. How can it mobilize in such a short period vast quantities of military equipment including so many planes, tanks and artillery pieces and regular armed forces of more than 10 divisions ? This surpasses the imagination of the ordinary people.

It is not without reason that the world public views the present armed control of Democratic Kampuchea as one by a massive military action of the Vietnamese side. It is intolerable to resort to an open armed action against a legitimate revolutionary power and overthrow it, under whatever pretext it may be committed. The Vietnamese control of Kampuchea by crossing the border through a massive military action is an outright infringement upon the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea and a crude violation of the publicly recognized international law.

This is an open challenge discrediting socialism and endangering peace.

We witness clearly here once again that the ambition for dominating and controlling other countries can be seen in a comparably small country, too. It is clear that if a precedent of one country dominating and controlling another country with strength is overlooked today, some other country will conquer and subjugate still another country tomorrow.

We advise Vietnam to ponder over the matter and immediately withdraw its armed forces from the Kampuchean territory. We hope that the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea will be guaranteed, the Kampuchean people be left to shape their destiny by themselves and an era of genuine peace come to Southeast Asia at an early date.

"Sing Sian Yit Pao" (Thailand) : The Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea was planned by the expansionists behind the scenes. It is not only aimed at conquering Khmer but controlling the whole Southeast Asia.

"Thai Siang Yit Pao" (Thailand) : What will become of Vietnam if it occupies Phnom Penh and does conquer the whole of Kampuchea ? It will definitely find itself estranged from all peace-loving and stability-desiring countries in the world and more deeply isolated. The Kampuchean people will rise and wage a guerrilla war to harass the aggressors. The Vietnamese will be mired down in protracted, futile fighting and finally fold up.

"Indonesia Times" (Indonesia) : Only the ignorant believe Vietnam's assertion that the fighting inside Kampuchea, against the legal government, was started by the so-called "national united front for national salvation".

"Aydinlik" (Turkey) : The Vietnamese people who have considered themselves to be completely liberated have been driven to attack the brotherly Kampuchean people. The rumbling of the Vietnamese tanks indicated that the Vietnamese people have not liberated themselves. If a nation is sent to take part in a war of subjugating others, that nation itself has lost freedom. Brezhnev and his like have not supplied tanks

and fighters for nothing. Any aid from imperialist countries has to be paid. Today the Vietnamese people are paying for it.

The Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea proves that the Soviet revisionist hostility to the revolution has reached frantic proportions! If the intervention of Soviet social-imperialism is not to be impeded everywhere in today's world, there will be no possibilities to lead the revolution to victory. It is necessary to resist the aggressions engineered by Soviet social-imperialism if the revolution is to be carried on and defended. The Turkish people expresses support for the Kampuchean people who are fighting for their fatherland and revolution and against the aggression engineered by the Soviet revisionists. The victory will again be with the Kampuchean people.

Scinteia (Romania): The Romanian paper, said today (10/1): "Romania fully disapproves the support granted to some elements that rose against the leadership in their own country and overthrew by means of military force the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea—a socialist country and member of the United Nations, its legal government and organs that are recognized in the international arena. The amplification and the continuation of this conflict is a heavy blow for the principles of full equality, mutual respect for national independence and sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. No reasons and arguments whatsoever can justify intervention and interference in the affairs of another state.

"Kampuchea has waged hard and prolonged struggles for many years against imperialist domination and for gaining its sacred right to national independence, sovereignty, freedom and independent development. That is precisely why nothing can justify the support given to elements rising against their own government which had borne the responsibility of fighting against imperialism and paved the way for the free and independent development towards socialism. Romania holds that for stability and peace in that region and in the interest of the two peoples, it is necessary to halt military actions as soon as possible, withdraw all military forces from the territory of Kampuchea and let the Kampuchean people ensure the socialist development of their country according to their own will and aspirations.

"The issues between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea should be settled through peaceful negotiation in the spirit of mutual esteem and understanding, full equality, observance of national independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries instead of using force and military conflicts or supporting anti-government elements and their actions."

Vjesnik—(Yugoslavia 20/1): It was proved many times in the history of international relations that if the international community exercises forbearance for the aggression and aggressor and pays no heed to the victim's call for help the consequence will be grave not only for the victim of aggression but also for the whole international community. When Vietnam declared that it had concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and joined the CMEA, one basic question was raised by people: why did it do so? Has Vietnam departed from non-alignment to which it made commitments? Vietnam has by its attitude towards Kampuchea cast aside the fundamental principles of non-alignment, above all the principles of peaceful settlement of conflicts and non-interference in other countries internal affairs.

Vietnam's 30-year stubborn struggle against foreign conquerors and for independence and national unification, which ended triumphantly in 1975, won such prestige among its friends (Yugoslavia included naturally) that they overlooked certain indications as well as the warning of some observers who had been studying Vietnam's policies that an Indochina-wide (if not wider) hegemonism was emerging in this country. It is a wonder that this country, which for many years was a victim of imperialism and aggression, has in just a few years become a hegemonist power bullying small and weak neighbours.

At a time when Vietnam was showing ever more distinct signs of a hegemonist desire for Kampuchea and Laos, it wanted to make the world believe that China was lording it over Vietnam. The world public did pay attention to this contention because—in view of the gap in size and potentials between China and Vietnam plus a lack of sufficient knowledge about the specific conditions of their relationship as well as the difficulty caused by conflicting propaganda—people were liable to believe the bigger country lording it over the smaller one, and not vice versa, to be a fact. Moreover, Vietnam still enjoyed a prestige it had won through 30 years struggle for liberation. Nevertheless, politics is not mathematics in which things must always accord with formal logic. The latest developments in the relations between Vietnam and Kampuchea indicate that what was regarded as an “illogical” prediction has become a reality. Vietnam is quarrelling with a big neighbour, but it is determined to overthrow the Kampuchean regime which oppose its hegemonist design in Indochina. On the contrary, China has not reacted with the same measures and methods; it uses political means in opposing Vietnam’s aggression against Kampuchea.

For a person who consistently and genuinely advocates the policy of non-interference and non-alignment, there is no reason whatsoever for him to defend foreign aggression against a free and independent country. However, Vietnam, the Soviet Union and other countries which have endorsed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea do not think so... If Vietnam had not received support from the Soviet Union in advance, it could not have decided on an open armed interference against Kampuchea... It is proved by history that a clique which has seized power through the bayonets of foreign intervention will find it hard to get rid of the ‘arms’ of interventionists. In its own policy, the clique’s independence cannot go beyond the limit tolerated by the interventionists.

The Call—CP(M-L)US (29/1) : What is behind the Soviet-Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea ? Is it a “proxy war” between the Soviet Union and China, as claimed by some in the U.S. ruling circles? Is it strictly an “internal struggle” as claimed by the Vietnamese and their puppets in Phnom Penh ? In fact, neither of these theories can explain the events which brought more than 100,000 invading troops into the sovereign country of Democratic Kampuchea at the end of December. To really understand the situation, it is necessary to look at Kampuchea in the context of the present world situation in which the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, are contending with one another for hegemony and domination.

Vietnam has now become the “Cuba of Asia” in the sense that it acts as a substitute for direct Soviet involvement. The Soviet Union has insured its own domination over Vietnam by bringing it into the Soviet-controlled CMEA, dispatching thousands of troops and military advisors to Hanoi, and signing a “friendship treaty” with the Vietnamese leaders that amounts to a military alliance. In this way, Vietnam is utilized by Moscow as a “regional hegemonist.” Vietnam’s job is to establish domination over Indochina and Southeast Asia, which in turn fits into the USSR’s overall drive for world hegemony. To this end, the Soviet Union has played on the long-standing chauvinism of the Vietnamese leaders towards the other Asian peoples, supporting the Vietnamese efforts to turn Laos and Kampuchea into colonies within a Vietnamese-controlled “Indochina federation”.

Vanguard—Australia CP(M-L) (25/1) : With the recent events in Kampuchea the fascist, imperialist nature of the Soviet Union and its Vietnamese puppets has been made clear. ...Using the technique of the big lie perfected by Hitler, the Soviet Union spread lies and slander against Democratic Kampuchea in an attempt to isolate the Kampuchean revolution and prepare the way ideologically for its invasion through the Vietnamese puppet army. The Soviet Union plans to use Vietnam to Asia in the same way as it used the Cubans in Africa—turning African against African and Asian against Asian, thereby increasing Soviet hegemony.

Throughout the world resistance to Soviet oppression is increasing. African countries are strengthening their unity against the onslaught by the Kremlin. In their client states of Angola and Ethiopia there is large-scale rebellion. The Eritrean people are carrying out a heroic people's war against the Soviet puppet Mengistu regime. In Asia the countries of ASEAN have become more and more aware of the aggressive role of the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The revolutionary movements of Asia have denounced the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Even the puppet Vietnamese state itself there is resistance. Many former fighters of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam have returned to the jungle to engage in guerilla warfare against the puppet government.

Holiday—Bangladesh (14/1) : Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea shows clearly that how important the "Indochina federation" is in Soviet social-imperialism's fond dreams of aggression throughout the world. It is also significant that the invasion of Democratic Kampuchea took place only weeks after Vietnam had signed a so-called treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union... Today peace and security of the entire Asian-Pacific region are in jeopardy. The peace-loving people of the world should increase their vigilance against the dangers of aggression by the expansionists.

Die Welt the W. German paper, editorially commented on 10/1 : "While the pro-Soviet Vietnamese are occupying Kampuchea with the help of arms supplied by the Soviet Union, Brezhnev is warning Western countries against selling arms to China. This is a Soviet intervention in the relations among other nations... It is not the Chinese army that is stationed in Germany and occupies a major part of Europe; nor is it Chinese nuclear missiles that are directed against 700 targets in Western Europe. It is not the Chinese Party leadership that wrote a letter to us, teaching us whom we should or should not maintain friendly relations with."

The Washington Post

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Major Khmer Rouge Attacks On Vietnamese Yield Success

By Richard Naticas

Special to The Washington Post

BANGKOK, Jan. 30—Forces loyal to the ousted Khmer Rouge premier Pol Pot have regrouped with unexpected speed to launch large scale attacks with some success against the Vietnamese divisions in Cambodia.

Although analysts here do not entirely discount claims over Khmer Rouge radio today that Pol Pot's forces raided within 12 miles of the capital, the small scale fighting around Bek Chan—renowned among the last ditch defense attempts of the U.S.-supported Lon Nol army in 1975—is thought as yet to pose no serious threat to Vietnamese control of

Phnom Penh.

The fighting around the provincial capitals of the south and west, however, is considered much more serious. The Khmer Rouge radio—thought to be broadcasting from Chir's Yunnan Province—yesterday claimed the recapture of the whole southwest, with the exception of Kampot where Vietnamese troops remain bottled up.

Although analysts consider these reports exaggerated, independent information indicates that the Khmer Rouge have managed to restore the integrity of their army with at least two military headquarters communicating with tactical units and coordinating effective operations against the Vietnamese.

One military source estimates that

four-fifths of the Cambodian army—or 60,000 men—have remained intact and regrouped in large units, mostly brigades of roughly a thousand men each, responding to central commands.

Casualty figures for both sides are vague. But in some engagements the Vietnamese are known to have lost hundreds of men.

The pro-Hanoi Cambodian government of Heng Samrin in Phnom Penh claimed 10 days ago that its forces "totally control all the country's territory" and denounced "distorted foreign press reports" of the Khmer Rouge guerrilla advances as the "propaganda trick of a number of big countries . . . who support Pol Pot in order to expand the war." The reference to "big countries" is considered by observers here to mean China and the United States.

But if the reports on which diplomats here base their views are accurate, the 14 full Vietnamese divisions now estimated to be in Cambodia appear to be more thinly spread

and bogged down than first implied by the lightning victory of their 14-day assault to capture Phnom Penh.

None of this threatens the initial gains from Vietnam's swift and deep thrust to capture Cambodia's key towns and communications. But as the Khmer Rouge army revives more intact than most assumed, the cost to Vietnam of holding the captured ground will increase.

"It now looks like a far longer, bloodier and more expensive operation than Hanoi probably counted on," one observer said. Hanoi may have little choice but to pay an unexpected high price.

The assault on Takeo, the provincial capital 50 miles south of Phnom Penh, is the first major operation by the Khmer Rouge since they evacuated Phnom Penh three weeks ago. Apparently catching thin Vietnamese security forces in the town unprepared, the Khmer Rouge recaptured Takeo Jan. 23 with two brigades of infantry reinforced by artillery and armor.

The Vietnamese managed to recover Takeo only recently after several days of intensive fighting and heavy air attacks which destroyed seven Khmer Rouge tanks and several heavy vehicles, analysts here say.

The surrounding countryside continues to be heavily contested.

Similar operations were simultaneously launched against the coastal towns of Kampot and Ream, which the Khmer Rouge have managed to capture and hold until now. Although the Vietnamese have regained the strategic deep-water port of Kampong Som after losing it twice, the Khmer Rouge have cut Highway 4 running between the port and capital in at least three places.

Closer to Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge have launched small night raids penetrating into the market place at Kampong Speu, 45 miles southwest of Phnom Penh. One intelligence report claims the Khmer Rouge slipped into Pochentong airport and managed to steal significant amounts of gasoline.

Reliable reports sketch a similar picture in western Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge, in large-scale engagements, have pinned down the Vietnamese in Kampong Chhnang, Pursat and Battambang — three provincial capitals northwest of Phnom Penh along Highway 5. A Vietnamese armored column heading southwest toward the Thai border from Battambang has been stalled for over a week

by a heavy artillery defense line, as yet unbroken.

Another report indicates that the Khmer Rouge massed in enough strength last week to surround a Vietnamese regiment and pin it down somewhere in the south west.

By evacuating the main towns and dissolving into small units the Khmer Rouge appear to have "jerked the anvil out from under the Vietnamese hammer blow," in the words of one veteran Indochina analyst.

Three weeks after the capture of Phnom Penh the Vietnamese remain heavily road-bound. Even their control over the roads remains tenuous and vulnerable to daylight attack.

The garrisons in the west are particularly exposed at the end of ever-stretched supply lines. The Khmer Rouge have blown bridges and trekked roads behind the Vietnamese advance.

Recently rice has had to be airlifted into Battambang and Siem Reap — the traditional granaries of Cambodia — a good indication that the Vietnamese either cannot move into the countryside or find no food when they arrive.

So far the Khmer Rouge appear to have denied their enemies the stocks of fuel and food the Vietnamese appear to have been counting on.

The Washington Post

March 3, 1979

Vietnam Bogged Down In Cambodian Quagmire

By Lee Lescaze

Washington Post Staff Writer

BANGKOK, March 2—Almost two months after Vietnamese troops conquered Phnom Penh, Cambodia appears to have become a quagmire for its new rulers.

Hanoi finds itself in the position of its one-time adversaries, South Vietnam and the Lon Nol government, unable to win active support from much of the population and struggling to build an administration with dubious success in the face of guerrilla opposition.

Much like the United States when it supported the South Vietnamese and

Cambodian governments, Hanoi has trouble resupplying its forces because of destroyed bridges and mined roads that halt its now-mechanized army. In several towns, its forces are bottled up by the guerrillas, sources say.

In a larger context, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and stationing of about 100,000 Hanoi troops to back a client regime in Phnom Penh have provoked a Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Peking has tried to link the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia to the eventual pullout of Chinese troops from Vietnam.

But for Cambodia, the Vietnamese conquest has brought a new step toward the destruction of a people al-

ready torn by five years of war. It ended in 1975 only to be succeeded by the mass murders and population transfers of the war's victors and today's guerrillas, the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot.

In western Cambodia, where Vietnam's supply lines are longest and its control tenuous to nonexistent, executions enforcing Pol Pot's control-by-terror tactics have resumed in the wake of Vietnam's troops, according to refugees who have fled to Thailand.

Pol Pot's troops and cadres ran to the jungles ahead of the Vietnamese advance, refugees say, but they told villagers they would return and in many places which they have reoccupied they have brought vengeance on those they accused of having been contaminated by the Vietnamese.

Men selected by the Vietnamese or in Vietnamese-sponsored elections to be village officials often have found themselves unprotected days or weeks

later when the Vietnamese left and Pol Pot's men returned.

Echoes of the earlier Indochina war are abundant.

Village chiefs are murdered; marketplaces in supposedly Vietnamese-controlled areas are attacked; senior communist officials apparently don't travel around the countryside; villages have been taken, lost and retaken, and there are reports that some areas, particularly western Battambang Province, are being resupplied with food by air.

In some western districts, Vietnamese troops were conducting what the U.S. military once called search and destroy sweeps looking for Pol Pot units during January, but now they appear to keep to the towns, analysts say.

"In the west, it's like the last years of the Lon Nol government. In the east, the Vietnamese have somewhat more control—it's like South Vietnam," one well-informed source said, drawing a parallel to former American-supported regimes.

No central government apparatus seems to be functioning under the regime of Heng Samrin, who was named Cambodia's leader after the Vietnamese invasion. Even the regime's own radio station can report no large organizing meetings or rallies of support.

It announced that political classes had begun in Phnom Penh evidently aimed at building up a new cadre of administrators. The radio said 107 people attended.

Three of the Vietnamese-installed regime's ministers held a meeting with medical personnel to plan health services, the radio said. They convened three doctors, one midwife and one medical student, according to the official report.

"If things had gone well, there would be photographs of crowds with flags and banners of welcome," one source said. "The absence isn't due to a lack of photographers."

It's also not due to the people's love for the brutal Pol Pot government,

but rather to their fear, analysts say.

If the 100,000 to 150,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia could provide security, there are signs that they would be welcomed by a part of the population despite traditional Khmer-Vietnamese antagonism.

When Vietnamese entered western Cambodian villages, typically in units of 100 to 300 men with several tanks and armored personnel carriers, according to refugees, they handed out cooking pots to allow people to eat in family groups if they chose instead of communally as the Khmer Rouge require.

The people were told they could rebuild their monasteries, practice Buddhism and traditional customs, marry as they pleased and that eventually they would have money again. Religion and money were abolished by the Khmer Rouge and forced marriage reportedly was common.

The changes were welcome, but the villagers noticed that only one or two Khmer speakers accompanied each Vietnamese unit and those often spoke the language badly or with an accent, raising the possibility they were ethnic Khmer from Vietnam.

Many feared Pol Pot's men would keep their promise and return.

Rang Phot, 26, told an interviewer in a refugee camp that she was jailed in 1977 for refusing to marry as ordered. She escaped from prison at Siem Reap when her guards fled the Vietnamese.

When she made her way to her village, she learned that the Pol Pot forces had warned they would return and kill anyone who had helped the Vietnamese.

She, like hundreds of other Khmer who have crossed into Thailand recently, chose not to take her chances on receiving protection from the Vietnamese.

Unlike Rang Phot, most had never been jailed. Non Loc, 76, for example, said he was asked by Pol Pot soldiers when they returned to his village to

help persuade other villagers to come out of hiding and rejoin the commune. A big meeting was scheduled, he said.

He was frightened to be singled out and fearful of what would happen at the meeting. So he fled.

No one knows how much of Pol Pot's army survived the Vietnamese invasion. It took heavy casualties when it stood and fought near the eastern border last year. It had an estimated 80,000 members at its peak and informed guesses are that about 30,000 are left to fight the guerrilla war.

They have no chance of driving the better-armed, larger Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, but as one source put it: "Vietnam will have to bleed for a long time."

Even then Vietnam may never succeed in its effort to pacify Cambodia, although the French and American experience of Vietnamese persistence cautions against any prediction that they might quickly abandon their effort.

Gen. Van Tien Dung, who commanded the offensive that conquered Saigon in 1975, is believed to have led the invasion of Cambodia. He has written that taking Saigon was only the most extreme of several contingencies when the 1975 offensive was launched. Only when the speed and extent of South Vietnam's military collapse became evident did Saigon become the goal.

In Cambodia, once the Vietnamese army broke through near the Vietnam border, Pol Pot's forces seemed to disintegrate. Vietnamese troops raced through the country on main roads and took Phnom Penh in four days.

However, Pol Pot's troops were prepared. They did not fall back on cities—which were largely emptied and never crucial to Pol Pot—nor did their discipline fail.

As early as last summer, Pol Pot's defense minister spoke of fighting a guerrilla war. Food, arms and other supplies apparently were stockpiled in hiding places.

1988 FEB 12